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Abstract 
We increasingly rely on forms of privatisation to provide networked 
infrastructures critical to the functioning of our communities yet some of those 
infrastructures fail to meet community expectations and their contractual 
relationships are characterised by disputation and the dominant behaviour of the 
private company is self-interest.  Reconfiguration of the contractual relationships 
may achieve stewardship of the infrastructure.  Many forms of privatisation rely on 
the Agency Theory perspective of organisations and individuals as motivated solely 
by self-interest. Yet it is highly likely that in the modern organisation-as-agent 
context Agency Theory assumptions are no longer relevant and are contributing to 
contractual relationships which do not deliver stewardship. Stewardship Theory 
offers the possibility of informing the configuration of contractual relationships 
which minimise self-interest and achieve stewardship. 
However, this line of enquiry is limited by the underdeveloped state of 
Stewardship Theory (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez 2012; Van Slyke 2007) which 
leaves unanswered several key questions. A full understanding of what constitutes 
stewardship behaviour of an organisation, the importance of sense of responsibility 
on the part of the steward to stewardship being achieved, and the capability of typical 
forms of privatisation to steward critical infrastructures has not been provided in the 
literature to date. To develop better understanding of these key issues this thesis 
‘unpacked’ case studies drawn from the Australian urban water sector as examples of 
privatisation. 
The research produced a number of findings.  First, it provided empirical 
evidence that the alliance, joint venture and Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) 
concession forms of privatisation achieved stewardship of the infrastructure.  
Second, Agency Theory was expanded as a result of findings in relation to how the 
assumptions as to goal divergence, information asymmetry, the agent being risk 
averse and agency loss function in the context of modern inter-organisational 
principal–steward relationships.  Third, the essential Stewardship Theory tenet of the 
steward acting in the interests of the principal (Davis et al., 1997) was developed by 
a detailed explication of component behaviours and by defining the behaviour 
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reasonably expected of an organisation as steward.  However, the evidence was that 
the agents in the contractual relationships configured in accordance with the Agency 
Theory model prescribed by Eisenhardt (1989) displayed the stewardship-like 
behaviour of acting in the interests of the principal.  In addition those contractual 
relationships configured in accordance with Agency Theory were found to support 
and promote the Stewardship Theory pro-stewardship attribute sense of 
responsibility to the principal, thereby expanding both Agency Theory and 
Stewardship Theory.  Finally, this thesis identified a significant body of actions and 
factors which, together with their practical application in these developments of the 
theory and literature, will assist practitioners to achieve better stewardship of critical 
infrastructures. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Governments increasingly rely on the private sector to construct, operate, 
maintain and own public infrastructure.  In Australia, some of these privatisations 
have been successful whilst others have not.  In The Age it was reported that the 
privately operated, government-owned Melbourne metropolitan railway system was 
failing to run scheduled services (PPPs: plans, PR, procrastination, The Age, 2009, 
January 15, p. 10).  In May 2010 it was revealed that the new operator was being 
paid $180m more than the previous operator and was running more late trains than 
that previous operator (Lucas, 2010, May 5).  In March 2012 in an Orwellian 
rewriting of timetables Metro trains announced “journey times have been revised to 
reflect actual journey times … this will significantly reduce the instance of late 
running trains …” (Carey, 2012a, March 7).  Notwithstanding, under the banner 
Dozens of trains diverted each day, The Age reported that in May 2012 only 90.7% 
of trains ran on schedule (Carey, 2012b, June 8) resulting in continuing 
embarrassment for the Victorian Government. 
In 1999 the State of Victoria leased the non-metropolitan intrastate rail network 
to a private company for a total of $160.1m.  The lease for a term of 45 years did not 
require the lessee to maintain the network other than for the last five years of the 
lease.  There was minimum maintenance on freight lines and some other lines were 
allowed to fall out of service.  The government received severe criticism in respect of 
the negative impact on the movement of grain to port and its inability to run its fast-
rail passenger trains at the intended speed.  The inadequate maintenance of the 
privatised rail system led to ridicule, for example The Age newspaper under the 
banner Slow trains to rule on regional rail observed that there would be a 3.5 minute 
improvement in the 62 minute journey between Geelong and Melbourne from the 
“bungled rail project” which was alleged to cost “$750 million compared to initial 
estimates of $80 million” (Gray, 2004, December 24).  In 2007, to achieve adequate 
maintenance and foster the use of the rail system by the broader freight industry the 
government bought back the lease for an announced price of $138m. In June 2009, 
the Auditor-General found that the full cost of the buy-back was likely to be $214m.  
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The departments involved ignored advice from external consultants to obtain a 
formal and unrestricted business evaluation despite there being clear indications that 
the market value was below the book value (Victorian Auditor-General’s Office 
[VAGO], 2009) and thus below the state’s acquisition cost. 
The South Australian Government in September 2009 lodged a claim in the 
South Australian Supreme Court against United Water, its contractor for the City of 
Adelaide’s water services, alleging that the contractor had overcharged “tens of 
millions of dollars” for services (Owen & Lower, 2009, September 1).  United Water 
filed a counter claim.  In December 2009 the Supreme Court chastised the Treasurer 
for public statements which were incorrect (Lower, 2009, September 22, December 
16), severely embarrassing the government.  The contract reached its end date and a 
public tender resulted in the work being awarded to another party.  The dispute was 
ultimately settled in September 2012, when United Water made a payment of $6.1m 
to the South Australian Government on the basis of “no admission of liability” 
(Australian Broadcasting Commission [ABC], 2012, September 14).   
All these infrastructures were previously owned and operated by government.  
The public expects that government continue to steward each critical infrastructure; 
that is, to operate it well now, and to meet future needs.  It seems these troubled 
privatisations are sending a message to governments that as stewards for critical 
infrastructure they must ensure that the agents they appoint by way of privatisations 
also act as stewards for the infrastructure. 
Privatisation as a pillar of New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1995; 
Kettle, 1997) had been seen as a masterstroke, recruiting private capital to resolve the 
widespread public funding shortfall, achieving efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy, and transferring risk from the state to the private sector (Hodge & Greve, 
2007; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004).  For some privatisations the commercial risks have 
been well managed but political and governance risks appear to have increased 
(Hodge & Greve, 2007), together with a corresponding increase in the average cost 
of service provision (Quiggin, 2005).  Funnell, Jupe and Andrew (2009) concluded 
that “… ultimate responsibility for providing high-quality essential services will 
always remain with government.  The conclusive, irrevocable transfer of operational 
and financial risk to the private sector for many services…is a fictitious 
impossibility” (p.10).  Privatisation has achieved many economic and efficiency 
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objectives but in some arenas has failed to meet social expectations and has proven 
to not be fully transferable across sectors.  At the extreme, privatisation of networked 
infrastructure creates ‘splintering urbanism’ (Graham & Marvin, 2001) undermining 
universal access to basic services such as water and providing premium infrastructure 
to the few. 
The Australian public has become accustomed to government being the 
provider and steward of infrastructure that is critical to the functioning of the 
community since the first colonial settlements (Aitkin & Jinks, 1982; Connell, 1977).  
This reliance upon governments to provide critical infrastructure continued until the 
current wave of privatisations which commenced in the 1980s.  Not surprisingly, 
despite government divesting itself of many roles which it traditionally performed, 
citizens continue to hold governments accountable for critical infrastructure in the 
same way they require government to ensure a satisfactory outcome from privatised 
institutions.  For example, Boston, McLeay, Roberts, and Levine (1996), 
commenting on privatised New Zealand hospitals, noted that the public continued to 
align their expectations with government rather than the private sector providers 
which had been contracted to deliver the hospital services.  Governments are at 
political risk as communities hold them accountable for the infrastructure meeting 
the values held by the public, for example efficiency and environmental quality.  Any 
suggestion that NPM initiatives (including privatisation) can radically depoliticise 
public administration disregards evidence that the public often continues to see the 
political authority as responsible (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004).  In short, despite 
government believing that risks associated with the privatised infrastructure have 
been passed over to the private sector, the public generally continues to hold 
government accountable for critical public infrastructure.  In addition, there will be 
some privatisations where the private party has not acted in the interests of the 
government or the public and for those the government will be held accountable by 
the public.  The problem then is how to configure the contractual relationship to 
replace any motivation of self-interest on the part of the private company with 
motivation to act in the interest of the government, ultimately achieving stewardship 
of the infrastructures and benefiting both the public and the government. 
The level of stewardship currently achieved may be restricted by the current 
forms of contractual relationships in place for privatised public infrastructures.  
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These relationships reflect the ideology in vogue when they were formed and the 
consequent limitations of their principal–agent relationships based on Agency 
Theory.  Agency Theory initially focused on contractual relationships between 
buyers and sellers (Waterman & Meier, 1998) to address the problem of parties in the 
agency relationship having conflicting goals and differing attitudes to risk (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Agency Theory took the perspective that the agent cannot be 
trusted and prescribed control by managers, or in the case of managers, by a board 
(Muth & Donaldson, 1998).  Many of the current forms of contractual relationships 
for privatised infrastructure reflect the largely economic rationalist NPM reforms of 
the 1980s and 1990s.  The reforms were introduced to overcome growing fiscal 
concerns and to satisfy the prevailing ideology that the market was best suited to act 
in the interests of the public, with the state being relegated to the role of provider of 
last resort (Funnell et al., 2009, pp. 21-27).  The reforms within the public sector can 
best be described as “managerial innovation” (Argy, 2001, p. 66) where public sector 
managers were given a set of commercial objectives and the flexibility to use 
whatever management techniques they chose to achieve those objectives.  Whilst 
NPM reforms sought to bring efficiency, effectiveness and economy to service 
provision their focus on the self-interest of the individual organisation (Denhardt & 
Denhardt, 2007) has led to rent-seeking and opportunism on the part of some private 
infrastructure operators, resulting in public values such as affordability and quality of 
services not being satisfied.  The practice of establishing principal–agent 
relationships in accordance with the normative assumptions of an agent as having 
goal conflict with the principal and being intent upon acting opportunistically 
(Waterman & Meier, 1998) has led to the infrastructure governance landscape being 
characterised by traditional contracts which are incomplete and adversarial (Walker 
& Hampson, 2003; Rahman & Kumaraswamy, 2004; Keast, Waterhouse, Brown, & 
Mandell, 2005).  Agency Theory has been recognised as inflexible and narrowly 
focused on control of the agent, ignoring possible collective and pro-organisational 
behaviours of agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Agency Theory assumptions such 
as goal divergence and information asymmetry, the risk appetite of the parties and 
the concept of agency loss (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; Eisenhardt, 
1989) are highly likely to be incorrect, especially in the context of privatised critical 
infrastructures.  If such incorrect assumptions exist within the contractual 
relationship for privatised infrastructure services then the contractual expectations 
 Chapter 1: Safeguarding our future 5 
and any expectation that the agent will protect and advance the interests of the 
principal will be unnecessarily limited This limited perspective would result in there 
not being stewardship of the infrastructure i.e. the communications network or water 
system not being operated to the appropriate standard and not being maintained to 
meet evolving community needs. 
To cope with the experience of opportunistic behaviour the ‘managerial 
innovation’ thread of reforms within NPM (Argy, 2001) has engendered extensive 
innovation.  The traditional contract has been replaced by relational contracts such as 
the Public-Private Partnership (PPP), or with innovative contractual arrangements 
such as Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) and Build-Own-Operate (BOO) where 
the private sector alone provides and operates the infrastructure.  In these contractual 
forms stronger alignment of financial and human resources of all parties with goals 
stipulated in terms of outcomes is utilised to limit the inherent opportunism.  
Authentic dialogue and inter-sector collaboration is introduced to leverage private 
capital investment (Quiggin, 2005) and to provide government access to scarce 
market sector expertise (Hodge & Greve, 2007).  Beyond those infrastructure 
construction initiatives, collaboration is widely employed as a mechanism linking 
within and across organisations and sectors, underpinning what has been 
characterised as ‘boundaryless’ or ‘network’ or ‘hybrid’ arrangements (Grimshaw, 
Vincent & Willmott, 2002; Keast, Mandell, & Brown, 2006).  These new, more 
horizontal, governance arrangements provide increased opportunities for coordinated 
service delivery, innovation and reduced costs (Klijn, Edelenbos, & Steijn, 2008; 
Koppenjan, 2005; Wettenhall, 2008).  The emphasis on collaboration and the 
collective interest challenges the immutability of the Agency Theory 
conceptualisation of the contractual relationship being in a continual state of tension, 
fuelled by self-interest and the relentless divergence of goals. 
This thesis explores whether  this model of motivation by self-interest can be 
reconfigured by the application of a theory which builds on Agency Theory and 
which provides a perspective as to how a better stewardship outcome can be 
achieved.  Dissatisfaction with the inflexibility and narrow focus of Agency Theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) led to the progressive development of Stewardship 
Theory around the framework offered by Agency Theory.  Stewardship Theory 
emphasises a range of factors that are argued to result in the steward having a sense 
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of responsibility to the principal, and acting in the interests of the principal even 
where the interests of the steward and principal are not fully aligned (Davis et al., 
1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Van Slyke, 2007).  In that way the Agency Theory 
perspective of the agent being motivated by self-interest is squarely overlayed or 
replaced by the perspective of the agent/steward being strongly motivated to act in 
the interests of the principal.  This perspective that the agent will act in the interests 
of the principal can be applied to the configuration of the principal–agent 
relationship by a principal who seeks to achieve stewardship.  The factors — trust 
and personal power, autonomy, shared culture and norms, and responsibility — are 
collectively referred to throughout this thesis as ‘pro-stewardship’ factors.  This link 
between the emphasis upon pro-stewardship factors and a better stewardship 
outcome is illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual model: Pro-stewardship factors and stewardship 
outcome 
 
As indicated in Figure 1.1 the central, key assumption is that if government 
wants to minimise its political risk and satisfy the values held by the community then 
it must set the objectives of the critical infrastructure in terms of those public values.  
In that way satisfaction of the public values attaching to an infrastructure (e.g. quality 
of services and accessibility, which are the goals of the government) constitutes the 
achievement of stewardship.  Stewardship Theory contends that if the pro-
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stewardship factors (e.g. trust or responsibility) are designed into the relationship 
between the principal and agent then stewardship will be achieved.  The concept in 
Figure 1.1 contrasts with the present situation where many critical infrastructures are 
operated to pursue only economic objectives and where the relationship is 
characterised by control, distrust and goal divergence. 
The research to date as to the scope and impact of pro-stewardship factors is 
underdeveloped. The most recent significant works in this area are the milestone 
achieved by Van Slyke (2007) in the assembly of all available Stewardship Theory 
literature and the model of structural and psychological factors which are the 
antecedents of stewardship formed by Hernandez (2012) which identified several of 
the pro-stewardship factors.  The pro-stewardship factors have not been the focus of 
the literature to date, resulting in the meaning of the factors and the importance of 
each factor to the achievement of stewardship being very unclear.  To further 
investigate the importance of the factors this thesis then had recourse to the broader 
body of literature such as Contract Law, Stakeholder Theory, Organisational Theory, 
and Organisational Culture.  That larger body of   literature assisted in better defining 
each factor, but the impact of each factor on the achievement of stewardship still 
remains unclear in the following ways: 
 the possible likely impact of the individual factor upon an agent acting as a 
steward varied widely; 
 several factors were the antecedents of other factors but not the sole cause 
of the other factors suggesting that one factor may be preeminent or a 
higher-order factor; 
 ‘sense of responsibility’ on the part of the agent/steward emerged as a 
higher-order factor but its precise impact on stewardship remained unclear; 
 it is possible that sense of responsibility is essential to stewardship; and 
 sense of responsibility offers the possibility of being the attribute which 
distinguishes an agent from a steward. 
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Understanding the impact of sense of responsibility may amount to the 
identification of the attribute which, if possessed by an agent or steward, would be 
highly likely to lead to stewardship being achieved.  If such a key indicator of the 
likelihood of stewardship was available then those seeking to achieve stewardship 
through others could adopt the attribute as a mandatory criteria for selection of 
individuals or organisations. 
Put simply, this thesis contends that there is a strong possibility that the 
inadequate performance of some privatised critical infrastructures can be improved 
by the   application of Stewardship Theory prescriptions.  If those prescriptions were 
applied in the configuration of the contractual relationship between government as 
principal and private companies as agents then it is highly likely that stewardship of 
the infrastructures will be achieved.  Key to the confirmation of this contention is 
firstly testing the core Stewardship Theory tenet that a steward will act in the 
interests of the principal, even where the interests of the steward and principal are not 
aligned.  If that tenet is confirmed, then testing can proceed to explore the link 
between sense of responsibility and the achievement of stewardship. 
The following areas within the literature require further exploration and 
development of theory: 
 the inflexibility and narrow focus of Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976); 
 the likely out-dated Agency Theory assumptions of goal divergence, 
information asymmetry favouring the agent, that the agent is risk-averse, 
and agency loss, which have not been addressed since the work of Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson (1997), Donaldson (1990) and Eisenhardt 
(1989); 
 the operation of stewardship behaviour at the inter-organisational level, 
which other than the work of Van Slyke (2007) has not been explored; 
 private, for-profit organisations behaving as would a steward; 
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 the importance of sense of responsibility to stewardship being achieved 
which, notwithstanding the work of Davis et al., (1997), Dicke (2002) and 
Hernandez (2012), is underdeveloped; and 
 the actions which maximise sense of responsibility of the organisation as 
steward in the literature (Hernandez, 2012) have focused on developing 
the commitment of the individual. 
Infrastructure as an economic driver and social requirement is highly 
important.  In Australia across all levels of government there are built environment 
assets with a replacement value of $371b and an annual maintenance expenditure of 
$18b (AAMCoG, 2008, p.1).  If research could address and resolve the 
underdeveloped aspects of Stewardship Theory then it is highly possible that forms 
of contractual relationships which apply Stewardship Theory can be constructed to 
achieve better outcomes from this infrastructure.  To achieve clarification of 
Stewardship Theory tenets, to understand the possible operation of limitations 
inherent in Agency Theory-based relationships and to gain understanding of the 
forms of contractual relationships which do achieve stewardship of privatised 
infrastructure services, evidence will be gathered through case studies.  So that the 
findings from that evidence be as transferable as possible it is highly desirable that 
the case studies have the following characteristics: substantial privatisation of the 
infrastructures, long-term relationships to increase the likelihood of sufficient 
secondary data and experience of one party with the other, no significant variable as 
to the specifications of the infrastructures, and commonality between case studies as 
to the prevailing public values. 
The urban water services sector (drinking water and sewerage) presents as a 
suitable candidate industry from which to draw case studies.  The sector is subject to 
a range of similar forms of privatisation (Rees, 1998) and contracts are typically 
long-term (providing long-term relationships rich in historical data for longitudinal 
comparisons).  In addition, the sector comprises similar infrastructure and its outputs 
have quality standards which are highly specific, measurable and published publicly 
(Funnell et al., 2009; Rees, 1998).  Importantly, reticulation of drinking water and 
removal of waste water is fundamental to the functioning of urban societies 
anywhere (Graham & Marvin, 2001), suggesting a high probability of consistency of 
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public values across case studies.  The relative constancy and mix of these variables 
will assist in maximising the validity of the results. 
The role of government in the supply of water services and the prospect of 
government disengaging from water services remains controversial.  Prasad (2006), 
when reviewing the results of private sector participation in water services, found 
that across countries there is general consensus among policy-makers and experts 
that governments should disengage from utilities such as telecommunications and 
electricity, yet water is seen as unavoidably social in nature.  Prasad (2006) contends 
that water “evokes political emotions like no other issue” (p. 669).  However, 
governments have achieved no respite from the pressures which have led to the 
privatisation of their other services leaving government-operated water services 
increasingly open to privatisation.  For those reasons research into privatised water 
services is likely to be highly valued by scholars, government and industry.  These 
water services are depicted diagrammatically in Figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.2 Overview of the provision of water services 
 
Source: Schouten Schwartz (2005, p. 4). 
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The scope of the empirical research in this thesis does not extend to water for 
agricultural users, but rather concentrates on the urban and rural water services as 
depicted by the shadowed part of the diagram, applying to industry, commercial, 
public sector and domestic users. 
Put simply, Stewardship Theory promises that if relationships between 
principal and agent were configured in accordance with Stewardship Theory then 
better stewardship of critical infrastructures would be achieved. Such promises have 
not been proven. Utilising case studies drawn from the urban water sector this thesis 
sought to answer the following questions: 
RQ 1: To what extent will a steward act in the interests of the principal? 
RQ 2: How important is it that the steward feels a sense of responsibility to 
the principal for the steward to act in the interests of the principal? 
RQ 3: What actions are available to the principal to increase the steward’s 
sense of responsibility and achieve stewardship of critical 
infrastructures? 
This thesis is structured with the objective of understanding whether aspects of 
Agency Theory can be updated and whether Stewardship Theory can assist in 
developing a better way to configure the relationships between government (the 
principal) and private entities (agents or stewards) which operate privatised critical 
infrastructures.  The next chapter, Literature Review, presents the concepts of 
privatisation, stewardship expectations and the stewardship of public values, and 
then explores the limitations of Agency Theory and the capacity of Stewardship 
Theory to address those limitations. 
The third chapter, Literature — Infrastructure Privatisation, examines the key 
typical forms of privatised contractual relationships and then explores the suitability 
of urban water systems of Australia as case studies.  The fourth chapter, Research 
Approach, outlines and justifies the research approach and data collection methods 
that were applied.  Case study data are assembled by firstly building a strong 
foundation of secondary data drawn from predominantly public sources and then 
supplementing this with data drawn from interviews with key stakeholders.  The fifth 
chapter, Analysis, examines the content of the data collection.  The sixth chapter, 
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Discussion, discusses the significance of the findings and then develops conclusions.  
The seventh, and final, chapter, Conclusions, brings together the thesis’ original 
contribution to knowledge and develops the implications for further research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis attempts to identify an alternate conceptualisation of the 
relationship between government and private operators to address the failure of some 
privatisations to meet the evolving requirements of the public with regards to service 
delivery.  It is possible that the conflict between private operators and government, 
contractual disputation and failure of privatised infrastructure is caused by 
limitations and assumptions arising from Agency Theory.  This chapter interrogates 
the literature to understand the limitations of Agency Theory and explores the 
capacity of Stewardship Theory to offer a conceptualisation of the principal–agent 
relationship which addresses the limitations of Agency Theory and achieves 
stewardship. 
As the prominent failures of privatised services have occurred in those services 
shared across communities the scope of this research has been narrowed to focus on 
critical networked infrastructures such as transport, telecommunications, energy, 
water and streets (Graham & Marvin, 2001).  Within that grouping the ‘privatised 
infrastructures’ considered encompass both those owned and operated by private 
companies and those owned by government but operated by private companies.  
‘Private companies’ are limited to only for-profit companies. 
This chapter explores the literature regarding privatisation, the stewardship of 
public values, Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory and has recourse to the 
broader body of literature to supplement areas where Agency and Stewardship 
theories may be underdeveloped.  Firstly, the literature in respect of the stewardship 
demands upon government in the context of privatisation reforms is explored, having 
particular regard to the concept of stewardship and the stewardship of public values.  
Secondly, the key elements of Agency Theory are examined and the limitations 
inherent in that theory are highlighted and Stewardship Theory and its capacity to 
address the limitations of Agency Theory are then explored. 
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2.2 STEWARDSHIP DEMANDS ON GOVERNMENT 
Although the public has largely accepted the decision of governments to 
privatise most critical infrastructures the public has not surrendered the expectation 
that the “…ultimate responsibility for providing high-quality essential services will 
always remain with government” (Funnell et al., 2009, p. 10).  This section firstly 
examines the literature as to the intent behind current privatisation, focusing in on the 
public expectations as to stewardship of infrastructure.  Secondly, the range of 
meanings of stewardship is explored and a definition of contemporary stewardship is 
developed.  Thirdly, the suitability of public values to express stewardship 
expectations by the public and as a measure of stewardship is explored. 
2.2.1 Privatisation 
Privatisation of public sector activities gained momentum in Australia, the 
United Kingdom and northern Europe (Funnell et al., 2009) in the 1980s and 1990s.  
By the late 1990s proceeds of privatisation in Australia had amounted to AUD$61b 
reflecting that for the years 1990 to 1997 Australia was second only to the United 
Kingdom in the value of privatisations (Funnell et al., 2009, p. 9).  Privatisation had 
been seen by governments as a strategy to access private capital funding and advance 
the ‘user pays’ principle and other aspects of the NPM ‘Three Es’ — efficiency, 
effectiveness and economy (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004) — all whilst seeking to pass 
off commercial, economic and political risks to the private sector. 
For some privatisations the commercial risks (e.g. delivering on time and 
within budget) have been well managed but political and governance risks appear to 
have increased (Hodge & Greve, 2007).  As to political risk, Deakin and Walsh 
(1996) found that in Britain in the 1980s and early 1990s politicians had been drawn 
back into the debate making it difficult for politicians to escape being called to 
account for the performance of services.  More recently Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) 
analysed the waves of reform which swept through public sectors in the preceding 20 
years. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) and concluded that any suggestion that NPM 
initiatives (including privatisation) can radically depoliticise public administration is 
contrary to evidence from many countries that the public often sees the political 
authority as responsible. 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 15 
The proposition that even when privatisation meets initial economic objectives 
political risks emerge at a later time is demonstrated by the individual examples cited 
earlier in the Introduction to this thesis.  The Melbourne metropolitan rail system 
brought prolonged criticism upon the Victorian Government with the first private 
operator failing to run scheduled services (PPPs: plans, PR, procrastination. The Age, 
2009, January 15, p. 10), and the replacement operator being paid $180m more than 
the previous operator only to run trains more behind timetable than its predecessor 
(Lucas 2010, May 5).  Embarrassingly for government, in March 2012 the operator 
increased the timetable journey times to reflect actual journey times (Carey 2012a, 
March 7) and in May 2012 still only ran 90.7% of trains on schedule (Carey 2012b, 
June 8). 
Again, in a second example, the privatised non-metropolitan intrastate rail 
network, the government received severe criticism.  Due to the ineffective 
maintenance obligations in the lease there was minimal maintenance of freight lines.  
This impacted badly on the movement of grain to port and it was not possible to run 
fast-rail passenger trains at the intended speed resulting in significant and continual 
criticism of the government.  More criticism ensued when it was alleged that the fast-
rail project had cost $750m compared to initial estimates of $80m and that there had 
been only a 3.5 minute improvement in the 62 minute journey between Geelong and 
Melbourne (Gray, 2004).  The privatisation continued to plague the government 
when in June 2009 the Auditor-General found that the full cost of the 2007 buy-back 
was likely to be $214m, notwithstanding the government in 2007 announcing the 
price to be $138m (VAGO, 2009). 
Similar political risk materialised for the New South Wales Government when 
the private operator of the Port Macquarie Base Hospital found the hospital to be 
more expensive to operate than anticipated; service levels declined and the local 
community vigorously called on the government to restore services.  In 2005 the 
government was forced to resume the responsibility for the operation of the hospital 
(Funnell et al., 2009). 
These three examples offer strong corroboration of Funnell et al.’s (2009, p.10) 
conclusion that for many services the transfer of operational and financial risk to the 
private sector is not possible.  This unequivocal conclusion by Funnell et al., (2009), 
and the findings of Deakin and Walsh (1996) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) that 
 16 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
despite privatisation the public holds the political authority accountable, would 
appear to outweigh the case study research of Hodge and Greve (2007) where they 
concluded that for some privatisations the commercial risks have been well managed 
but that political and governance risks appear to have increased (Hodge & Greve, 
2007).  Clearly the corollary to the observation by Hodge and Greve (2007) is that 
there are privatisations where none of the types of risk have been well managed.  The 
absolute perspective taken by Funnell et al., (2009) suggests an underlying premise 
that political, operational and financial risk cannot be separated, and that if political 
risk eventually emerges then the commercial successes of the privatisation are 
ignored and the privatisation is deemed a failure in terms of stewardship of the 
infrastructure.  Alternatively the cautionary approach of Deakin and Walsh (1996) 
and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) with their implied indication that there are 
privatisations which have not offended public values and have not precipitated 
politicians being called to account suggests that there must be arrangements for 
privatised infrastructures which satisfy public values. 
This evidence of political risk materialising when the public perceives that 
their values are not met establishes the role of public values as an expression of the 
expectations of the public.  The expectation of the public as to stewardship is 
explored, and the usefulness of public values as a measure of those stewardship 
expectations are considered in the following sub-section. 
2.2.2 Stewardship expectations 
Stewardship in the context of infrastructure a particular infrastructure can be 
simply described as operated to the appropriate standard and continually being 
maintained to meet evolving community needs. 
Expectations as to the stewardship of each individual infrastructure can be 
quite specific and the next sub-section of this chapter builds an argument that 
satisfaction of public values such as affordability and quality of services can serve as 
measures of the achievement of stewardship.  The concept of stewardship of critical 
infrastructures is explored by first considering the range of conceptualisations of 
stewardship and then a modern definition of the steward in the context of critical 
infrastructures is formed. 
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Stewardship has deep roots in the Christian and Jewish religions wherein a 
steward cares for an asset on a day-to-day basis, anticipates future trends in all issues 
impacting the asset, devises grand plans and has an obligation to improve the assets 
to match anticipated requirements of the asset owner (Saltman & Ferroussier-Davis, 
2000).  Block (1993) conceptualised the leadership role of all members of an 
organisation as a stewardship responsibility and willingness to be accountable for the 
well-being of the larger organisation through service rather than control.  
Stewardship in the environmental context has progressively developed into a form of 
governance (Gray & Hatchard, 2007) comprised of all forces driving the 
environment-related agenda forward, which collectively bear intergenerational 
responsibility. 
Each of these perspectives on stewardship has in common the intertwined 
themes of obligation, accountability and responsibility to advance the interests of all 
others in both the short and long terms.  These three themes were seen by  Birnberg 
(1980) as the fundamental building blocks when constructing a hierarchy of forms of 
stewardship which distinguishes between three levels of stewardship according to the 
level of responsibility of the steward to enhance the asset and discretion of the 
steward to convert the asset.  The distinction between the forms of stewardship 
developed by Birnberg (1980) is set out in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Forms of stewardship 
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Source: Model based on the forms  of stewardship identified by Birnberg (1980) 
In the traditional custodial form identified by Birnberg (1980) the 
responsibility of the steward is to take care of the item and return it to the owner 
intact. For example, a private contractor doing no more than maintaining a water 
storage dam and its equipment at the standard when the contract commenced.  The 
asset utilisation form sets the responsibility of the steward in terms of objectives and 
targets, which in the water storage example might be improved performance as to 
water quality, environmental impact and volume of water delivered.  This asset 
utilisation form allows the steward more autonomy and commensurate judgement 
than does the custodial form.  In this model there is no intent by the owner that the 
asset remains unchanged over time.  The steward may be authorised to sell certain 
assets for other assets if that will enhance the probability of meeting the owner’s 
charge.  Thus the steward with the asset utilisation charge has the responsibility to 
contribute both initiative and insight whilst achieving the goals and targets set by the 
owner.  In the open ended form the asset owner allows the steward extensive, open 
ended autonomy in meeting objectives which are most often set as monetary targets 
allowing for the assets to be converted to any other form.  An example is modern 
investment corporations where shareholders require executives (as stewards) to 
generate a specified level of profit and accept the conversion of assets e.g. selling 
traded equities to purchase commercial property. 
There is no example of this open ended form of stewardship in the critical 
infrastructures context, as the core infrastructure must always remain in the form 
required by the community.  Even those infrastructures that have been divested to the 
private sector (fully privatised) such as the water services in England were regulated 
to ensure that when water infrastructure is sold between private parties it remains as 
a water service for the public (Rees, 1998).  At the other end of Birnberg’s (1980) 
continuum the custodial form may largely align well with public expectations with 
respect to critical infrastructure.  Yet as most critical infrastructures are natural 
monopolies situated in a community; the public requires continually improving 
performance against criteria of accessibility, affordability, reliability and 
environmental quality (de Bruijn & Dicke, 2006; De Bruijn, Dicke & Steenhuisen, 
2008; Van Gestel, Koppenjan, Schrijver, Van de Ven & Veeneman, 2007; Van 
Gestel, Koppenjan, Schrijver, Van de Ven & Veeneman, 2008).  It is this 
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aspirational, future-oriented expectation upon the steward which is described best by 
the asset utilisation (Birnberg, 1980) conceptualisation of stewardship.  Thus it 
would seem that to best describe the stewardship of critical infrastructures it is 
necessary to draw on aspects of both the custodial and asset utilisation forms of 
stewardship. 
To focus this research and provide a conceptualisation of the behaviour of the 
steward it is proposed to knit these perspectives together to create the following 
definition of the steward: 
Steward: A steward is an agent, contractor or employee who has been 
engaged on the basis of having the requisite knowledge and skills and who 
exercises initiative and judgement to actively act in the interests of the 
principal. 
Testing this definition in the context of critical infrastructures, the steward 
would be acting in the interests of the principal (the government entity) which is a 
surrogate for the service users, largely the public.  The steward organisation would 
be applying its knowledge, skills and judgement to meet the expectations of the 
public.  The stewardship expectations of the public are expressed in terms of the 
pertinent public values. In order to bring precision to the term ‘stewardship 
expectations’ the concept of public values is explored for its utility as a measure of 
those stewardship expectations. 
2.2.3 Public values 
Public values such as affordability and environmental quality provide a 
terminology that is suitable to describe the steward’s responsibility for critical 
infrastructures.  This thesis proposes that public values will have two roles: one role 
as the driving force behind the public having expectations of the government in 
respect of critical infrastructures and the other to measure whether stewardship has 
been achieved.  This sub-section firstly considers the various levels of public values, 
progressively drilling down to those attached to critical infrastructures.  Secondly, 
public values as an expression of stewardship expectations and a measure of the 
achievement of stewardship are explored. 
At the highest level, public values are universal values such as democracy, 
efficiency and sustainability (Van Gestel et al., 2007).  These values provide a 
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normative consensus about the rights of citizens, their obligations to society and one 
another, and the principles on which governments and policies should be based 
(Bozeman, 2009).  Drilling into the part of society characterised by its ‘publicness’ 
(both state and market sectors) Jorgensen and Bozeman (2002) identify values which 
guide individuals, organisations and policies, for example integrity, honesty, probity 
and transparency.  Drilling further into that public arena de Bruijn and Dicke (2006), 
de Bruijn et al., (2008), Van Gestel et al., (2007) and Van Gestel et al., (2008) 
identified substantive public values specific to networked infrastructures such as 
quality of services and accessibility. 
Van Gestel et al., (2008) drew on the burgeoning literature as to the public 
values connected to utilities to develop a framework of levels of public values at 
play.  The framework was then applied to six completed networked infrastructure 
projects.  Van Gestel et al., (2008) identified which values were important (or in 
tension with other values) at the four stages (preparation, design, realisation and 
execution) of the projects.  The public values which were confirmed as being at play 
during the various stages of the projects are listed in Table 2.1 below. 
Table 2.1 Public Values — Netherlands’ public infrastructure projects 
Public values with respect to: Examples 
Government — society in general Democracy, legitimacy 
Reliability 
Efficient use of public resources 
Employers — employees/customers Quality of services 
Safety of employees, customers 
Reliability of employers 
Infrastructure — target groups Universal access 
Low prices 
Specific tools for people with a disability 
Infrastructure — regional economy Economic development 
Mobility 
Environmental quality 
Infrastructure — general social effects Safety 
Health 
Sustainability 
Source: Van Gestel et al., (2008, p.141) 
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The findings of Van Gestel et al., (2008) are highly important as they offer a 
clear insight as to why there is significant political risk attached to critical 
infrastructures and why public values describe the public’s expectations as to the 
performance of critical infrastructures.  Van Gestel et al., (2008) found that the 
public values considered most important at the start of all six projects (i.e. economic 
development and environmental quality) were not the values that received the most 
attention in the later stages of those same projects (i.e. efficiency, transparency and 
democracy).  Van Gestel et al., (2008) also found that public values were subject to 
tensions and conflicts between values (e.g. efficiency versus accessibility).  Thus the 
importance of the particular public value was not held constant over time by the 
community, but rather the importance of the public values changed over time (Van 
Gestel et al., 2008).  These findings by Van Gestel et al., (2008) confirmed the 
contentions of de Bruijn and Dicke (2006) that public values such as efficiency, 
affordability and safety all co-exist, competing and conflicting, with the public 
continually adjusting its choice between values. 
The satisfaction of these conflicting and changing public values requires a 
trade-off through judgement which often tends to be subjective (de Bruijn & Dicke, 
2006; Van Gestel et al., 2008), presenting as a heightened political risk for 
governments as the application of privatisation to critical infrastructures intensifies.  
An example from the research of Van Gestel et al., (2008, p. 143) was the initial 
focus on innovation resulting in issues relating to maintenance and systems operation 
being neglected and the government and taxpayer ultimately suffering high 
maintenance costs, less social safety and operational failures.  Privatisation, and 
often merely the proposal to privatise, has led to intense debate which has been 
conducted in the language of public values.  Privatisation, liberalisation and 
contracting out have put public values “under stress” (Veeneman, Dicke & 
de Bruijne, 2009, p. 415) and often have the effect of eroding public values through 
the accumulation of market values substituted for public values (Jorgensen & 
Bozeman, 2002, p. 65).  This concern has resulted in a significant body of literature 
which focuses upon the ways in which public values pertaining to infrastructure are 
safeguarded (Koppenjan, Charles & Ryan, 2008, pp. 131-134).  As observed by 
Veeneman et al., (2009), “Public values are the reason why many infrastructures 
exist today: … Without them, modern societies crumble” (p. 415).  In that way it is 
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public values which drive the public’s expectation as to the performance of the 
infrastructure, and are the essence of the stewardship the public expects from 
governments and private participants. 
The next issue then is whether public values will provide a suitable measure of 
the achievement of stewardship.  For a measure to be considered suitable the 
measure must be demonstrably the outcome of actions of the agent/steward and must 
be identifiable through robust research methods.  The performance of the agent or 
steward in respect of values such as reliability, efficiency, and access, environmental, 
economic and social sustainability can readily be assessed from secondary data, 
interviews or a questionnaire, as can the link between the actions of the agent or 
steward and the satisfaction of public values.  The necessary data can be obtained 
and analysed using proven, robust methods suggesting that public values will provide 
a suitable and practical measure of the achievement of stewardship. 
Public values determine the public’s expectations as to the performance of 
critical infrastructures, and satisfaction of public values attaching to a specific 
infrastructure is for that reason an appropriate measure of the achievement of 
stewardship of that infrastructure.   
2.3 AGENCY THEORY AND STEWARDSHIP THEORY 
The clearly different goals of the government and the private companies 
evidenced in the failed privatisations and the disputation and tensions described in 
Chapter 1 bring attention to the issue of whether the configuration of the contractual 
relationships for infrastructures contributes to the unsatisfactory outcomes.  
Privatisation as a key element of the NPM reforms adopted the models of contractual 
relationships which had proven successful in the private sector across a range of 
industries and the vast majority of these have been configured in accordance with the 
tenets and assumptions of Agency Theory.  There is a possibility that these Agency 
Theory prescriptions are not suitable for the contractual relationships applying to the 
operations and maintenance (O&M) of privatised critical infrastructures.  An 
example is long-term, traditional contacts such as those required for the O&M of 
infrastructure that have been based on Agency Theory.  These have been shown to be 
less suitable for achieving the principal’s objectives because of the incompleteness of 
the contract which results from the difficulty of adequately specifying the outcomes 
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required in distant years (Keast, Waterhouse, Brown, & Mandell, 2005, Walker & 
Hampson, 2003).  In providing an alternate conceptualisation of contractual 
relationships, Stewardship theorists have identified significant limitations in the 
Agency Theory assumptions about the behaviour of the agent. 
2.3.1 Agency Theory 
Agency Theory conceptualises all relationships as contracts.  Perrow (1986) 
explained this foundation of Agency Theory, saying: 
In its simplest form, agency theory assumes that social life is a series of 
contracts.  Conventionally, one member, the ‘buyer’ of goods or services is 
designated the ‘principal’, and the other, who provides the goods or service 
is the ‘agent’ — hence the term ‘agency theory’.  The principal–agent 
relationship is governed by a contract specifying what the agent should do 
and what the principal must do in return. (Perrow, 1986, p. 224) 
Agency Theory has focused on contractual relationships between buyers and 
sellers (Waterman & Meier, 1998, p. 174) in commercial relationships which 
developed after World War II to address the problem of parties in the agency 
relationship having conflicting goals and differing attitudes to risk (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  Agency Theory was able to meet the need for a theory which 
might better explain the behaviour of owners and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), board chairs and chief executives (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), principals and 
managers (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997), and boards of directors (Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998) in the large corporations which burgeoned in the 20th century.  
Individuals had sold off their ownership, dispersing the shareholdings whilst the 
organisations also grew in size and complexity.  Professional managers became the 
only parties with the specialised knowledge necessary to operate the company and 
were free to maximise their own self-interest at the expense of the shareholders 
(owners). 
Agency Theory took the perspective that those managers cannot be trusted and 
prescribed that they be controlled by a board (Muth & Donaldson, 1998).  Agency 
Theory was progressively applied to a range of situations outside the for-profit 
corporations.  Waterman and Meier (1998, pp. 194-199) challenged the basic 
assumptions of the principal–agent model in the context of politician/bureaucrat 
relationships and found that the model was not generalisable, was simplistic, failing 
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to recognise a range of conceptualisations of the relationship, in particular that where 
goal conflict does not exist and the principal possesses the information necessary to 
exercise control.  Caers et al. (2006) demonstrated that the not-for-profit sector is not 
quarantined from the configuration of relationships according to Agency Theory 
principles.  Dicke and Ott (2002) examined the utility of human services 
accountability methods which were grounded in Agency Theory and explored the 
capacity of Stewardship Theory to assist in the development of the accountability 
methods internal to the individual employee. 
Both Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory were applied to human services 
by Van Slyke (2007) to explore how government contract managers manage the 
contractual relationships with not-for-profit organisations.  Van Slyke (2007, p. 182) 
found that the initial disposition of public managers was consistent with Agency 
Theory and the initial disposition of not-for-profit executives was consistent with 
Stewardship Theory.  Agency Theory has been found to be highly useful in 
understanding the behaviour of principals and agents in contractual relationships.  As 
observed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), “The problem of inducing an ‘agent’ to 
behave as if he were maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general.  It exists 
in all organizations and in all co-operative efforts…” (p. 309).  However not all 
parties to contractual relationships behave in the manner conceptualised in Agency 
Theory.  Yet Agency Theory prescriptions are applied broadly — possibly 
indiscriminately — perpetuating assumptions as to behaviour that may impact 
adversely on the stewardship outcome. 
In this sub-section the key assumptions of Agency Theory viz. conflicting 
goals, information asymmetry favouring the agent, agents being risk-averse, and 
agency loss are first considered.  The limitations that are created by those 
assumptions and which may affect the capacity of the agent to act as steward are then 
discussed to identify the direction this thesis must take. 
2.3.1.1 Goal conflict 
Goal conflict is conceptualised as the conflict or divergence between the 
goals of the principal and the goals of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Agency Theory 
with its basis in economics characterises both parties to the agency relationship as 
self-interested, utility maximisers (Davis et al., 1997; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
This self-interest has been portrayed as goal conflict or goal divergence with the 
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early, normative conceptualisation being that of outright opposing goals.  Such a 
simplistic model has been progressively relaxed with Eisenhardt (1989) having 
regard to a range of empirical data and asserting that, amongst other things, if goal 
conflict decreases the agent will behave as the principal would like irrespective of 
whether the behaviour is monitored.  The rigid view of goal conflict was 
subsequently reconceptualised as a variable operating on a continuum ranging from 
conflict to consensus (Waterman & Meier, 1998, p. 185) and then as an axis 
ascending from “zero (consensus)” to “agency conflicts” (Caers et al., 2006, p. 29).  
In that way the Agency Theory model was expanded to align with a much greater 
proportion of the relationships examined in empirical studies. 
2.3.1.2 Information asymmetry 
The principal not having sufficient information to verify that the agent is 
behaving appropriately is held by Agency Theory to exacerbate goal conflict 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Typically the principal does not have the specialist technical 
expertise of the agent (Waterman & Meier, 1998, p. 184) or does not have access to 
the information held by the agent.  This ‘information asymmetry’ (typically assumed 
to advantage the agent) is not itself the problem, rather the problem is the possibility 
of opportunism on the part of the information holder (Van Slyke, 2007).  
Opportunism commonly occurs when either party uses information and expertise and 
acts in its own self-interest, contrary to the contractual terms (Van Slyke, 2007) and 
disadvantages the other party.  Agency theorists conceptualise opportunism as 
extending beyond immediate, expedient decisions to include long-term, systemic 
decisions.  The very possibility of opportunism causes the principal to incur an 
agency cost by way of increased controls.  The concept of agency cost and its 
limitations in the modern context are discussed in Section 2.3.1.4 Agency cost. 
Information asymmetry, the assumption where the agent possesses more 
information than the principal, originates in Agency Theory research into the 
behaviour of owners, board chairs, directors, chief executives and managers.  
However, the generalisability of this assumption has been challenged by research 
into both the market and bureaucratic sectors.  Waterman and Meier (1998) 
concluded that in the public sector setting, which is characterised by multiple 
‘principals’ in the form of regulators, oversight agencies and interest groups who 
require and publish widely information as to the performance of the agent, 
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information asymmetry may not be as common as in the market place (pp. 180-183).  
Eisenhardt (1989, pp. 65-70) examined the findings from 12 Agency Theory market 
sector empirical studies and found that there was support for the proposition that in 
the market sector the information provided by boards and efficient markets addresses 
and mitigates opportunism resulting in the agent acting in the interests of the 
principal.  Eisenhardt (1989, pp. 60-61) accordingly debunked the simplistic model 
of the principal–agent literature, observing that there are cases of ‘complete 
information’, ones where the principal knows what the agent has done, and went on 
to note that for those cases a contract based on the agent’s behaviour is most 
efficient. 
Waterman and Meier (1998, p. 184) in the context of the state sector 
observed that the expertise of a party in a particular type of information, for example 
process (technical), policy and political expertise, results in information asymmetry 
favouring that party.  The subsequent Agency Theory literature has not further 
explored the issue of information asymmetry, yet specialisation has increased 
exponentially to the extent of some organisations being described as ‘virtual’ 
organisations, having much of their productive capacity provided by contractors.  
Accordingly the Agency Theory conceptualisation of information asymmetry may be 
out-dated and leading to assumptions which diminish the stewardship outcome. 
In the late 20th and 21st centuries there has been a simultaneous rise in the 
availability of information.  Extensive regulatory regimes, widespread use of 
information technology, smart ways of providing measurement and unforgiving 
community expectations have resulted in many industries and organisations being 
information rich.  Certain modern commercial contracts specify the responsibility of 
the party to provide other parties with particular data immediately.  Organisations 
which are subject to relevant corporations law must meet comprehensive regulatory 
and reporting requirements, and are scrutinised by the media, share markets, 
investors and competitors.  Government agencies (increasingly including the 
commercial entities) are the subject of extensive reporting requirements and their 
partners in the agency relationship have access to additional regulators, appeal 
tribunals and the courts. 
It may be the case that modern contractual relationships do not suffer 
significant information asymmetry.  This conceptualisation would alert the contract 
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parties to the possibility of information asymmetry and allow them to configure 
relationships to avoid the higher costs of increased controls.  Critical infrastructures 
could then be governed by contractual relationships which achieve reduced costs of 
control and which replace control with other behaviours which promote the 
stewardship of the infrastructure. 
2.3.1.3 Risk appetite 
Agency Theory also assumes that the principal and agent have different 
appetites for risk and in the circumstances where the risk experienced is more than 
the party’s appetite the principal or agent acts opportunistically (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) to mitigate the risk (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The principal apprehends or 
experiences the action by the agent which is averse to the interests of the principal 
and institutes more monitoring and control, increasing agency cost.  As the amount 
of agency cost the principal can bear is finite, the allocation of risk between principal 
and agent becomes important for the principal.  Formalising this trade-off between 
risk and agency costs in efficient contractual terms is a key feature of Agency Theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Market sector principals are conceptualised as risk-neutral because they can 
diversify their investments by owning shares in multiple companies and agents are 
conceptualised as more risk-averse because as employees they are unable to diversify 
their employment (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 60-61).  There has been some movement to 
reconceptualise the risk appetite of principals and agents in more relaxed forms.  
Eisenhardt (1989) validated one proposition where the agent was less risk-averse 
because the individual was wealthy and validated a second proposition where the 
principal was not risk-neutral but was risk-averse because of the behaviour-based 
nature of the contract.  A modern example is the agent being a global organisation 
with substantial capacity and capability to manage risk, resulting in a positive 
appetite for risk. 
In respect of the operation of risk preferences of principals and agents in the 
state sector Agency Theory literature is limited — particularly so in respect of 
government as principal and the agent a private company.  Yet the public has set 
expectations which have beaten the appetite for risk of government down to a level 
much lower than that of the principal in the market sector.  Funnell et al., (2009) 
describe the public values in operation: 
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There is far less tolerance for government failure than tolerance for market 
failure…In the market place it generally matters little if business gets things 
wrong 10 per cent of the time.  What is important are the final results, the 
overall outcome, the other 90 per cent.  In stark contrast, in government it is 
the 10 per cent of the time when things go wrong which might matter most, 
not the 90 per cent of things that are done right. (Funnell et al., 2009, p. 14) 
Van Slyke (2007) found that state, county and urban public administrators 
managing contractual relationships with not-for-profits were risk-averse because of a 
lack of replacement providers and their skills to manage contracts not being 
adequate.  In these same contractual relationships the agents (the not-for-profits) in 
suburban counties were found to be risk-averse because of the competition and 
legitimate risk of contract termination (Van Slyke, 2007, pp. 176-182).  This 
experience resonates with the findings of McGregor Lowndes (2008) who found that 
governments in Australia have shifted risk to not-for-profit organisations 
“…irrespective of whether those organisations are in the best position to manage 
such risks.” (p. 51). 
The issue then is that there is a strong possibility that the Agency Theory 
conceptualisation of the risk appetite of the principal and agent is no longer current, 
particularly for privatised infrastructures which are characterised by the mixing of 
sectors by way of a government principal and a private company.  The assumptions 
as to risk appetite are based on empirical research as to the behaviour of agents who 
are individuals such as owners and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), board 
chairs and chief executives (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), principals and managers 
(Davis et al., 1997), and boards of directors (Muth & Donaldson, 1998).  The 
exception is the work of Van Slyke (2007) where individual not-for-profit executives 
were interviewed as proxies for their organisations and public managers as proxies 
for their public agencies.  If similar research at the inter-organisational level between 
government and the private sector were carried out it may be possible to identify 
circumstances where private companies as agents have an appetite for risk that is not 
being accessed.  This may be found to be due to the continued adoption by 
government of a simplistic market sector principal–agent model regarding risk 
appetite which has no legitimate application to the state sector or its agents. 
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If contractual arrangements that allocate risk to the full extent that the 
private organisation can bear are adopted then it is highly possible that government 
can harness the complete private sector capabilities and efficiencies and achieve 
better stewardship of the infrastructure.  For the private company agent the 
acceptance of greater risk and increased contribution of its technology and capability 
would be compensated by increased reward — such an increase in reward being 
funded by the efficiencies achieved by the reapportionment of risk.  Innovative 
contractual relationships which minimise the self-interest of parties and which 
emphasise collaboration and the pursuit of the interests of other stakeholders have 
emerged in recent years.  Relational contracts (Grimshaw, Vincent & Willmott, 
2002; Rahman & Kumaraswamy, 2004; Walker & Hampson, 2003; Waterhouse, 
Brown & Flynn, 2001), PPP’s (Hodge, 2002; Hodge. & Greve, 2007) and hybrid 
mixes of organisations from the state, market and network modes (Keast et al., 2006) 
which have departed from the traditional concepts of risk apportionment have 
emerged.  Relational contracts share the risk and typically provide for the sharing of 
reward, resulting in the poor performance of one party translating into actual losses 
for all parties (Keast et al., 2005, p.4).  The construction industry has been at the 
forefront of adopting relational contracts, applying them to design and construction, 
including that of critical infrastructures (Walker & Hampson, 2003).  However the 
majority of privatisations of critical infrastructures have been for the O&M of 
existing infrastructures with an increasing number of the private participants in those 
privatisations being drawn from the construction industry.  It follows then that 
innovative forms of contractual relationships such as relational contracting may 
translate successfully to the O&M of critical infrastructures.  
Empirical research into forms of contractual relationships which address the 
assumptions of Agency Theory as to the risk appetite of agents will assist in 
identifying those forms which achieve stewardship of critical infrastructures. 
2.3.1.4 Agency cost 
Agency Theory has been shown to focus on the resolution of the agency 
problem by providing a framework to assist the principal to determine the most 
efficient trade-off between goal conflict, risk and control/monitoring costs.  The net 
cost of the trade-off has been conceptualised as the “agency cost” (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976, p.308) and is a concept similar to transaction costs, which in the 
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economic literature are described as “…the sum of the costs associated with 
engaging in exchange and contracting activities, which are distinct from the costs of 
production” (Polski, 2000, p.11).  Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308) defined agency 
cost as being comprised of the following costs: 
 the monitoring expenditures by the principal; 
 the bonding expenditures by the agent; and 
 the residual loss (agency loss). 
Monitoring expenditures includes budgets, operating rules, specified 
reporting requirements, financial incentives, audits, third party assessments and 
performance evaluations (Davis et al., 1997, p.22; Jensen & Meckling, 1976 p. 308-
309), and governance mechanisms such as company structures (and their boards of 
directors) (Davis et al., 1997, pp.22-23; Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  Agency costs 
arise in any situation involving cooperative effort by two or more people (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976, p. 309) and no theory argues that the principal does not need to 
incur some cost of controls, incentives etc., whilst Stewardship theorists (Davis et al., 
1997; Tosi et al., 2003) argue that Agency Theory controls can be counterproductive 
in that they inhibit the motivation of the agent.  The overall position of Stewardship 
Theory is that costs associated with accountability can be reduced (Van Slyke, 2007), 
as distinct from being avoided.  As the Agency Theory concept of monitoring costs is 
not shown by the literature to have a possible causal link to the agent not acting in 
the interests of the principal it is proposed to not consider the monitoring 
expenditures component of agency cost further in this thesis. 
Bonding expenses are the expenses incurred by the agent when required 
contractually by the principal to guarantee performance.  Whilst required by the 
principal as a device to control the performance of the agent, the possibility of the 
bonding expense to the agent increases the risk to the agent which leads to the agent 
seeking a greater reward.  The use of this control device is not widespread and has 
received limited attention (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Van Slyke, 2007) in the 
literature.  Whilst separated out as “the bonding expenditures by the agent” in the 
definition formed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) there is no material difference 
between bonding expenses and the monitoring expenditures discussed earlier and 
will similarly not be considered further in this thesis. 
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In contrast, agency loss provides a valuable insight into the perspective 
taken by Agency theorists as to the extent of the capability of any agent.  As well as 
characterising agents as being opportunistic and requiring close control, Agency 
theorists hold that in most agency relationships the agent will not be able to carry out 
the task as well as the principal could if the principal itself had done the task (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976).  The assumption that agency loss is inevitable has its origin in 
the early role of Agency Theory in explaining the behaviour of executives and 
managers when individual owners of corporations sold off their shareholding 
publicly and reduced their personal involvement in the management of the 
corporation.  Agency Theory assumed that the returns to the owners (the principal) 
would fall below what they would be if the owners themselves continued to directly 
manage the corporation rather than contract with executives/managers (agents).  The 
perspective of Agency theorists on agency loss is described by Donaldson (1990) as 
“…a degree of under-fulfilment of the wishes of the principal by the agent” (p. 369).  
This conceptualisation of the principal as being fully competent for any role and of 
the agent needing control, behaving opportunistically and inevitably under-fulfilling 
the role conceived by the principal ignores the actual capability of the agent and risks 
the creation of a self-fulfilling prophecy of the agent not performing to a high level. 
The agency loss assumption would appear to be flawed or, at the least, out-
dated.  As Vandaele, Rangarajan, Gemmel and Lievens (2007, p. 237) observed 
“In today’s turbulent marketplace, firms are increasingly concentrating on their core 
competencies to remain competitive.  Consequently, these firms resort to outsourcing 
those activities that fall outside their own domain of expertise.”  Similarly, the state 
and not-for-profit sectors are now comprised of highly specialised service providers 
to whom the principal willingly contracts if (and only if) the agent can carry out the 
task better than the principal itself could.  Muth and Donaldson (1998, p. 5) observed 
that the professional managers (agents) appointed by owners were progressively 
becoming the only parties with the specialised knowledge necessary to operate the 
corporations, subtly making the point that the principal does not have that knowledge 
and would not be capable of performing to even the level of the agent. 
If the assumption of agency loss continues to operate, in concert with the 
other Agency Theory assumptions that agents seek to pursue their own goals, act 
opportunistically and require control (Davis et al., 1997, pp.22-24), then there is 
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every likelihood that contractual arrangements will deliver less favourable outcomes 
than would be possible if the assumptions were not in play.  Accordingly, of the three 
elements of Agency Theory agency cost (monitoring expenditures, bonding costs and 
agency loss), agency loss offers the possibility of being an assumption which limits 
the outcome of the contractual relationship. 
2.3.1.5 Discussion 
This examination of key assumptions underpinning Agency Theory has 
identified that the assumption of goal conflict or divergence, the paradigm of 
information asymmetry favouring the agent, the assumption that the agent is risk-
averse and the assumption of agency loss may each be incorrect in the modern 
context of the agent being a specialist or large organisation.  As the complexity of 
service delivery requirements increase the role of agent can only be assumed by an 
organisation. As those agent organisations are contracted by the principal only if the 
agent has a level of specialist skills higher than that assumed by Agency Theory, the 
possibility of inappropriate Agency Theory assumptions being in operation is 
substantial and demands that this research explore those assumptions further.  This 
sub-section discusses the limitations that these possibly out-dated assumptions may 
be imposing upon the outcomes of contractual relationships and sets the direction the 
research must take to identify alternate conceptualisations of the relationship which 
achieve better stewardship. 
Goal conflict (or indeed goal divergence) as an assumption within Agency 
Theory has progressed to a conceptualisation as a continuum ranging from conflict to 
consensus (Caers et al., 2003, Waterman & Meier, 1998).  Yet discussion of agency 
relationships continues to often be simplistic, remaining at the normative level with 
the emphasis being upon conflict or goal divergence.  Information asymmetry as 
asserted by Agency Theory to engender opportunism on the part of the agent and in 
turn goal conflict and increased controls may not be the case in the modern context.  
The capability for the principal and agent to share quite detailed ‘real-time’ 
information is available and affordable to governments and private companies of the 
size which operate critical infrastructures.  For that reason it is timely to challenge 
the Agency Theory paradigm of relationships being ripe with opportunism caused by 
information asymmetry.  If there was symmetry of information within a contractual 
relationship then costs of controls and monitoring would be reduced and a closer 
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convergence of goals achieved.  If research were conducted to pursue the possibility 
of information symmetry then Agency Theory could be developed and contractual 
relationships configured to reduce agency costs and achieve better stewardship of 
infrastructures. 
The assumption that agents are risk-averse may not be pertinent to the 
modern context of highly specialised service providers and large companies as 
agents.  If specialised service providers were shown to have an appetite for risk 
because of their superior knowledge and capabilities in the specialist area then the 
principal could obtain a better outcome from a contract which is configured to 
apportion to the agent the complete risk that the agent can best accept.  Similarly, the 
large international private companies which characterise the infrastructure 
construction and/or operation sectors have particular strengths as to technical, 
managerial and financial risk and a contract configured to apportion risks in those 
areas to the companies as agents would benefit the principal.  If the Agency Theory 
assumption that agents are risk-averse is found to be incorrect in the context of 
organisations contracted by government to operate privatised critical infrastructure 
then it is highly probable that the use of contractual arrangements that allocate 
greater risk to the private organisation can be adopted and a better outcome achieved 
by the principal (the government entity). 
Agency loss has presented as an assumption which conceptualises the 
typical agent as being of a lesser capability than the principal.  The re-
conceptualisation of this aspect of Agency Theory to one where the agent exceeds 
the capability of the principal may well accord with the reality of modern specialists.  
Alternatively there may be another theory which offers a conceptualisation of the 
agent that sets no limitations upon the capability of the agent. 
In summary, Agency Theory presents distinct assumptions as to the 
characteristics of the agent.  Goal conflict, information asymmetry favouring the 
agent and opportunism, the agent being risk-averse and agency loss by way of the 
capability of the agent being less than that of the principal were each found to present 
as limitations to the conceptualisation of the agent.  This limited conceptualisation of 
what the agent can achieve has a high probability of translating into the principal not 
accessing the full capability of the agent to achieve stewardship.  This research seeks 
an alternate conceptualisation of the agent — one where the agent acts in the 
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interests of the principal and pursues the goals of the principal.  There is a possibility 
that such alternate conceptualisation is offered by Stewardship Theory.  The key 
tenets of Stewardship Theory and how Stewardship Theory differs from Agency 
Theory are explored in the following section. 
2.3.2 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship Theory emerged in the 1990s as scholars (Davis et al., 1997; 
Donaldson, 1990) sought to understand the pro-organisational behaviours of 
employees, managers and chief executive officers (CEOs), and for which Agency 
Theory could not provide a satisfactory explanation.  Empirical studies have applied 
Stewardship Theory to: CEO membership of boards (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), 
board structure (Muth & Donaldson, 1998), human services (Dicke, 2002; Ott & 
Dicke, 2000; Van Slyke, 2007), not-for-profit board–manager and manager–
employee relationships (Caers et al., 2006), not-for-profit organisation and 
stakeholder relationships (Van Puyvelde, et al., 2012) and private company executive 
compensation (Wasserman, 2006).  Stewardship Theory provided a counterpoint to 
Agency Theory which had been recognised as one-sided “…because it negatively 
characterises an individual agent’s moral and collective behaviour as self-seeking 
and obtaining power and wealth; ignores worker loyalty, pride and identification 
with the organisation’s mission and goals; and omits opportunistic behaviour by 
principals” (Van Slyke, 2007, p.163).  Van Puyvelde, e. al., (2012) saw stewardship 
theory not as a separate theory but one that complements agency theory and 
encouraged agency theorists to focus on “limit situations” where agents share the 
same interests as the principal or are motivated to act in the best interest of the 
principal, in line with the stewardship view of nonprofit organizations.  
Stewardship Theory examines relationships and behaviours in an 
organisational context and emphasises behaviour in which a higher value is placed 
on goal convergence in contrast to the goal divergence focus of Agency Theory (Van 
Slyke, 2007, p. 164) and collective behaviour (Davis et al., 1997, pp. 24-25).  
Employees or managers are held to be stewards in “…that they will act in the 
interests of owners” (Donaldson, 1990, p. 377).  Thus from the Stewardship Theory 
perspective the agent acts as a steward of the principal’s interests. 
Stewardship Theory has two tenets: one the conceptualisation that agents act in 
the interests of the principal as “good stewards” (Davis et al. 1997, p.24; Donaldson, 
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1990, p. 377; Van Slyke, 2007, pp. 164-165); and the other, that certain factors cause 
stewardship behaviour (Van Slyke, 2007, p. 167).  This thesis first explores the 
conceptualisation of a steward acting in the interests of the principal and then draws 
out any limitations or issues inherent in the current Stewardship Theory literature.  
Secondly, the proposition that if pro-stewardship factors such as trust and personal 
power, autonomy, shared culture and norms, and sense of responsibility (Davis et al., 
1997; Van Slyke, 2007, p. 167) are emphasised then the agent will act as a steward 
are examined to understand the contribution of each factor to stewardship. 
2.3.2.1 Concept of stewardship behaviour 
The seminal Stewardship Theory work is that of Davis et al., (1997).  The 
authors conceptualised stewards as pro-organisational collectivists who realise the 
trade-off between organisational needs and personal needs by working towards 
collective goals in the belief that they are meeting personal goals, saying: 
Given a choice between self-serving behaviour and pro-organisational 
behaviour, a steward’s behaviour will not depart from the interests of his or 
her organisation.  A steward will not substitute or trade self-serving 
behaviours for co-operative behaviours. Thus even when the interests of the 
steward and principal are not aligned, the steward places higher value on 
co-operation than defection.  Because the steward perceives greater utility in 
co-operative behaviour and behaves accordingly, his or her behaviour can be 
considered rational. (Davis et al., 1997, p. 24) 
Put simply, Stewardship Theory argues that the pro-organisational values of 
the steward take precedence over personal interests. The steward maximises their 
utility by acting in the principal’s interests even when the goals of steward and 
principal are not aligned, and the typical behaviour of the steward is co-operation 
(Davis et al., 1997, pp. 24-25; Tosi Brownlee, Silva & Katz, 2003).  This thesis 
found that Agency Theory characterised the agent as opportunistic and acting against 
the interests of the principal and did not contemplate the concept of the agent acting 
in the interests of the principal.  Davis et al. (1997, pp.29-30) found that where 
Stewardship Theory behaviours were in evidence managers defined themselves in 
terms of their membership of the organisation by accepting the organisation’s 
mission, vision and objectives and by working towards the goals of the organisation.   
 36 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
However Stewardship Theory has not, to date, set or explained the level of 
performance of the steward.  The Stewardship Theory claim is that the outcome for 
the principal is better than that from a relationship configured according to Agency 
Theory.  But Eisenhardt (1989) argued that the simple Agency Theory model can be 
extended by relaxing the assumption of goal conflict and that if there is no goal 
conflict then the agent will behave as the principal requires, complying with the 
contract.  Importantly the claim of Stewardship Theory goes beyond the Agency 
Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) claim that the goals of the principal can be achieved by an 
agent who is complying with the contract.  tewardship Theory promises a better, 
higher level of performance as the outcome of ‘pro-organisational behaviour’ in 
place of self-interest or ‘self-serving behaviour’ (Davis et al., 1997). 
The issue then is the extent or nature of the benefit brought by the 
Stewardship Theory relationship that makes such relationship better than the 
contractual compliance which might be achieved by some models of the Agency 
Theory relationship.  Stewardship Theory does not make clear whether there is any 
limit to the behaviour of a steward.  Davis et al., (1997, p.29) conceptualised the 
steward’s actions saying “...[the steward] will not depart from the interests of his or 
her organisation.”  Van Slyke (2007, p. 165) asserted that a steward “…makes 
decisions he/she perceives to be in the best interests of his/her principals.”  These 
conceptualisations would seem to be rigid and possibly unrealistic having regard to 
the requirement of individual agents to meet their personal needs and for 
organisations which are agents to meet organisational goals and be comprehensively 
sustainable.  In the case of private companies profits must be made.  Davis et al. 
(1997, p. 30) acknowledged that the pro-organisational behaviour of the steward 
“…does not imply that stewards do not have necessary ‘survival’ needs.”  
Unfortunately the examples offered by Davis et al., (1997) and Van Slyke (2007) do 
not set a limit on the extent to which a steward might act in the interests of the 
principal. 
A further dimension of the extent of the steward’s behaviour which is 
unclear emerges when the agent/steward is an organisation.  Davis et al., (1997) 
explained stewardship in the context of the individual as agent/steward, unfolding the 
Stewardship Theory “model of man” (p.24).  Yet the agent/steward in the contractual 
relationship for privatised critical infrastructures is invariably an organisation: a 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 37 
private company.  The question then is how far the ‘survival’ needs of the 
organisation as agent/steward are abandoned by the steward and whether survival 
needs would encompass the profit which is the expected outcome from a commercial 
relationship such as those established for privatised critical infrastructures.  Put in the 
negative:  Will a for-profit organisation act as a steward or will the agent/steward 
seek to protect its profit and in doing so act against the interests of the principal? 
Stewardship Theory is incomplete or underdeveloped in two areas.  One 
area is the extent of the behaviour of the agent/steward which characterises 
stewardship behaviour, specifically the behaviour that is ‘better’ than that achieved 
by an Agency Theory relationship.  The other is that the literature to date explains 
the behaviour of agents who are individuals rather than agents who are organisations.  
The exception is Van Slyke (2007) who explored the contract management 
techniques applied by government managers to not-for-profit contractor 
organisations, as distinct from for-profit companies such as those which operate and 
maintain service delivery infrastructures.  If the extent of stewardship behaviour that 
a principal might reasonably expect was known then principals and agents could 
make an informed choice between Agency and Stewardship Theory 
conceptualisations of contractual arrangements.  That choice would then have a high 
probability of resulting in a configuration of contractual relationships which result in 
private companies achieving stewardship of critical infrastructures. 
It follows then that this thesis should seek to establish first that there is 
stewardship, for instance using satisfaction of public values as the measure of 
stewardship, and then assess the behaviour of the steward against those behaviours 
conceptualised in Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory.   
The stewardship of critical infrastructures would benefit by way of 
governments which seek to configure contractual relationships having a much clearer 
understanding of what constitutes a reasonable expectation as to the behaviour of the 
steward organisation.  At the same time Agency Theory would benefit from the 
explication of the behaviour of agents who have achieved, or are expected to achieve, 
stewardship of infrastructures.  The agent/steward would benefit from the 
expectation of stewardship being accompanied by the relationship being configured 
to minimise divergence of goals and control by the principal, and the resultant 
opportunity for greater intrinsic and extrinsic rewards and incentives. 
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The behaviour of the steward is argued by Stewardship theorists (Davis 
et al., 1997) to be promoted by factors which take the focus off structures which 
monitor and control on to those which facilitate and empower through long-term 
relations (Davis et al., 1997).  Thus these pro-stewardship factors offer the possibility 
of being a way to reconceptualise and reconfigure the relationship between principal 
and agent to achieve a stewardship outcome.  These factors are examined in the 
following sub-section. 
2.3.2.2 Pro-stewardship factors 
The assembly of these pro-stewardship factors from the Stewardship Theory 
literature by Van Slyke (2007) was a milestone in the development of the relatively 
young Stewardship Theory.  The pro-stewardship factors identified by Van Slyke 
(2007, p. 167) were: 
 personal power and trust; 
 autonomy; 
 shared culture and norms; and 
 responsibility. 
Van Slyke (2007) then examined the contracting relationships between five 
human service agencies (principals) and not-for-profit contractors (agents).  
Van Slyke (2007) hypothesised that certain trust, reputation and monitoring were 
used by the government principals to manage contractual relationships.  Van Slyke 
(2007) applied a semi-structured interview instrument to 35 public managers and not-
for-profit executives and found that contract management concentrated upon 
extending trust after the relationship evolved and the agent proved that it could be 
trusted.  This conceptualisation of trust is consistent with Agency Theory as the 
underlying premise is that “…the agent is not to be completely trusted…” (Van 
Slyke, 2007, p. 171).  Public managers were found to support the proposition that 
trust extended by public managers was the single most important criterion by which 
providers were managed, with enhancement or threat to the reputation of the 
providers being used to a lesser extent.  Van Slyke (2007, pp. 176-177) concluded 
that the use of reputation as an incentive is consistent with either Agency or 
Stewardship theories.  Other pro-stewardship factors (i.e. shared culture and norms, 
autonomy and sense of responsibility) were not contemplated in the hypothesis nor 
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reported in the findings.  The methodology of Van Slyke (2007) appears to have been 
directed towards scrutiny of monitoring, with no attention given to the counterpart 
autonomy.  In the case of shared culture and norms, Van Slyke (2007) had 
established a preliminary assumption that in the area of human services it is 
acknowledged that the contracting parties share goals.  Responsibility was not 
addressed in the hypotheses of Van Slyke (2007) as the research focused on the 
behaviour of the principal — that is, the practices of public administrators — as 
distinct from the behaviour of the agent which would include sense of responsibility 
to the principal. 
The approach taken by Van Slyke (2007) to not explore the other two pro-
stewardship factors, shared culture and norms and autonomy, pertinent to the 
behaviour of the principal and his findings as to trust bring into question the relative 
importance of the four pro-stewardship factors.  The high prominence of trust and 
relatively low significance of reputation and monitoring, which Van Slyke (2007) 
had hypothesised as being utilised by public managers to manage the contracts 
indicate the distinct possibility that the factors do not each have the same or equal 
impact on stewardship.  Van Slyke (2007) had established the assumption that there 
was shared culture and norms by way of shared goals and the focus of his research 
did not include the senses internal to the steward, for example sense of responsibility.  
Thus the methodology of Van Slyke (2007) was not constructed to explore all four 
pro-stewardship factors and, as he was the first stewardship theorist to bring together 
the literature surrounding these factors, it is apparent that Stewardship Theory on this 
issue is underdeveloped.  The puzzle then is whether the factors are all inextricably 
intertwined, consequent upon each other or independent of one or more of the other 
factors.  If that puzzle can be solved then the relative impact of each pro-stewardship 
factor on the stewardship outcome can be understood and the factor or factors with 
the highest impact can be emphasised in the configuration of contractual 
relationships and a better stewardship outcome achieved. 
2.3.2.2.1 Personal power and trust 
This sub-section first assembles the Stewardship Theory literature 
regarding personal power and trust.  Secondly the body of literature regarding inter-
organisational trust is considered.  Thirdly how important trust and personal power 
are to stewardship are evaluated. 
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Trust is a factor key to both Agency and Stewardship theories, with 
Agency Theory asserting that the agent is not to be completely trusted (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and Stewardship Theory asserting that the steward can be trusted by 
the principal (Davis et al., 1997; Van Slyke, 2007).  Early Stewardship theorists 
(Davis et al., 1997) identified trust as a behaviour not well accounted for in Agency 
Theory yet deserving attention because of the observed superior performance of the 
agent to whom trust is extended.  Whilst Agency Theory relies on institutional power 
(vested in the agent by way of delegated authority) Stewardship Theory relies on 
personal power (influence derived from perceived expertise or affective relationships 
where individuals identify with each other) (Davis et al., 1997).  Davis et al. (1997, 
p. 33) asserted that trust is a critical element of a high-commitment or involvement-
oriented management philosophy which is “…more likely to produce Stewardship 
Theory relationships.”  Van Slyke (2007) conceptualised trust as being a mutual 
expectation of reciprocity based on knowledge of the other party. 
Stewardship Theory research has to date adopted the individual as the unit 
of analysis for the agent/steward role and largely concentrated on the factor of intra-
organisational trust, with Van Slyke (2007) being the first to consider trust at the 
inter-organisational level which brings the unit of analysis to the organisation-to-
organisation level.  To extend that research the literature regarding inter-
organisational trust is explored.  The networks, conditions and mechanisms which 
contribute to inter-organisational trust were identified by Sydow (1998) in a 
comprehensive analysis of issues at the individual, inter-organisational and network 
levels.  Sydow (1998) found that inter-organisational relationships, in particular trust, 
can be built and sustained by intentional actions in respect of the structural properties 
that constitute the network of organisations and also the relationships and processes 
at the individual and organisation levels.  Alford (2009) identified the steward’s 
predisposition to act in the interests of the principal, explaining such action prompts 
reciprocation of trust from the principal and a consequent high-trust spiral and an 
increasingly better outcome for the principal. 
Importantly, relationships characterised by trust have been found to be 
highly important in the governance of the planning, construction and operation of 
critical infrastructures.  Edelenbos and Klijn (2007) sought to understand the 
importance of trust to complex inter-organisational decision-making networks, in 
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particular those supporting PPPs.  Edelenbos and Klijn (2007) surveyed the literature 
as to the operation of trust, formed hypotheses and tested these using data gathered 
from the conception, planning, construction and operation of a ring road in the 
Netherlands.  Edelenbos and Klijn (2007, p. 34) concluded that “…the value of trust 
lies in both handling uncertainty in complex decision making because other actors’ 
actions become more predictable…it also lies in enhancing the capacity for 
information exchange and innovation.”  The literature surveyed and the ring road 
case study data led Edelenbos and Klijn (2007, p. 42) to conclude that trust can be 
developed by intentional actions but “…is very fragile and can easily turn into 
distrust.” 
The findings of Alford (2009), Edelenbos and Klijn (2007), and Sydow 
(1998) that inter-organisational relationships can be built and sustained by intentional 
actions strongly support the Stewardship Theory (Davis et al., 1997; Van Slyke, 
2007) contention that trust and the resultant personal power can be applied to 
increase stewardship behaviour. 
The issue then is whether trust as a factor that promotes stewardship 
behaviour is something more than important — whether it is essential.  Klijn, 
Edelenbos and Steijn (2009, p. 14) conclude “…that trust in governance networks is 
important for achieving better (perceived) outcomes.”  It is reasonable to consider 
‘better outcomes’ to be synonymous with stewardship.  Alford (2009) asserted that 
trust is important in partnerships between government organisations and other 
organisations (not-for-profit and market) because it provides a mechanism for 
coordinating the actions of the organisations involved, thus reducing the transaction 
costs.  Alford (2009, p. 4) then goes on to provide an explanation for the effects of 
trust, emphasising the power of trust to access motivations through intrinsic rewards 
and normative purposes.  Returning to the Stewardship Theory literature, the seminal 
work of Davis et al., (1997, p. 33) asserted that “The issue of trust is a critical aspect 
of the high-commitment or involvement-oriented management philosophy.” which 
“…will lead to the emergence of behaviour that is more consistent with stewardship 
theory” (Davis et al., 1997, p.34).  Van Slyke (2007) found that for public managers 
of contracts with not-for-profits trust was not the relational starting position but 
rather was developed over the progress of the contractual term and found that even 
then the use of trust by the public manager was congruent with an evolved principal–
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agent relationship.  At the same time, and in contrast, it was found by Van Slyke 
(2007) that the not-for-profits started in the relationship with a Stewardship Theory 
perspective and that they sought, and largely achieved, principal–steward 
relationships.  Seen another way, the data gathered by Van Slyke (2007) showed that 
there was stewardship behaviour even though the principal (the public managers) did 
not take the position of trusting the not-for-profit steward.  This finding of 
stewardship in the absence of trust on the part of the principal is consistent with the 
perspective of O’Leary (2007) that trust is not an essential condition for there to be 
cooperation. 
In summary, Klijn et al., (2009) concluded that trust was ‘important’ for 
achieving better outcomes, Alford (2009) held that trust is ‘important’ in partnerships 
between government organisations and other organisations because it offers the 
possibility of reducing transaction costs, and Davis et al., (1997) positioned trust as 
‘critical’ to a particular management philosophy, which in turn leads to the 
emergence of behaviour which is consistent with Stewardship Theory.  However Van 
Slyke (2007) found that there was stewardship behaviour by not-for-profit providers 
of human services even in cases where the principal had not extended trust to the 
steward.  No claim is made in the Stewardship Theory literature or broader trust 
literature that trust is essential to stewardship.  Accordingly, whilst there is 
substantiation for the Stewardship Theory proposition that the extension of trust by 
the principal to the steward will result in a better outcome from the contractual 
relationship, there is a clear indication from the research of Van Slyke (2007) that 
trust is not essential for there to be stewardship.  The remaining pro-stewardship 
factors will now be considered to understand the importance of those factors to 
achieving stewardship behaviour. 
2.3.2.2.2  Autonomy 
Stewardship Theory asserts that because extending the autonomy of the 
steward motivates the steward to deliver increased benefits to the principal autonomy 
is key to establishing the less controlling contract management arrangements which 
promote stewardship (Davis et al., 1997).  This sub-section assembles the 
Stewardship Theory literature regarding autonomy.  A principal might balance the 
greater autonomy advocated in Stewardship Theory with commensurate controls.  
However, Davis et al., (1997) and Tosi et al., (2003) caution that control can be 
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counter-productive because it signals distrust, lowering the motivation of the steward 
to work in the interests of the principal.  Autonomy is seen as a logical consequence 
“…because he or she [a steward] can be trusted” (Davis et al., 1997, p. 25).  Block 
(1996) argued that the autonomy of stewards should be extended as much as possible 
as they work in the best interests of the organisation, requiring little monitoring.  Ott 
and Dicke (2000) contend that where control is required informal and intrinsic 
accountability mechanisms such as professional standards and peer reviews rather 
than legalistic mechanisms are appropriate.  Such relaxed controls and accountability 
mechanisms would operate under the shadow of hierarchical authority (Scharpf, 
1994) with stewards apprehending the possibility of failure to achieve stewardship 
resulting in the principal imposing controls and other prescriptions of Agency 
Theory.  This Stewardship Theory model of minimal monitoring contradicts the 
experience of fully privatised water in England where control by heavy regulation of 
autonomous private operators was needed (Rees, 1998). 
Stewardship Theory research in respect of the impact of autonomy has 
been limited.  Assistance might be found in the literature concerning the relationship 
between government and government-owned, non-departmental public bodies 
(NDPBs) (e.g. government-owned companies or statutory corporations), as the 
relationship is similar, principally because NPM initiatives by government emulated 
the private sector.  Thynne and Wettenhall (2004) analysed the issues surrounding 
freedoms and controls allocated by governments to their NDPBs and found that the 
government positioned the particular NDPB between freedom and control by 
determining a trade-off between effectiveness through managerial autonomy and 
political control (Thynne, 2003; Thynne & Wettenhall, 2004).  Verhoest, Peters, 
Bouckaert and Verschuere (2004) conceptualised autonomy as having two 
dimensions: one the intended autonomy in respect of decision-making on policy 
matters and management matters, and the second the actual constraints (structural, 
financial, legal and interventional) on decision-making.  Verschuere (2007) then 
surveyed 87 Flemish public sector organisations with respect to two key arenas of 
managerial autonomy, financial management and human resources management and 
found that it was rare that the intended model of disaggregation, autonomisation and 
results-based control was achieved.  The learning then is that research that seeks to 
establish a causal link between autonomy and behaviour (e.g. stewardship) must 
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contain a method to establish the actual level of autonomy to distinguish between the 
claimed configuration, for example according to Stewardship Theory principles and 
the actual relationship (e.g. Agency Theory control). 
A note of caution must be raised as to the concept of autonomy within the 
larger Stewardship Theory conceptualisation of the contractual relationship.  
Autonomy has been shown to be introduced to maximise the opportunity for the 
steward to carry out the contracted role.  Autonomy is not about fragmentation or 
silos but rather the underpinning, core principle of the NPM tenet of “free managers 
to manage” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, pp. 165-167).  A principal seeking to 
implement the tenets of Stewardship Theory must be alert to establishing a level of 
autonomy which is appropriate to facilitate the full integration of the system shared 
by the parties.  The agent/steward being fully autonomous heavily restricts the 
possibility for the relationship to progress through the Integration Continuum (Keast, 
Brown & Mandell, 2007), from cooperation and then coordination to collaboration.  
This is highly important as coordination and collaboration are behaviours said by 
Stewardship Theory to be characteristic of principal–steward relationships. 
However, this exploration of the pro-stewardship factor autonomy is for 
the purpose of understanding how important autonomy is to stewardship.  It has been 
shown that autonomy does contribute to stewardship (Davis et al., 1997) and that 
autonomy relates to the pro-stewardship factor trust in two ways.  The first is that 
autonomy is dependent upon the steward first being trusted by the principal (Block, 
1993; Davis et al., 1997; Van Slyke, 2007) and the second is that if autonomy is 
increased then the consequent actions of the steward may engender increased trust on 
the part of the principal (Davis et al., 1997; Van Slyke, 2007). 
In respect of determining how important autonomy is to stewardship it is 
proposed to consider the possibility of the null hypothesis; that is, that there is no 
possibility of a situation where the steward has autonomy and does not demonstrate 
stewardship behaviour.  Such a scenario, where an agent/steward has autonomy but 
chooses to not act as a steward, is quite possible.  Indeed Agency theorists warn 
against the likelihood of such opportunism and recommend tight control rather than 
autonomy.  Another telling scenario is where the steward is subjected to substantial 
ongoing control, has no autonomy on significant matters but acts in the interests of 
the principal beyond mere contractual compliance; that is, acts as a steward.  This 
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scenario is also quite possible.  Having regard to these scenarios it is concluded that 
there is a high likelihood of autonomy not being essential to stewardship behaviour 
and begs the question as to whether autonomy might be more accurately 
characterised as a lower-order factor, perhaps one that is facilitative of other pro-
stewardship factors — those which may be more important to achieving stewardship.  
Firstly, considering autonomy in the context of trust, Stewardship theorists (Block, 
1993; Van Slyke, 2007) hold that trust is an antecedent of autonomy with there being 
evidence (Sydow, 1998) that the act of increasing autonomy signifies trust with the 
reasonable expectation that the agent reciprocate with further trustworthy behaviour 
which in turn may engender increased trust on the part of the principal (Davis et al., 
1997; Van Slyke, 2007).  Secondly, interrogation of the Stewardship Theory 
literature finds no suggestion that autonomy has any impact on shared values and 
norms.  Thirdly, there is the suggestion of a link between autonomy and sense of 
responsibility but that link is through the granting of autonomy engendering trust 
which increases the sense of responsibility. 
This examination has shown that autonomy may be a lower-order factor 
which facilitates the establishment of other pro-stewardship factors or a factor which 
emerges as a result of the operation of other factors.  This thesis now considers the 
two remaining pro-stewardship factors to understand how important they are to 
stewardship behaviour. 
2.3.2.2.3 Shared culture and norms 
The term ‘shared culture and norms’ first appears in Van Slyke’s (2007) 
summary of the key Stewardship Theory literature where he lists the theoretical tenet 
that workers are empowered through the pro-stewardship factors.  This section firstly 
examines the broader literature regarding organisational culture to set parameters as 
to the meaning of shared culture and norms.  Secondly, the limited Stewardship 
Theory literature regarding shared culture is unpacked.  Thirdly, how important this 
factor is to stewardship behaviour is evaluated. 
In the broader body of organisational culture literature Schein (1985, 
1990) contributed the seminal work identifying a hierarchy of three levels of 
organisational culture.  The first is the immediately apparent behaviours and tangible 
artefacts.  The second level is the professed values as evidenced by corporate 
publications and interviews with organisational representatives.  The third, deeper 
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level, is the underlying tacit assumptions shared across the organisation.  Schein 
(1990) characterised the first two levels, the artefacts and the values, as providing 
insights but being ‘flawed’ dimensions which provide no assurance as to whether 
they are salient in the culture.  Schein (1990) concluded that tacit assumptions offer 
the best understanding of the actual organisational culture.  Schein (1990) observes 
that the unconscious nature of these assumptions leads to their not being discussed, 
which leads to an immense difficulty for those who seek to change the culture. 
Thus it is apparent that shared culture is not a factor which the principal 
can initiate readily by way of corporate publications or espousing values.  However, 
longer-term perspectives and actions do impact the tacit assumptions that constitute 
the shared culture, with Davis et al., (1997) identifying the management philosophy 
which the principal (management) brings to the relationship as key to forming a 
shared culture that supports a principal–steward relationship.  Davis et al., (1997) 
distinguished between Agency Theory control-oriented normative management 
philosophies and Stewardship Theory high-commitment and involvement-oriented 
normative philosophies and asserted that the operation of a culture and related 
management philosophy generates a self-fulfilling prophecy as to the nature of the 
culture in future relationships. 
Van Slyke (2007, p. 164) described the underlying management 
philosophy as the “managerial starting point” and held that this managerial starting 
point differs between different types of services and markets.  Van Slyke (2007) 
characterised government–not-for-profit human services contractual relationships 
with their strongly shared goals as having a much greater probability of reflecting the 
Stewardship Theory model than would contractual relationships in well developed 
markets such as refuse collection.  Dicke (2002) observed that not-for-profit, 
charitable, human services organisations are assumed to hold altruistic core values 
and that if these values are shared with the government organisation as principal then 
the steward is likely to display stewardship behaviour.  Block (1993) found that the 
inculcation of altruistic values within an organisation achieves a culture that supports 
and promotes steward-like behaviour.  Stewardship theorists (Block, 1993; Davis et 
al., 1997; Dicke, 2002; Van Slyke, 2007) acknowledge that the principal benefits 
from, or is constrained by, their underlying management philosophy when applying 
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alternate conceptualisations as to the principal–agent relationship such as the high-
commitment, involvement-oriented culture advocated in Stewardship Theory. 
Davis et al., (1997) explored culture as a factor by which Stewardship 
Theory could be differentiated from Agency Theory, drawing on the work of 
Hofstede (1980, 1991), on cultural differences along two dimensions, power distance 
and individualism-collectivism.  The power distance dimension describes the extent 
to which less powerful members of organisations within a country expect and accept 
that power and privileges are distributed unequally.  The high power distance is 
thought to lead to agents rejecting the principal’s authority in a way similar to the 
divergent goals of the self-serving agent described in Agency Theory and low power 
distance is held to be conducive to the development of a principal–steward 
relationship (Davis et al., 1997, p. 36).  As the unit of analysis in this thesis is the 
organisation, the power distance between agent/steward and principal is the lowest 
possible. However, for all inter-organisational relationships, be they configured 
according to Agency Theory or Stewardship Theory, whether they achieve 
stewardship or they do not, there is no scope to distinguish between case studies.  
Accordingly there is no good purpose in further considering this dimension of 
culture. 
Evaluating the second dimension of culture, individualism-collectivism, 
Davis et al., (1997) proposed that the disposition to individualism (i.e. personal goals 
over group goals) is characteristic of Agency Theory behaviour and the disposition to 
collectivism (i.e. subordination of personal goals and strong responsibility to group 
goals) is characteristic of Stewardship Theory.  Collectivists have a very positive 
attitude towards harmony in groups, preferring long-term relationships and 
expending greater time and effort to establish relationships prior to a business 
transaction (Davis et al., 1997).  Davis et al., (1997) developed the proposition that 
collectivist cultures are more conducive to the emergence of a principal–steward 
relationship. 
However, as with much of Stewardship Theory, the explanation of the 
operation of collectivist behaviours is underdeveloped.  Clarification of the 
disposition to collectivism (Davis et al., 1997) is needed.  If the responsibility were 
to be to the group as distinct from the principal then there is the possibility of there 
not being stewardship of the interests of the principal.  An example would be a group 
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comprised of collectivists employed by a child care agency who hold a strong view 
as to how services should be provided to the children in the principal’s care, but that 
view being contrary to the policy and goals of the principal.  The collectivists may 
support each other in not implementing the policy of the principal.  The alternate 
scenario, where there is little collectivist behaviour but where the culture is that of 
implementing the policy of the principal and achieving the goals of the principal, 
suggests that shared culture which is not characterised by collectivist behaviours can 
still achieve stewardship.  For that reason it is held that collectivist behaviour is not 
the only form of culture which may have a causal link to stewardship. 
Having concentrated the focus of this exploration upon the culture shared 
between the agent/steward and principal the conceptualisation of the collectivist as 
characterised by strong responsibility to the principal comes into high prominence.  
Yet the Stewardship Theory literature does not make clear whether the responsibility 
factor (considered in the next sub-section of this thesis) leads to shared culture and 
whether shared culture has a causal link to stewardship behaviour.  It reasoned that it 
is highly likely that sense of responsibility to the goals of the principal would be a 
key contributor to a culture shared between the contractual parties and which leads to 
a better outcome for the principal.  If sense of responsibility were found to be a key 
element of the culture then there is the possibility that sense of responsibility is 
essential to the culture or indeed is the essence of the contribution of the steward to 
the culture. 
To test whether sense of responsibility is essential to a shared culture that 
causes stewardship on the part of the agent/steward it is proposed to examine the 
viability of the null hypothesis; that is, that a culture where the steward has no sense 
of responsibility to the principal will nonetheless result in stewardship.  Earlier in 
this thesis an examination of the literature in respect of the meaning of stewardship 
found that stewardship required that the steward actively act in the interests of the 
principal.  The question then is whether the steward, in acting in the interest of the 
principal, could do so without having a sense of responsibility to the principal.  
Whilst the argument that a single instance of acting in the interests of the principal 
without there being a sense of responsibility could be made, ongoing, stable 
contractual relationships require a continual stream of actions, and particularly so in 
the instance of critical infrastructures.  Accordingly the probable scenario would be 
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one of there being continual actions and decisions where the steward acts in the 
interests of the principal.  Those actions on the part of the steward would be a key 
contributor to, or demonstration of, the culture shared between principal and steward.  
Accordingly, to maintain a culture in which the steward continually acted in the 
interests of the principal it is necessary that the stewards continually display a sense 
of responsibility to the principal.  For that reason it is concluded that sense of 
responsibility to the principal is an essential element of the shared culture which has 
a causal link to stewardship. 
Sense of responsibility to the principal has been concluded to be essential 
to the shared culture factor.  This thesis seeks to understand the contribution of each 
pro-stewardship factor to stewardship and determine whether there is one factor that 
has the possibility of being highly important to there being stewardship and thus 
being worthy of particular focus in this research.  Having regard to the conclusion 
that there could not be a shared culture which causes stewardship without there being 
a sense of responsibility to the principal it is concluded that sense of responsibility is 
distinctly more important than shared culture.  This thesis now considers the impact 
of the responsibility factor upon the achievement of stewardship. 
2.3.2.2.4 Sense of responsibility 
Sense of responsibility (Dicke, 2002), as used in the Stewardship Theory 
literature, refers to an internal sense of responsibility on the part of the steward which 
leads to the steward acting accountably and achieving the principal’s goals.  The 
steward acts in a pro-organisational, collectivist way, values and goals are aligned, 
and the steward has a sense of responsibility to the organisation (principal) (Davis et 
al., 1997, p. 24).  In addition, the exploration of the other pro-stewardship factors 
(trust, autonomy and shared culture) earlier in this chapter has signalled that sense of 
responsibility may have a more significant impact on stewardship than the other 
factors.  This section firstly considers the Stewardship Theory literature regarding 
sense of responsibility.  Secondly, it evaluates the importance of the sense of 
responsibility factor to the achievement of stewardship behaviour. 
Responsibility as conceptualised in Stewardship Theory literature emerged 
from McGregor’s (1960) identification of two distinct groupings of assumptions 
underlying managerial approaches.  The first is Theory X, which is based on 
assumptions that people are lazy, passive, are not intrinsically motivated to work and 
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need to be controlled by management because they will not act in the best interests of 
the organisation (McGregor, 1960).  Agency Theory, with its economic view of 
human nature and heavy emphasis upon control, has strong Theory X overtones 
(Tosi et al., 2003).  In contrast, Theory Y, is based on assumptions that people are 
not passive, are intrinsically motivated and have a high capacity for assuming 
responsibility.  According to Theory Y management (the principal) can arrange the 
work context, for example using empowering structures, so that employees can 
achieve their own goals by directing their own efforts toward organisational 
objectives.  Davis et al., (1997) explained that “Subordinates in a stewardship 
relationship are reinforced by these intrinsic, intangible rewards (opportunities for 
growth, achievement, affiliation and self-actualization) and are motivated to work 
harder on behalf of the organization” (p. 28). 
Davis et al., (1997) explored the then established theories of motivation 
having particular regard to the need theories and focused on the model of worker 
motivation: the Job Characteristics Model developed by Hackman and Oldham 
(1976).  Hackman and Oldham (1976) identified three psychological states, 
experienced meaningfulness of work, experienced responsibility for outcomes, and 
knowledge of actual results, which can be attained or facilitated by factors such as 
skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy and feedback.  Davis et al., 
(1997, p. 24) concluded that this model of work motivation is consistent with the 
assumptions of Stewardship Theory but that, as this conceptualisation of the 
motivation is predicated on the assumption of the individual worker having a strong 
growth need, there are some workers for whom the assumptions of the stewardship 
model may not fit.  It would seem then that Davis et al., (1997) are inferring that if an 
individual does not attain one of the psychological states such as experienced 
responsibility then the stewardship model will not fit and the relationship should 
default to the high control/monitoring Agency Theory model. 
Dicke (2002) was the first to adopt the term ‘sense of responsibility’ 
observing that sense of responsibility is subjective to the person, being closely allied 
with an individual’s personal conscience, values and loyalty.  Dicke (2002), in 
conceptualising this internally held sense of responsibility as being directed to the 
principal, created a clear distinction from the principal–agent conceptualisation of 
responsibility which she defined as an accountability based on an obligation to 
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someone outside-of-self.  Dicke (2002) observed that when organisations hold strong 
core public service values an internal sense of responsibility is created.  ‘Internal’ in 
this use of the term referred to the sense of responsibility being generated at the level 
of the individual, as distinct from the organisation. 
Dicke (2002) sought to test the argument that the Stewardship Theory 
concept of responsibility to the principal, together with shared value sets, would 
provide internal accountability methods for human services contracting.  Dicke 
(2002) observed that there was a large body of research from a wide range of 
disciplines that showed the presence of strong core public service values (service to 
the community by organisations from the market, state and network sectors).  Dicke 
(2002) hypothesised that if the not-for-profit employees held these values then there 
would be a convergence with the values of the government (the principal) and the 
attendant sense of responsibility on the part of the employees would constitute an 
internal accountability mechanism, resulting in there being a reduced need for 
external control mechanisms.  Dicke (2002) found that the control methods in place 
were derived from the principal–agent perspective and that the not-for-profit practice 
of hiring students principally for their flexibility as to hours of work had displaced 
the selection of employees on the basis of public service values or sense of 
responsibility, thus not providing the anticipated internal accountability mechanisms. 
Continuing the thread woven by Davis et al., (1997) and Dicke (2002), 
Hernandez (2012), in her substantial assembly of the knowledge surrounding the 
influence of structural and psychological factors on stewardship behaviours, sought 
to redress the paucity of knowledge as to the causal influence of organisational-and 
individual-level factors on stewardship behaviours.  Hernandez (2012) categorised 
the structural factors into control systems and reward systems developing a Model of 
Stewardship Antecedents (p. 177), which established psychological ownership (as 
distinct from material ownership) of the beneficiaries of stewardship behaviour as a 
mediating factor between those structural and psychological factors and the 
achievement of stewardship behaviours.  Further, Hernandez (2012) developed a 
strong argument that stewardship behaviour does affect a ‘feedback loop’ by 
reinforcing and enhancing the operation of the factors which established those same 
stewardship behaviours.  Within the control system factors that generate stewardship 
behaviour, Hernadez (2012) outlined that the control systems be configured to allow 
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for a high degree of collaboration and a significant level of autonomy and 
responsibility.  Hernandez (2012) conceptualises responsibility in several ways: the 
responsibility accepted by the individual, the sense of collective, (or shared 
responsibility), sense of obligation, and commitment. 
This evaluation of the literature now turns to exploring how important a 
sense of responsibility is to the achievement of stewardship that there is a sense of 
responsibility.  Davis et al., (1997) assembled the established theories of motivation 
with the impact of experience of responsibility for outcomes emerging from 
consideration of the model of worker motivation then advanced by Hackman and 
Oldham (1976).  Hernandez (2012) examined both the actions which influence sense 
of responsibility and also the operation of sense of responsibility as an antecedent of 
stewardship behaviour.  Whilst characterised by Hernandez (2012) as being 
established and cultivated by control systems sense of responsibility was also found 
to influence the cognitive and affective mechanisms that, in turn, drive stewardship 
behaviours.  An example is the design of relationships within the organisation such 
that there is an authentic opportunity for leadership at many levels which Hernandez 
(2012) concluded engendered a sense of responsibility, both individual and 
collective.  This dynamic of leadership and sense of responsibility is held by 
Hernandez (2012) to heighten the ‘other-regarding’ perspective of the steward, 
cultivating the individual’s shared sense of responsibility to consider multiple 
stakeholder perspectives including an intergenerational perspective to encompass the 
needs of distant future beneficiaries. 
Thus the concept of sense of responsibility is interwoven throughout the 
structural and psychological factors which form the model of stewardship 
antecedents built by Hernandez (2012), suggesting the possibility that if there was no 
sense of responsibility on the part of the employee then there would not be 
stewardship behaviours.  Put another way, if sense of responsibility and the closely 
related antecedents of stewardship behaviour, sense of obligation, collective 
responsibility and commitment were removed from the model established by 
Hernandez (2012) then there is a very low probability of the remaining control and 
reward systems resulting in stewardship behaviour.  In considering the impact of the 
shared culture factor in the preceding sub-section it was argued that it was highly 
unlikely that there could be a shared culture which would cause stewardship without 
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the steward contributing a sense of responsibility to that culture.  For that reason it 
was concluded that sense of responsibility to the principal was an essential element 
of a shared culture which has a causal link to stewardship.  Building on that 
conclusion, it is reasoned that if there cannot be a shared culture which causes 
stewardship without there being sense of responsibility to the principal then sense of 
responsibility is distinctly more important to the achievement of stewardship than 
other aspects of shared culture. 
In summary, this examination of the pro-stewardship factors sought to 
determine whether there is one factor that has the possibility of being highly 
important or essential to there being stewardship and thus being worthy of particular 
focus in this research so that it can be emphasised in the configuration of contractual 
relationships for privatised infrastructures.  The pro-stewardship factor personal 
power and trust as extended to the steward by the principal was found to be not 
essential to there being stewardship as there was a reasonable possibility of the 
steward continuing to act in the interests of the principal notwithstanding the 
principal not extending trust to the steward.  For the autonomy factor it was 
concluded that autonomy was a lower-order factor which facilitates the establishment 
of another pro-stewardship factor — trust.  The factor shared culture was found to be 
dependent upon that culture containing a sense of responsibility on the part of the 
steward, positioning sense of responsibility to the principal as a higher-order factor 
and one which is possibly essential to the achievement of stewardship.  In that way it 
might be a factor which distinguishes a steward from an Agency Theory agent. 
Clearly it is important that this critical infrastructures research seek to 
understand how important sense of responsibility on the part of the steward is to 
there being stewardship behaviour.  If that importance is understood then 
configuration of relationships can focus on that pro-stewardship factor and the 
actions that can be taken to increase that sense of responsibility.  Selection of parties 
with which to contract can focus of their demonstrating sense of responsibility.  To 
provide that focus it is necessary to obtain evidence in the following key areas: 
 day-to-day behaviour and extraordinary events that will demonstrate 
sense of responsibility; and 
 actions by the principal or steward to increase or support the 
steward’s sense of responsibility. 
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The following section distils the issues and literature which have been 
considered and draws together the precise questions which will be addressed in the 
research. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
The catalyst for considering Stewardship Theory was the concern that 
privatised critical infrastructures are being managed in a way that creates political 
risk for the government or which fails to meet public values such as value for money, 
quality or adequacy of service.  The literature attributes this failure to the 
privatisation initiatives of government which, amongst other things, introduced 
Agency Theory-based principal–agent relationships between government and the 
private contractors who operate and maintain the infrastructures.  These relationships 
may be inappropriate for the achievement of stewardship because of the constraints 
imposed by Agency Theory conceptualisations of the behaviour and capabilities of 
the agent.  The identification of these constraints provoked the search for a theory 
which provides a conceptualisation of the relationship which leads to stewardship of 
the infrastructure by the contractor. 
Governments privatise infrastructure in the expectation that the market sector 
will bear both financial and political risk.  The community has not accepted that 
abrogation of the political risk, holding governments accountable against public 
values as their steward of the infrastructures.  The concept of stewardship is a term 
that was widely used but loosely defined, as was the role of a steward.  Drawing on 
the literature, this thesis forms the following definition of a steward: 
A steward is an agent, contractor or employee who has been engaged on the 
agreed basis of having the requisite knowledge and skills and exercising 
initiative and insight to actively act in the interests of the principal. 
Key to this conceptualisation of stewardship is the expectation that the steward 
must actively protect and advance the interests of the principal.  The steward must 
not put their own interests ahead of those of the principal.  This concept of 
stewardship applies to government in its relationship to the public and by virtue of 
privatisation to those members of the market sector who enter into contracts with 
government.  It is against this criterion of stewardship that this thesis explored the 
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literature regarding Agency Theory for the constraints or limitations which might 
explain the failures in stewardship of infrastructure. 
Agency Theory presented as offering a useful way of explaining relationships 
where the parties’ interests are at odds, offering a conceptualisation of the 
relationship which facilitates the parties being brought more into alignment through 
well planned monitoring, control and extrinsic incentives (Davis et al., 1997).  
However, where the goals and interests of the parties are aligned, application of the 
assumptions that are fundamental to Agency Theory would constrain the principal 
from achieving a better outcome from the agent.  In that way, assumptions as to the 
behaviour of the agent that will lead to goal conflict, that information asymmetry will 
prevail, that the agent is risk-averse, or that there will be agency loss impose the 
quite limiting Agency Theory conceptualisation of the role of the agent and result in 
there not being a principal–steward relationship. 
Stewardship Theory was explored for its capacity to address the constraints 
resulting from the application of Agency Theory and to provide a possible alternate 
conceptualisation of the relationship — one which achieves stewardship outcomes.  
Two key tenets of Stewardship Theory were examined.  The first is that the agent 
will act as a steward, not departing from the interests of his or her organisation rather 
than acting with self-interest (Davis et al., 1997; Van Slyke, 2007).  It was concluded 
that Stewardship theorists are offering a conceptualisation that is likely to provide a 
better outcome for the principal than does Agency Theory but that the literature as to 
the behaviour that constitutes stewardship is underdeveloped and thus unclear.  The 
proposed research will confirm the operation of the tenet that the steward will not 
depart from the interests of the principal and will seek to better define the behaviour 
which constitutes stewardship.  The second tenet, that if the factors (pro-stewardship 
factors) trust, autonomy, shared culture and norms, and sense of responsibility (Davis 
et al., 1997; Van Slyke, 2007) are emphasised then an agent will act as a steward was 
explored by way of a detailed consideration of each factor.  This thesis concluded 
that sense of responsibility to the principal on the part of the steward was possibly 
essential to stewardship behaviour being achieved.   
Public values were found to be the essence of the public’s expectations as to 
the performance of critical infrastructures.  The satisfaction of public values 
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attaching to a specific infrastructure is used in this research as a measure of the 
achievement of stewardship of that infrastructure. 
As observed by Van Slyke (2007), Stewardship Theory remains acknowledged 
but largely untested.  More telling for those seeking better stewardship of critical 
infrastructures is the conclusion of Hernandez (2012) that “past theorizing has not 
been able to provide organizations with prescriptions on how to generate and sustain 
stewardship.”  This research seeks to develop the literature and to achieve findings of 
practical relevance to government and industry practitioners by pursuing three key 
issues: 
1. the extent to which a steward acts in the interests of the principal; 
2. the importance of the factor sense of responsibility to there being 
stewardship; and 
3. the actions available to either the principal or steward to increase or 
support the steward’s sense of responsibility. 
In addition there are two key aspects of the proposed research which have to 
date received little attention in Stewardship Theory research.  The first is the steward 
being a commercial ‘for-profit’ entity rather than a not-for-profit human services 
provider as was the case in the research of Dicke (2002) and Van Slyke (2007).  The 
second is the steward being an organisation as distinct from an individual (Davis et 
al., 1997; Donaldson, 1991).  These issues require a research method which will 
provide data as to the characteristics displayed by actual stewards and the actions 
which contribute to those characteristics.  Accordingly, a research methodology 
which includes gathering data from individuals who comprise principal and agent 
organisations by way of interview is appropriate. 
The purpose of this research is to understand whether an organisation 
contracted to government can act as a steward and whether governments can take 
actions to configure the relationship with that organisation to increase stewardship 
behaviour.  To do this it is necessary to work with a number of case study principal–
steward relationships drawn from privatised critical infrastructures. 
Specifically this empirical case study research seeks to answer the following 
questions: 
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RQ 1: To what extent will a steward act in the interests of the principal? 
RQ 2: How important is it that the steward feels a sense of responsibility to 
the principal for the steward to act in the interests of the principal? 
RQ 3: What actions are available to the principal to increase the steward’s 
sense of responsibility and achieve stewardship of critical 
infrastructures? 
The focus of this thesis has moved from the broad explorations of the literature 
surrounding privatisation, Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory, narrowing in on 
the opportunities offered by better understanding the operation of Stewardship 
Theory and the pro-stewardship factor sense of responsibility and setting the 
boundaries of the research by determining those three research questions.  With the 
objective of answering those questions, data will be gathered through case studies.  
This thesis will now narrow that focus to the identification of suitable candidate case 
studies, giving particular attention to the privatised urban water services sector. 
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Chapter 3: Literature – Infrastructure 
Privatisation 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 considered the demand by the community that governments achieve 
better stewardship of critical infrastructures and concluded that Stewardship Theory 
offers the potential to provide an alternate conceptualisation of the relationship 
between government as principal and private organisations as stewards — one which 
achieves stewardship.  As Stewardship Theory was found to be underdeveloped it 
was concluded that empirical research into the behaviour expected of a steward, how 
important the pro-stewardship factor sense of responsibility is to there being 
stewardship, and the actions to increase that sense of responsibility in the context of 
privatised critical infrastructures must be carried out.  In this chapter typical forms of 
privatised critical infrastructure contractual relationships are examined utilising 
examples of those typical forms drawn from urban water services and then the 
suitability of the urban water sector to provide candidate case studies for this 
research is explored. 
Before commencing the examination it is proposed to set criteria that can be 
applied to assessing the suitability of case studies for this research.  For conclusions 
to be drawn from the data collected through case studies, variables other than the 
pro-stewardship factors and contractual forms must be eliminated or identified.  To 
maximise the general application of learning from this research it would be ideal to 
carry out case studies in an infrastructure sector where there is substantial 
privatisation. Urban water services (drinking water and sewerage) throughout the 
world are subject to a range of similar forms of privatisation, constructed of similar 
infrastructure and outputs have quality standards which are highly measurable and 
invariably published publicly due to regulatory requirements (Funnell et al., 2009; 
Rees, 1998).  Because reticulated drinking water and removal of waste water is 
fundamental to the functioning of urban societies anywhere (Graham & Marvin, 
2001) there is a strong likelihood of a consistent set of public values.  Urban water 
services have been subjected to the full range of forms of privatisation: outright sale 
to the private sector, joint ventures including various forms of PPP arrangements and 
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alliances, concessions, and leases and management contracts.  It is assumed that 
privatised water services as a sector will have few variables outside the forms of 
contract and offers the potential to capture data which will be recognised as highly 
reliable. 
As organisations which agreed to participate in the research did so on the basis 
of not being identified care has been taken in this chapter to not provide information 
which might, in conjunction with the data set out in later chapters of this thesis, 
identify participant case study organisations.  For that reason the following sections 
of this thesis will not describe individual systems. 
This chapter reviews the various forms of contracts for privatised urban water 
services as examples and, in Section 3.3 Conclusion, the suitability of these forms of 
privatised water governance as candidate case studies is evaluated. 
3.2 FORMS OF PRIVATISED WATER CONTRACTS 
The stewardship of water services infrastructure is currently performed through 
governance forms involving a mix of public and private organisations, each fulfilling 
one or more roles; that is, policy, ownership, operation or maintenance.  The focus of 
this research is on that part of the governance arrangement which carries out the 
functions of ownership, O&M as established by the contractual relationship between 
the steward (the private operator) and the government as principal. 
The four typical forms of privatised water contracts are: 
 full divestiture by government of its ownership of the system to a private 
entity; 
 partial divestiture/joint venture/alliance; 
 concession, being a contract to provide services that confers ownership 
and revenue rights on the private entity; and  
 leases/management contracts. 
There is no comprehensive assessment of the extent of privatisation of water 
services in developed countries.  However, a search of the literature has revealed an 
absence of uniformity as to the extent of privatisation with the data suggesting the 
operation of other factors within each nation.  The results of that search are as 
follows: 
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 Australia: 21% of water and 6% of sewerage is privatised (Owen, 2001). 
 England and Wales: all water services are privatised (Birchall, 2002; Kay, 
Kassim, Pickernell, & Brooksbank, 2007). 
 France: 80% private sector participation (Reynaud, 2007). 
 Netherlands: 27 water supply companies, three are private (Schwartz & 
Blokland, 2002). 
 United States: 5% of the population has private water providers 
(Haarmeyer & Coy, 2002). 
The choice made by countries as to the contractual form for privatised water 
has been characterised by countries not adopting the full range of typical forms but 
rather one form being dominant in each country.  Examples would be England with 
full-divestiture being highly dominant and Australia where joint ventures and 
management contracts dominate.  The contractual forms utilised in all countries are 
explored in the following section which is structured around the four typical forms of 
privatised water governance identified by Rees (1998). 
3.2.1 Full divestiture 
Full privatisation is the divestment by government of its ownership of assets; in 
this case the transfer of the ownership of the water system to private companies and 
the responsibility for all operations, maintenance, revenue raising and investment 
(Rees, 1998). 
The extent of full privatisation of the world’s urban water systems has been 
limited with much of the literature regarding the privatisation of water services 
focusing on the 1989 sale (or divestiture) in England and Wales of 18 (now 15) 
water-only and 10 combined water and sewerage utilities by an open market process 
(Birchall, 2002).  Licences to operate for 25 years were granted and a complex and 
expensive regulatory system anchored on three separate oversight bodies (Funnell et 
al., 2009) was established.  In the English/Welsh model the private companies have 
major limitations upon how they conduct their business, constraining them on the 
setting of prices, investment decisions, the choice of raw materials, the disposal of 
assets, and merging and restructuring (Rees, 1998). 
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The heavy regulation deemed commensurate with the monopoly power and 
functions of the private companies (Rees, 1998) has impacted negatively on the 
English Government.  Government is burdened with the significant ongoing cost of 
the regulatory regime and cannot fund that from revenue generated by the asset (the 
water system) as the government no longer owns the asset.  Also, government has 
incurred political risk as the powers, discretions and lack of transparency on the part 
of the economic regulator have resulted in allegations of opportunism, condemnation 
by consumers, and investors losing confidence as to cost recovery (Munssen & 
Williamson, 2002). 
Full privatisation of water with its divestiture by government of the water 
system assets has led to general consensus among policy-makers that whilst 
governments may sell telecommunications and electricity utilities, “…water is 
unavoidably social in nature evoking political emotions like no other issue” (Prasad, 
2006, p. 669). 
The full divestiture form has not been a popular option in  water sectors largely 
because of the need to accompany full privatisation with continued public regulation 
(Rees, 1998), the cost and political risk attached to that regulation, and the political 
emotions attached to water services by the public.  However, the question as to 
whether a fully privatised water system would be suitable as a candidate case study 
remains.  Superficially the absence of either a principal–agent or a principal–steward 
contractual relationship would suggest that it would not be suitable.  Yet the fully 
privatised water services as stewards may achieve stewardship of the infrastructure 
as measured against public values and may act in the interests of the government and 
may have an internal sense of responsibility to the government.  It is concluded that 
the fully privatised form would offer a rich source of data to understand stewardship 
behaviour and allow comparison with other case studies in the form of contractual 
relationships. 
3.2.2 Partial divestiture/joint venture/alliance 
Partial divestiture can take forms such as a government selling a partial 
shareholding in a ‘corporatised’ enterprise or the creation of a joint venture company 
with the private sector (Rees, 1998, p. 99).  The World Bank (2010) summarises the 
key features of joint ventures involving infrastructure as: 
 Chapter 3: Literature – Infrastructure Privatisation 63 
 In the case of an existing utility, shares in the utility are divested to the 
private sector. 
 The level of share ownership will differ depending on whether the 
government is seeking to get the project off the balance sheet and whether 
the government wishes to retain management control of the utility.  
Government may retain control, or even negative veto power over certain 
management issues, even though it divests a majority of shares. 
 The O&M functions are delegated to the private operator through a 
management contract. 
 It is also possible to have a joint venture in the form either of: 
o a partnership (an arrangement with profit sharing between partners) 
created for a specific purpose — no separate legal entity is created and 
each of the partners continues with full legal responsibility for the 
project; or 
o a contractual consortium arrangement in which the parties contract to 
work together on a specific project; there is, however, no concept of a 
sharing of a pool of profits as there is with a partnership — each party 
is remunerated for specific services provided to the consortium and no 
separate legal entity is created. 
This partial-divestiture/joint venture model has been used to a limited extent 
for water services O&M in Australia, with there being an urban water system 
operated by a joint venture comprised of a government corporation and one national 
and one international utilities company. 
A related mixing of sectors has emerged in the form of alliances between 
government and specialist contractors, principally for the construction of 
infrastructure (Walker & Hampson, 2003).  Alliance contracts are an increasingly 
prevalent feature of water utilities, often being used to deliver O&M work, customer 
service or capital expenditure activities in Australia (National Water Commission, 
2011), suggesting that the term ‘alliance’ should be explored to determine which of 
the typical forms of water governance, established by Rees (1998) and utilised as the 
framework for this section of the chapter, it most resembles.  Alliances are 
distinguished from joint ventures and partnerships in that an alliance is built on an 
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explicit ‘no-disputes’, ‘no-liability’ framework and a far greater emphasis upon 
teaming than these other relationships (Davies, 2008, p. 4).  The alliance form of 
contract was developed as a response to the experience of traditional contracts which 
were typically incomplete in their specification of outcomes required in the 
comparatively distant future encompassed in their long contracted period (Rahman & 
Kumaraswamy, 2004; Walker & Hampson, 2003).  Davies (2008, p. 3) found that 
typically alliance contracts: 
1. share risk equally between customer and supplier; 
2. include a ‘no-disputes clause’ which prohibits recourse to external disputes 
resolution (including litigation); 
3. preclude liability between alliance participants for loss, damage or 
negligence; and  
4. provide that all transactions are of an ‘open book format’, and all cost 
escalations or savings are shared between the parties. 
In the public sector context “…the project team is integrated; it is required to 
act in good faith, with integrity…and make unanimous decisions and 
recommendations on all key project issues.” (Department of Infrastructure and 
Transport, National Alliance Contracting: Policy Principles [NACPP], 2011, p. 3).  
The alliance contract is typically structured to incentivise the parties to work quickly 
and collaboratively to resolve issues as they arise and work cooperatively to 
complete the project on time and within budget (NACPP, 2011), suggesting a strong 
alignment with the cooperation and collaboration emphasised in the Stewardship 
Theory conceptualisation of the contractual relationship. 
In summary, the forms of partial divestiture (joint venture and alliances) are 
used in Australia to a sufficient extent that there is a high probability that suitable 
candidate case studies will be available. 
3.2.3 Concession 
Concession (or franchise) arrangements have been used for providing 
infrastructure for hundreds of years.  Concessions are often granted as build-operate-
transfer (BOT) contracts or BOOT or rehabilitate-operate-transfer (ROT) 
arrangements (Kerf, Gray, Irwin, Levesque & Taylor, 1998).  These forms of 
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concessions are distinguished by the feature that the infrastructure as constructed or 
taken over by the concessionaire is owned by the concessionaire until transfer (back) 
to the government, together with operating rights, at the end of the period of time 
stipulated, for example the 99 years stipulated in the Suez Canal contract (Smith, 
1999).  Ownership is particularly important for both parties as the ownership may be 
accompanied by rights to carry out certain non-core but profitable commercial 
activities such as property development (Smith, 1999), leading to the overall project 
being more likely to be viable.  The concession form of contract can provide for the 
service assets to remain state property but for the concessionaire to have exclusive 
usage and complete responsibility for operations, system maintenance, capital 
investments and revenue collection over an extended period (25–30 years or more).  
The affermage form of concession contract, which is predominantly used in the water 
sector in France, not only provides that infrastructure ownership remain with the 
government entity but also places the responsibility for investment with the owner 
(Hall, De la Motte & Davies, 2003).  Concessions as highly autonomous monopolies 
require regulation for the same reasons as the fully divested model (Rees, 1998). 
Modern governments perceive benefit from concessions in their capacity to 
bring competitive pressures to industries or services which are natural monopolies 
(such as water distribution).  The concession documents are used to specify the rights 
and obligations of the private firms/companies and the tender process is used to 
create competition for a market in the circumstances where competition in the market 
(the monopoly provider has no ongoing competition) is not operating (Kerf et al., 
1998).  Limiting the initial term of the concession, combined with the opportunity for 
extensions based on performance and the advantage to the concessionaire of being 
the incumbent at the end of the term re-bid, encourages the concessionaire to perform 
well during the term.  The availability of additional work for the same government 
entity or similar entities again encourages the concessionaire to perform well and 
maintain reputation, whilst also providing a greater number of opportunities for 
competition. 
In Australia there is one urban water system that has been put to an affermage 
contract and an increasing number of BOT, BOOT and ROT contracts for operation 
of elements of water systems such as sewerage treatment plants, water filtration 
plants and desalination plants.  These are not insignificant enterprises, with one water 
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filtration plant operator receiving annual payments that are more than the combined 
annual operations, maintenance and capital budgets of several urban water systems in 
Australia. 
In summary, the concession form of privatised contractual arrangements has 
been established as one of the principal forms of privatisation of critical 
infrastructure throughout much of the world, and to date has been used in Australia 
to a limited extent.  As the concession form is representative of a significant 
proportion of water privatisations throughout the world it is highly important to the 
usefulness of this thesis that the case studies utilised in this research include the 
concession form of contract. 
3.2.4 Leases and management contracts 
The remaining typical forms of water contracts, leases and management 
contracts, are not designed to provide private capital for infrastructure construction 
or maintenance.  Most leases provide funding by way of the private companies 
collecting charges direct from users.  This often creates tensions between public 
values such as affordability and accessibility, particularly in the context of a 
monopoly provider and price guarantees by the government to the provider over a 
relatively long term such as 25–30 years.  Management contracts are for a shorter 
duration, usually five years, where the private company is only responsible for O&M 
with the government collecting user charges.  Service contracts are typically single-
function contracts to perform a specific service, for example renovate a pipeline, or 
read or install meters (Rees, 1998).  The right to contract being at risk at the end of a 
relatively short term (3–5-year contract), together with the contracted-out functions 
usually being those for which there is a market of competing providers, leads to 
efficiency in use of public funds and better alignment of the service with public 
values. 
The inclusion of leases or management contracts in the case studies utilised in 
this research was problematic.  The concession form of privatisation is itself a form 
of lease and the form of lease most suited to the O&M of water systems because of 
the long-term nature of construction and maintenance programs and water services 
being a natural monopoly.  Accordingly there are no notable examples of leases in 
water in Australia (with the exception of the concessions touched on in the preceding 
section).  In respect of management contracts these are correctly traditional contracts 
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whereby the ‘doing’ of a function is carried out by a private organisation and no 
assets transfer to the private entity.  The management contracts, and to a lesser extent 
leases, appear to have been included in the list of forms of privatisation created by 
Rees (1998) for completeness and to allow ready comparison and distinction. 
No leases or management contracts were included in the pool of candidate case 
studies. 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the typical contractual forms for 
privatised water services to understand the nature of those forms and to determine 
whether there is a sufficient number of candidate case studies that will allow the 
exploration of Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory behaviours. 
The range of forms of privatisation of critical infrastructures — full divestiture, 
partial divestiture (including joint ventures and alliances) and concession forms of 
contract — were found to be present in the Australian urban water services sector.  
The exception is the full divestiture/fully privately-owned and operated form which 
has not been adopted in Australia and has been adopted to a very limited extent 
elsewhere in the world.  For that reason this research proceeded without the inclusion 
of a case study that provided an example of a fully privately-owned water system. 
The Australian water services sector provided case studies suitable for this research. 
The process for the selection of candidate case studies and in turn the gathering 
of data from each case study is set out in the following chapter, Chapter 4: Research 
Approach. 
 

 Chapter 4: Research Approach 69 
Chapter 4: Research Approach 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Earlier in Chapter 2 Literature Review, the requirement by communities that 
governments steward critical infrastructures was established and the increasing 
reliance of governments upon private companies to operate and maintain those 
critical infrastructures was examined.  Some privatised operations were found to be 
failing to meet the needs of the community.  There was some evidence that the 
private operators who had contracted with government were acting against the 
interests of the government and the community.  It was concluded that there was a 
high probability that this behaviour was caused by the underpinning contractual 
relationships which were configured in accordance with Agency Theory 
prescriptions.  The use of Stewardship Theory as a complement to Agency Theory to 
provide ways in which the behaviour of private companies as agents can be shaped to 
achieve better stewardship of infrastructures was proposed.  The Stewardship Theory 
pro-organisational attribute sense of responsibility (Dicke, 2002; Hernandez, 2012) 
was identified as being highly important (and possibly essential) to achieving 
stewardship on the part of the agent (the private company). 
The largely theoretical nature of Stewardship Theory to date and its 
underdeveloped state suggested that this thesis conduct empirical research utilising 
case studies to explore the actual experience of stewardship (or otherwise) of typical 
forms of contractual relationships.  The data collected from each case study was 
examined on a case-by-case basis and the findings for each are set out in Chapter 5: 
Analysis.  The findings were in turn analysed by way of a cross-case comparison and 
conclusions as to the contribution to theory and practical knowledge are reported in 
Chapter 6: Discussion.  Those processes were carried out within a framework of 
themes and factors which retained the structure and focus established in the research 
questions.  Through that design the methods delivered findings which directly 
addressed the objective of this thesis; that is, understanding the potential of 
Stewardship Theory to inform the configuration of contractual relationships to 
achieve stewardship of critical infrastructures. 
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This chapter first outlines the design of the case study method, paying 
particular attention to the design of the data collection approach and the experience 
of the administration of the data collection and analysis processes.  Secondly, the 
steps taken to ensure research integrity and data quality are explained and the 
limitations of the research methods are discussed. 
4.2 THE CASE STUDY METHOD 
Because of the need to explore the actual behaviours of parties within the 
privatised contractual relationships and to draw out from the parties their perceptions 
as to the sense of responsibility held by an organisation as agent or steward, the 
multiple case study method was chosen.  The requirement was that this empirical 
data be drawn from examples of different, typical contractual configurations (e.g. the 
alliance or the concession) to gather data in respect of the individual configuration 
and for the purpose of comparison between typical configurations.  In addition, the 
multi-case study method provides broad data to assist in the validation of findings 
from individual case studies and to provide some generalisability of findings 
(Stewart, 2012). 
This multi-case comparison fell into three tracks consistent with the model 
identified by Stake (2006) namely the identification of themes in each of the cases, 
the identification of factors and the cross-case analysis.  As will be explained later in 
this chapter these tracks were approached on a largely sequential basis; however, the 
latter tracks, particularly the cross-case analysis, identified issues which caused the 
revisiting and adjustment of the themes and factors. 
This research proceeded on the basis that the collection of data into these 
themes and factors would be structured within the areas covered by the three research 
questions: stewardship behaviour, sense of responsibility, and the actions which 
increase that sense of responsibility.  This structure within a structure established a 
template which forced a rigorous examination of each item of data, and in turn the 
allocation of that data to one or more factors in whichever themes the factor had been 
positioned. 
4.2.1 Data collection approach 
Three data collection sources common to each case study were utilised.  The 
first was the literature where the individual water services infrastructure had been the 
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subject of scholarly examination.  The second was an archival document study.  The 
third was a structured informant interview study. 
4.2.1.1 Literature regarding case study systems 
The availability of data regarding certain aspects of the operation of three of 
the case study water systems in published articles became apparent as the researcher 
surveyed the broad body of literature and prior to the identification of Australian 
urban water systems as suitable case studies.  The five articles review a part, or the 
whole, of the operations of the case study and the data contained in those articles 
contributed to the research in three ways.  The first was as an additional source of 
data, independent of the archival document study and informant interview study.  
The availability of such an additional source of data influenced the choice of the case 
studies covered in the literature.  The second was to contribute to the development of 
the initial themes and factors and the consequent informant interview questions.  The 
third was as a source of data explored in the development of findings for the 
individual case studies and which was re-examined in the cross-case analysis. 
4.2.1.2 Archival document study 
The archival document study was approached as a foundation 
methodological strategy.  The data collected through this study was used as the basis 
for findings plus it was used to prepare the researcher for the forthcoming interviews 
for each case study.  In addition, concerns as to the possibility of bias in the data 
collected through the semi-structured informant interviews demanded that the 
proportion of data which was sourced from archival documents be maximised.  
Further, a strategy of seeking out every possible pertinent document generated by 
entities independent from the case study organisation was adopted to maximise the 
credibility of the data. 
Archival data was available from a broad range of public sources, in 
particular annual reports, strategic plans, public tender process documents, 
regulators’ reports, reports of Auditors-General, newspapers and media reports.  
Documents which were published regularly (for example annual reports and water 
quality reports) covering each of the water systems were obtained for the 2011–12, 
2010–11 and 2009–10 years. 
 72 Chapter 4: Research Approach 
The water services sector can be characterised as having a high level of 
transparency as to its core activities, the provision of safe drinking water and the safe 
treatment of waste water, reflecting the importance to the public of values around 
efficient use of public resources and quality of customer services (including 
environmental outcomes).  In addition one case study was the subject of a Royal 
Commission (and subsequent review of the implementation of the recommendations 
of the Commission) regarding water contamination events, providing documents 
which were highly relevant to the stewardship of that water system.  That 
documentation also provided independent expert comment about standards which 
had been adopted across the Australian urban water services industry. 
The archival data was collected in two stages.  The first stage brought 
together descriptive data such as the demographics of the entities which comprise 
each water service and data as to the legal form of the entities.  The data were 
collected in a structured manner using a standardised template.  The second stage 
involved the collection of data relevant to the research questions and served the 
purpose of informing the development of the initial themes and factors and the 
consequent informant interview questions.  The archival data was again interrogated 
in the data coding stage subsequent to the informant interviews for each case study 
which is explained in Section 4.2.2 Administering the research design. 
4.2.1.3 Informant interview study 
This section explains the rationale for choosing the semi-structured 
interview tool and then the approach taken in the development of the interview 
questions.  Finally the interview protocols and the use of the protocol document, 
together with the testing of the protocol, are explained. 
4.2.1.3.1 Rationale for informant interviews 
The choice of interview tool was driven by the formative stage of 
Stewardship Theory and the need to collect and analyse data regarding the 
behaviours and attributes of organisations and individuals.  In addition it was 
necessary that the method be open to the possibility of insights or factors to date not 
identified in the literature or the archival documents.  In contemplating the options as 
to collecting data from individuals the questionnaire was thought not to be open to 
grasping possible insights or factors beyond those identified to date in the literature 
and archival study. 
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The informant interview method was chosen because of the necessity to 
collect data directly from those experiencing that behaviour (Shah & Corley, 2006) 
and the capacity of the interview to reveal the ‘realities’ experienced by informants 
and capture nuances and insights to facilitate the further development of theory.  It 
was acknowledged that the particular interview method must control for the multiple 
realities (Sale, Lohfeld & Brazil, 2002) of informants who participate in 
organisational and individual relationships and that it was highly important to this 
research to understand the realities of each informant (Brower, Abolafia & Carr, 
2000).  These factors directed this research towards ensuring that informants were 
chosen such that their role, and thus their evidence, intersects with that of informants 
from the other parties in the contractual relationship.  This technique allowed the 
validation of interview data, by way of triangulation (Jick, 1979) involving data 
gathered between interviews and that collected through the archival document study. 
4.2.1.3.2 Interview protocol 
Consequent upon the interrogation of annual reports and other documents 
the researcher concluded that the persons most likely to be able to inform the 
research were executives and managers from the government and private entities.  
With those candidate informants in mind the Interview Protocol (Appendix A), 
including the interview questions, was constructed having regard to the literature and 
archival study data. 
The Interview Protocol document contained the Consent Form covering 
the requirements set by the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) Human 
Research Ethics Committee, an explanation of the purpose of the research and the 
interview questions.  Those questions were formed to allow a semi-structured 
interview of 45 minutes to one hour duration. 
4.2.1.3.3 Confirming the research design 
First the Interview Protocol was put to senior government officers as 
surrogates for the water industry informants seeking their comment as to the clarity 
of the questions, and likely effectiveness of the interview process.  Second, the 
overall design and questions were put to representatives of the Cooperative Research 
Centre for Infrastructure and Engineering Asset Management (CIEAM) and the 
Australian Asset Management Collaborative Group (AAMCoG) as infrastructure 
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industry members and acknowledged research scholars. The Interview Protocol was 
adjusted in accordance with suggestions from the three groups were adopted. 
Accordingly a design was formed which, through the case studies, 
provides knowledge of the lived experience of stewardship (or not) of critical 
infrastructures by private entities, while still providing assurance as to the validity of 
data by gathering data from a sufficient range of sources. 
4.2.2 Administering the research design 
The research methods were administered by a single researcher, the author of 
this thesis.  Risks emerging from having only one researcher administer the research 
methods, namely bias and the possibility of missed insights, were formally identified 
and the steps taken to mitigate these risks are explained throughout this chapter. 
Having established the detail of the data collection methods, the methods were 
applied to the case studies and in turn the cross-case analysis was carried out.  This 
section sets out the process applied in administering the research methods, 
highlighting the iterative approach that emerged as the data from each case study 
were interrogated.  Key elements of this explanation are the ethical considerations, 
the determination of the case studies, the process for conducting the interviews and 
the analysis of the data. 
4.2.2.1 Ethical considerations 
As the thesis author is an employee of the Queensland Audit Office, water 
systems within Queensland were considered not eligible as candidate case studies in 
order to obviate the possibility of a perceived conflict of interest.  The proposed 
research and methods were submitted to the QUT Human Research Ethics 
Committee with the research being considered to be low risk and considered as 
meeting the requirements of the national Statement on Ethical Conduct of Research 
Involving Humans (QUT Ethics Approval Number 0900000931).  In 
acknowledgement of the commercial sensitivities of each case study organisation and 
the close-knit Australian water industry the needs of organisations and individuals as 
to confidentiality was anticipated in the design of the informant interview study.  To 
achieve informed consent template documents were used in a stepped process which 
both allowed the organisation or individual to participate or decline and provided 
documented agreement by the organisation or individual in order to protect the 
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interests of the participants.  Each candidate organisation was provided with detailed 
information as to the proposed research by way of a standard email and attached 
Participant Information document (Appendix A).  Informants were provided with a 
written Interview Protocol before the interview commenced (see Appendix A).  That 
document contained the standardised interview questions and is prefaced by a 
Consent Form which explains the research.  Before commencing the interview 
questioning the written consent of each interviewee was obtained by way of their 
signing that page.  To address the issue of the need for confidentiality and the risk 
attributing adverse comments to particular participants, an organisation and 
informant de-identification strategy was put in place and ethics approval was granted 
on that basis prior to the schedule of informant interviews commencing. 
4.2.2.2 Determination of the case studies 
Proceeding from the body of candidate case studies identified as suitable in 
Chapter 3: Literature — Infrastructure Privatisation, the Australian candidate case 
studies with their broad offering of forms of privatisation were examined.  The 
criteria for case studies developed in Chapter 3 — substantial privatisation, 
commonality between the systems as to the public values attached to the 
infrastructures, and that other than the form of the contractual relationship there is no 
significant variable which has the potential to diminish the comparability and 
translatability of findings — were applied to these candidate case studies.  The focus 
of this purposive sampling was narrowed by the application of the most-
similar/most-different case approach (Przeworski & Teune, 1970) where the variable 
was the form of the privatisation contractual relationship, for example alliance or 
concession.  Having grouped the candidate water systems according to the 
privatisation type the most-different approach was taken with the objective of 
ensuring the sample represented as broad a range of forms of privatisation as was 
possible.  Seven urban water systems providing a broad range of forms of 
privatisation and some redundancy by way of similar case studies were identified.  
One candidate water system was the subject of strained relationships between the 
contracted party and the government in the lead up to renewal of the long-term 
contract due in June 2011.  Tentative support for this research from the government 
entity was formally withdrawn in May 2011.  The remaining candidate case studies 
were reviewed against the criteria of data being available by way of documents 
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published by independent bodies or by way of published literature pertaining to the 
following four water services.  The following four case study services were chosen 
because of the high level of availability of data from independent bodies and having 
regard to the balanced mix of contractual relationships as set out in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Case study water services 
Urban water service Contractual arrangements underpinning relationships 
Case Study A An alliance comprised of the government entity responsible 
for the distribution and retail services for drinking and waste 
water and a consortium of two companies (which are 
subsidiaries of companies providing services worldwide) 
pursuant to an alliance agreement to perform O&M and 
some capital works for 10 years. 
Case Study B A joint venture by way of 50% ownership of each of two 
partnerships (distribution and retail) by the government 
entity responsible for the distribution and retail services for 
drinking and waste water and other utility services, and one 
international company for the distribution partnership and 
one ASX listed company for the retail partnership for the 
O&M and some capital works for water pursuant to a formal 
agreement for 20 years. 
Case Study C Two identical contracts between a government entity and an 
international contracting company for one half of a 
metropolitan area, and between the government entity and 
an international engineering and property services company 
for the other half of the metropolitan area, for the delivery 
of O&M services for the drinking and waste water services.  
The contracts were put to tender after seven years then let 
and extended for a further total 10 years which ended in 
2012. 
Case Study D Two identical BOOT contracts for a term of 25 years to 
construct and operate drinking water filtration plants.  In 
one contract a government entity has contracted with an 
international utilities company to construct and operate a 
filtration plant providing approximately 75% of the 
requirements of a large metropolitan area.  The second 
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contract is with an international utilities and transportation 
company to construct and operate two smaller filtration 
plants. 
 
Each of these case studies was rich in secondary data and, as they share a 
focus on O&M, allows comparison across case studies.  Case Study C offers an 
example of two alliance contracts established in the mid 1990s for the same services 
to adjacent geographical areas with the added benefit of the government entity 
having formally identified the shortcomings of the alliances; during 2011 the 
government went to the market seeking participants for a replacement, single 
alliance.  This evolving model, when contrasted with Case Study A (also an 
alliance), was thought likely to offer clear insights into actions which have a strong 
impact on sense of responsibility and satisfaction of public values such as service 
quality and value for money.  Similarly Case Study D, with the feature of ownership 
of the water filtration plants by each of the private companies, was thought to be rich 
in opportunity to understand the impact of such contractual arrangements on sense of 
responsibility.  In turn Case Study B, with the ownership of such plants retained by 
the government entity, offered a promising comparison with Case Study D.  The 
conduct of O&M by the Case Study B joint venture promised opportunities for 
comparison with the alliance case studies, Case Study A and Case Study B. 
All four candidate case study water systems are of a sufficiently large size to 
fall into the “utilities with 100,000 connected properties” grouping utilised by the 
National Water Commission in its annual National Performance Report: Urban 
water utilities (National Water Commission, 2011).  This similarity in size removed 
variables based upon the size of the case study operations and allowed focus on the 
dependent variables arising out of the features of each case study. 
4.2.2.3 Interviews 
The administration of the informant interview was comprised of several 
stages.  The first was the negotiation of appropriate informants.  The second was the 
conduct of the interviews.  The third was the completion of notes and reflections 
following the interviews.  This section of the thesis sets out how those stages 
proceeded and how emerging issues were addressed. 
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The negotiation of appropriate informants was achieved through the four 
entity contact persons, each of whom was provided with a copy of the Interview 
Protocol (including the interview questions).  Each contact person was from the 
government entity as a strategy was adopted of first approaching the government 
entity, gaining the support of that entity and asking that they arrange the agreement 
of the private companies to participate.  This approach was taken as it was likely that 
the private entities would not commit without first knowing that the government 
entity had agreed to the research.  The possibility that this strategy allowed the 
government entities to select private company informants who would favour the 
government entity was acknowledged and the researcher was alert to such choices.  
The data provided by private companies was tested during the later coding stage 
against data provided by counterpart government informants and data gathered from 
the literature and the archival study.  There was no apparent bias in the data provided 
by the private company informants. 
The interviews were conducted on site in the offices of the respective water 
systems or private companies.  Each informant was provided with a copy of the 
Interview Protocol by email in advance of the interview and at the commencement of 
the interview, and the written consent form (see Appendix A) was completed by the 
interviewee.  The interviews were recorded electronically and later transcribed by an 
independent, professional transcription service.  Notes were taken by the interviewer 
during the interview.  The researcher took handwritten notes of the interview 
including notes as to the physical environment, changes in the demeanour of the 
interviewee and issues to be followed up after the interview. 
The researcher prepared for the interviews by revisiting the secondary data 
sources.  This strategy was adopted to demonstrate respect for the informants and to 
be as prepared as was possible to recognise and follow unexpected themes and 
issues. 
Across the four case studies 22 informants were interviewed.  It was 
intended that there be a minimum of two informants from each of the entities which 
comprise each of the case study relationships so that data validation by way of 
comparison between intersecting roles could be achieved.  In addition, issues 
identified in the interview of the first entity representative could then be pursued with 
the second informant from that entity.  This was achieved in all cases except 
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Case Study B, where there were three informants from the joint venture and one 
informant from the government entity.  However, the government entity has only one 
executive position allocated to water.  Ultimately validation of data from the single 
informant was achieved by way of interviewing the counterpart informant from the 
joint venture and interrogation of the considerable body of data gathered from the 
archival study. 
A routine was adopted of conducting a review of the interview data gathered 
and the overall proceedings of each interview at the end of each day.  The practical 
effect of the four case study water systems being drawn from across Australia was 
that interviews for each case study were completed and reviewed typically over a 
two-day period and before the interviews for the next were commenced.  This review 
stage examined the audio recording of the interview, the researcher’s notes taken 
during the interview and a structured reflection upon the proceedings of the 
interview.  This review allowed the researcher to reflect upon the nuances of the 
concepts and facts which the informants had put forward.  A summary of the data 
from each informant was written up together with notes and observations regarding 
themes and factors, and impacting issues such as the physical environment in which 
the informant operated.  Handwritten notes were annotated with the then existing 
themes and factors and further research tasks (usually regarding the particular water 
system) were identified. 
This review routine improved the administration of the research methods.  
The researcher, in reviewing the recording of interviews from the first case study 
interviews, found that his strong personal identification with the engineering culture 
of the informants may have led to his assuming meaning, rather than confirming 
meaning.  Thereafter the researcher was careful to explore rather than assume.  In 
addition, the approach informants took to responding to the research questions 
informed the refinement of the tactics of conducting the interviews, generally leading 
to the collection of information staying more ‘on point’ with the Interview Protocol 
questions.  The Interview Protocol questions remained unchanged for all interviews. 
The informant interview study provided a substantial body of data which 
met the researcher’s expectations as to informing the research regarding the 
behaviour of agents, stewards and principals. 
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4.2.2.4 Analysis of data 
The analysis of the data commenced by applying the structure of themes and 
factors which underpinned the Interview Protocol to the coding of the data following 
the interviews. 
A strategy of coding the data from all sources for the one case study before 
proceeding to the data from the next case study was adopted.  This strategy allowed 
comparison and verification within the case study, and triggered further research 
tasks.  Similarly the coding of data from successive case studies caused reflection 
upon the coding to date and led to the review of previous coding and the 
identification of nuances not previously detected. 
The coding was carried out using the NVivo software which assists in 
organising and analysing data.  The nodes were used for concepts or items, for 
example trust and incentives.  Where there was an apparent theme between items, for 
example incentives and gain–share/pain–share, these nodes were allocated to a tree 
node.  Where there was an apparent link between items, for example between 
incentives and sense of responsibility, relationship nodes were established.  Because 
of the need for the research design to be open to all possibilities offered by the case 
study data the coding was approached on the basis of maximising the possible 
meanings and allocating each word, or section of text, to whichever node or multiple 
modes their possible meaning suggested.  As was expected, the subsequent iterative 
processes focused and reduced this initial ‘catch-all’ coding.  This approach proved 
to be invaluable in detecting underlying themes in addition to the more obvious 
meaning attributable to the language.  An example is the overt theme of 
coordination/collaboration/partnership which had for the private informants the less 
obvious dimension of being a measure of their success.  Parent private companies 
were found to require this behaviour from individuals and their subsidiary 
organisations, formally surveying clients (contract principals) and seeing a direct link 
between their having a reputation for cooperation, coordination and collaboration and 
additional work elsewhere in the sector. 
Following the coding of data from the last case study, and before writing-up 
the findings for the case studies (Chapter 5: Analysis), the researcher took the 
opportunity to end this case study-driven phase of the process and review the data 
from two quite different perspectives: one being the literature; and the other the 
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readiness of the node trees, the nodes and the reflective notes attached to some nodes 
to inform and support the write-up of the findings of the case studies and the cross-
case analysis (Chapter 6: Discussion).  The revisiting of the literature came from the 
obvious need to ensure that there was complete alignment between the format in 
which the data was assembled and the objectives of the research, particularly the 
research questions.  In addition the exposure of the researcher to the facts and 
conceptualisations of the informants created the need for the researcher to draw out 
further meaning from the Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory and Privatisation 
literature.  In respect of the readiness of the allocation to nodes and the choice of 
connection of nodes the researcher’s concern was whether the whole and the parts 
portrayed in NVivo had arrived at the stage of being near complete or sufficient to 
support the write-up of the findings of the case studies.  The coding was adjusted and 
the results tested by way of presentation to a peer colloquium and industry 
conference. 
The analysis of the data presented by the refined assignments in NVivo 
proceeded using the framework of stewardship behaviour, sense of responsibility and 
actions to increase sense of responsibility with the data for each case study being 
explored and findings established before moving to the next case study and repeating 
the process.  The outcome of that process is reported in Chapter 5: Analysis.  After 
findings for each case study had been established a cross-case analysis of the data 
was carried out and conclusions reached as to the impact upon theory and the 
practical application of the findings.  The outcome of that process is reported in 
Chapter 6: Discussion. 
The process of examining the data on a case-by-case basis proved to be 
intensely iterative.  The exploration of the informant interview data required both 
considerable reference back to the literature and existing archival data and also 
further archival research.  Through that important step it was possible to not only 
bring precision to small issues such as correct titles and earlier organisational history, 
but also to develop deeper and alternate meanings from the data.  This approach to 
the treatment of data was repeated in turn, with the remaining three case studies. 
Each case resulted in refining the coding and themes.  For each case study the data 
collected from each informant was cross-checked by the researcher against that 
provided by other informants from that case study for the purposes of both validating 
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the immediate claims and uncovering nuances and subtleties in areas such as 
relationships, behaviours and culture. 
The structure of the reporting of the findings was progressively adjusted to 
accommodate the unfolding themes and issues, and the reshaped framework was 
reapplied to the case studies that had previously been reviewed.  This rigid 
application of the same reporting framework to each case study proved invaluable in 
drawing out further and embedded issues and revealed both factors common to more 
than one case study and distinctions between case studies.  This framework, having 
been settled by such exhaustive consideration and readjustment, was then adopted for 
the reporting of the cross-case analysis. 
The analysis of the findings from the individual case studies was then 
carried out utilising the cross-case method.  The framework of themes and factors 
that had been refined in the development of the findings for individual case studies, 
together with the four case studies, formed the matrix that proved highly effective in 
comparing the findings and in developing the additional theoretical and practical 
knowledge which was the objective of this thesis.  The discipline of this cross-case 
analysis, on a factor-by-factor basis, challenged perspectives taken by the researcher 
and the insights gained led to readjusting both the framework and findings 
established in Chapter 5: Analysis.  This readjustment was less frequent than during 
the development of the findings for individual case studies but the insights gained 
through the comparison of cases required that findings which were earlier fixed were 
no longer viable, and the realigned data required fresh evaluation.  The fresh 
approach to the data extended to a revisiting of the archival documents and literature 
and, to a limited extent, exploration of additional literature and archival documents.  
An example is the data challenging the somewhat out-dated Agency Theory 
assumption of the agent being risk-averse.  This data was initially thought to be 
incidental; however, discussion of the findings as to principal’s perception of 
attributes which supported the sense of responsibility of the agent or steward 
revealed that the principals had carried out formal risk assessments and selected 
private companies who had demonstrated the capability and capacity (the appetite) to 
accept those risks.  Thus the cross-case comparison had revealed that what, from the 
perspective of the individual case study, appeared to be no more than an anachronism 
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was an attribute of the organisation as agent or steward which was highly important 
to being able to act with a sense of responsibility. 
Acknowledging that any interpretation by a single researcher offers the 
possibility of bias, the assembled tentative conclusions were presented by the 
researcher to a meeting of the AAMCoG council for the purpose of gaining comment 
regarding rigor of process, relevance to the asset management industry and viability 
of interpretations.  Council members assisted with insights into the perspectives of 
principals and contractors as to attributes that contributed to a sense of responsibility 
and suitability as stewards.  In response to this advice the researcher revisited the 
interview transcripts and archival data which resulted in the development of an 
additional sense of responsibility perspective — one where the importance of that 
sense must also be seen through the lens of the principal. 
4.3 ENSURING RESEARCH INTEGRITY AND DATA QUALITY 
Having explained the strategies for collecting and analysing the case study data 
and the experience of administering the research design, this section now justifies 
that research strategy and its administration, in particular the steps taken to ensure 
the integrity of the data collected.  Finally, this section lays out the limitations 
inherent in the research approach and methods. 
4.3.1 Justification for the design, methodology and administration 
The three aspects of Stewardship Theory being pursued in this thesis are: the 
nature of stewardship behaviour at the inter-organisation level, the importance of 
sense of responsibility to stewardship being achieved, and the actions which the 
principal might take to increase that sense of responsibility.  Keeping those three 
targets in clear sight, this thesis then assembled the data within a framework built 
upon those areas and applied that framework rigorously to all data, whether collected 
from the case study methods or the literature.  The research did not depart from that 
framework resulting in the conclusions as to the development of the literature and the 
practical application of the conclusions retaining full alignment with the research 
questions and the purpose of this thesis. 
To draw out the data for this thesis a multi-case method was utilised and 
multiple sources of data for each case study were accessed.  These many sources 
revealed a matrix of themes, factors and issues which provided significant insights 
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into the behaviours of organisations as stewards, the importance of sense of 
responsibility on the part of the agent or steward to the achievement of stewardship 
behaviour and the actions which increase that sense of responsibility.  Drawing data 
from the literature, the archival study and the informant interview study provided a 
deep understanding of the actual experience within the case study and the 
comparison tool provided by the cross-case method was found to be a powerful tool 
for understanding the importance of a factor either in the context of one case or 
across multiple cases.  The most-different case approach provided a broad range of 
forms of privatisation, which presented contrasting evidence which engendered 
further rigor into the evaluation of the findings.  This multi-case comparison was 
highly appropriate to the task of supporting the development of aspects of Agency 
Theory and Stewardship Theory.  The multi-case method with its relentless between-
case comparison of the same issue or concept allowed the researcher to provide 
considerable rigor to this research resulting in precision of findings and conclusions 
that have a high probability of validity (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Stewart, 2012; 
Yin, 1994). 
4.3.2 Data quality and integrity 
To maximise the quality of the data and to achieve the highest possible level of 
reliability in interpretation of that data a number of strategies were applied in the 
areas of: choice of methods; close, careful design; and application of the processes.  
These have been described in the preceding sections of this chapter. 
The utilisation of multiple sources of data, cross-case comparison and case 
study organisations that are subject to a high level of scrutiny by independent 
regulators and requirements as to high levels of transparency to the public set the 
foundation for the strong comparison of data. 
The processes involving the collection of data were strengthened by audio 
recording and the independent transcription of interviews.  The findings and later the 
conclusions from the cross-case analysis were put to the scrutiny of industry bodies, 
namely AAMCoG, CIEAM and the World Congress on Engineering Asset 
Management 2012. 
The processes for the analysis of data, with the initial examination of data and 
reporting of findings on a case-by-case basis against a common framework of factors 
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followed by a detailed cross-case comparison and analysis, mandated that the 
researcher explore all data in considerable depth.  However, despite these strategies 
to ensure that high quality data were collected and that there be the highest reliability 
in interpretation of the data it is inevitable that the research methods adopted have 
inherent limitations.  These in turn affect the results of this research. 
4.3.3 Limitations of the methodology 
The key areas of limitation are the relative reliability of the research methods 
chosen and the generalisability of findings attributable to the form of privatisation, 
having regard to there being only one example of a form of privatisation in the case 
studies chosen. 
The research methods chosen have inherent limitations as to reliability, for 
example issues involving bias in data collection and interpretation.  How controls for 
those limitations were addressed in the research methodology was explained in the 
preceding sections.  The major limitation which remains is the reliance upon a single 
(unaided) rese archer for the conduct of the interviews and the treatment of data and 
analysis of findings.  The potential for bias in the conduct of the interviews and 
interpretation of data have been addressed by controls but the limitation remains.  
Indeed, Stewart (2012) observes that “…unless the study is very tightly bounded, it 
may be physically impossible for one unaided researcher adequately to cover the 
data-gathering” (p. 80).  However, Stewart (2012) acknowledged that in the 
circumstances of more than one researcher the risk of moderation problems ensue 
making knowing how the research team handled this issue helpful in assessing the 
reliability of the conclusions.  Whilst the research design in this thesis was 
constructed in as tight a fashion as was possible given the exploratory nature of the 
research and as the number of interviews (22) did not present a resourcing issue to 
the single researcher it is acknowledged that the findings and conclusions of this 
research should not be taken to have greater reliability than should be given to the 
work of a single researcher.  The prudent user of this research should build on the 
findings and conclusions of this research with their own work. 
The reliance upon four case study water services and the application of the 
‘most different’ approach to the selection of case studies from within the Australian 
urban water services industry provided a rich range of typical forms of privatisation, 
but in doing so limited the capacity for generalisability of findings based on forms of 
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privatisation.  In that way the original aspiration for this research, for learnings which 
could be applied to all critical infrastructures, cannot be met.  However, the 
performance of an individual form of privatisation, for example an alliance, in 
relation to stewardship is but one aspect of the research and the finding of 
stewardship by a particular form of privatisation at least points theorists and 
practitioners in the direction of a possible causal link. Notwithstanding this 
limitation, the fact that all four case studies had many factors in common was found 
to allow the outcomes of the research to significantly contribute to the extension of 
Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory and provide learnings which are highly 
applicable to the operation of urban water systems and be generalisable to other 
critical infrastructures. 
4.4 TOWARD THE PRIVATISATION CASE STUDIES AND FINDINGS 
This chapter has explained the overall research methodology and processes 
adopted for this thesis.  The archival document study and the informant interview 
study collected qualitative data in respect of four case study Australian urban water 
systems.  The application of the methodology was shown to allow a very detailed 
analysis of the findings with the intent of unpacking the variables impacting on 
stewardship, sense of responsibility and actions to increase the sense of 
responsibility. 
The next chapter, Chapter 5: Analysis, describes the four case study 
organisational relationships and reports on the findings obtained by the application of 
the research methodology.  Then following this in Chapter 6: Discussion the findings 
for all case studies are compared and contrasted and conclusions reached as to the 
implications for theory and practical application of the findings. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the four case studies drawn from across Australia.  The 
participation of organisations and individual informants and the approval of the QUT 
Ethics Clearance were conditional upon neither the organisations nor the individuals 
being identified.  For that reason the case study relationships are denoted by way of a 
letter of the alphabet, for example D being the fourth case study.  The informants are 
each denoted by way of an alphanumeric identifier, such as informant D3, which 
reveals nothing more than the person was the third person from the case study which 
is reported fourth in this thesis. 
5.2 CASE STUDY A 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The Case Study A contractual relationship was established by the government 
entity (referred to in this thesis as GovCom) responsible for the provision of water 
and waste water services to a major part of an Australian capital city.  At that time 
GovCom extended the existing practice of contracting out O&M work by going to 
the market for private participants to join it in an alliance to carry out operations, 
maintenance and capital works.  A consortium comprised of two private companies 
was successful and entered into an alliance contract (The Agreement) with GovCom 
for a term of about 10 years.  ‘The Alliance’ is the focus of this case study. 
The following sections first describe the key features of The Alliance to 
establish a foundation for the subsequent development of the findings from this case 
study.  Second, the findings are assembled utilising a framework based on the areas 
of this research; that is, stewardship behaviour, sense of responsibility and actions to 
increase sense of responsibility.  Third, the key findings are probed to understand the 
significance. 
5.2.2 Key features of The Alliance 
The Alliance exists to carry out the operation, maintenance and an increasing 
proportion of the capital works of the water service.  This section firstly describes 
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that service to provide a context for the findings.  Secondly, the legal form of The 
Alliance and the objectives of GovCom when establishing The Alliance are 
described.  Thirdly, the environment of regulation and reporting within which The 
Alliance operates is examined.  Fourthly, the payment arrangements, comprising Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs), margins linked to performance and gain–share/pain–
share payments, are explained. 
5.2.2.1 The water service 
GovCom purchases drinking water from a separate government supplier and 
through the water system serves approximately 1.5m people and industrial customers 
(GovCom Corp. Plan 2010–13).  In 2011 GovCom’s income was about $600m and 
The Alliance charged GovCom $100m for O&M, and $50m for capital works. 
5.2.2.2 Legal form and objectives 
The legal form was described by the Auditor-General as an ‘alliance’ 
describing alliances as a procurement strategy whereby an owner-participant and 
commercial participant/s establish a virtual organisation to undertake works 
(Auditor-General, 2010).  No new legal entity was created, the infrastructure assets 
remain owned by GovCom, each participant engages employees or contractors or 
purchases materials in their own right, and each retains its responsibilities to its 
owner.  GovCom is a Corporations Law company for which the State Treasurer is the 
sole shareholder (GovCom Corp. Plan 2010-13).  One private participant is one of 
the largest contracting groups in the world and the other a large engineering, 
manufacturing and services company based in Europe. The Alliance’s participants, 
governance and service outcomes are illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
 Chapter 5: Analysis 89 
Figure 5.1 The Alliance 
 
Decision-making is carried out by an alliance governance board (AGB) 
which is comprised of four members: two representing GovCom and one each from 
Private Company One and Private Company Two.  The Agreement specifies that one 
of the GovCom members performs the role of alliance General Manager on a full-
time basis and the other three AGB members have a time involvement limited to the 
monthly meeting process and other less frequent processes, typically planning.  The 
other GovCom member is the GovCom executive responsible for infrastructure.  
Both positions are members of the GovCom executive which is subordinate to the 
GovCom Board of Directors.  In addition the Agreement confers on GovCom the 
right to appoint the Chief Finance Officer of The Alliance so that the interests of 
GovCom are protected. 
The Agreement requires that decisions must be unanimous and made on the 
basis of the best interests of The Alliance rather than in the interests of any of the 
participant entities.  This feature of The Agreement is explored in greater detail in 
Section 5.2.3.1 Stewardship of infrastructure and Section 5.2.3.3 Actions to increase 
sense of responsibility, as all informants put forward the requirement for decisions to 
be unanimous as a strong contributor to both stewardship and sense of responsibility. 
The Alliance was formed to achieve the following objectives: 
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 reduce costs, maintain service levels and optimise performance 
in terms of cost, reliability and availability over the lifecycle of 
assets; 
 achieve profitable growth of unregulated income by 
undertaking external works; 
 encourage the participants to bring technologies and develop 
technologies in the alliance; and 
 attract, retain and develop skilled GovCom staff (Auditor-
General, 2010). 
The satisfaction of these objectives is assessed in the part of Section 5.2.3.1 
Stewardship of infrastructure which evaluates whether stewardship of the system has 
been achieved. 
5.2.2.3 Regulation and reporting 
The regulatory and reporting environment which applies to GovCom and 
The Alliance is now outlined with the objective of understanding the control, 
transparency and community protections within which this privatisation operates.  
Firstly, the regulation which applies to operators of drinking water and sewerage 
systems is set out.  Secondly, the regulation of the charges for services and the 
finances of GovCom are described.  Thirdly, the reporting as a government company 
and provider of water services is described. 
As a water services provider GovCom must meet requirements of state-level 
water sector legislation and hold a licence covering both water and sewerage.  The 
state environment protection authority issues licences for sewerage treatment plants 
and oversees the recycling programs (GovCom Corp. Plan 2010-13).  Drinking and 
recycled water quality and other public health issues are overseen by the state health 
department (GovCom Corp. Plan 2010-13) which publishes public drinking water 
quality reports (Annual Report on Drinking Water Quality 2009-10) which include 
issues with water services including GovCom.  Customer dispute resolution is 
achieved through an ombudsman (State Ombudsman Annual Report, 2011). 
The charges which GovCom must apply to its customers are determined by 
the state regulator.  The regulator has specified measures of the quality of service 
provided by urban water services to customers.  Financial management of GovCom 
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is controlled by the State Treasurer as sole shareholder who approves significant 
financial management matters (such as capital expenditure programs) for all water 
entities. 
Public reporting is comprised of items required of a government entity and 
those required of a water entity plus other reporting which GovCom makes 
voluntarily.  A business plan is formed annually for approval by the Treasurer.  In 
turn, an annual report is provided audited by the Auditor-General and tabled in the 
parliament.  Half-yearly and quarterly reports as to financial and non-financial 
performance (GovCom AR 2011) are made to the Treasurer as shareholder.  A Water 
Quality Report is made annually in line with safe drinking water legislation.  
GovCom participates in the National Water Commission annual comparison between 
similar urban water services (Department of Infrastructure and Transport, 2011).  
GovCom also participates in an ongoing survey by Customer Service Benchmarking 
Australia Pty Ltd across industries which have customer call centres.  GovCom was 
found to be one of the best performers in four out of five categories (GovCom Corp. 
Plan 2010-13). 
A key aspect of this regime is the significant accessibility of information to 
the public.  These various reports, and those of the independent regulators listed 
earlier, are all available on the internet sites of each organisation.  This reporting 
results in a high level of transparency as to the issues and outcomes of the activities 
of GovCom and The Alliance. 
5.2.2.4 Payment arrangements 
Core to the alliance financial arrangements is the underlying premise that all 
three participants continue to enter into contracts, purchase materials and engage 
employees in their respective names.  The Agreement commits the three participants 
to ensuring the highest standards of probity and transparency, which in practice 
requires the three participants to maintain complete accounting records including 
details of all direct costs incurred and all relevant work documentation (Auditor-
General, 2010). 
For O&M work the private participants are reimbursed for direct costs and 
paid a margin applied to those direct costs that is adjusted every four months (A-G, 
2010) based on the performance of the alliance against 16 KPIs with the target for 
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each KPI being adjusted annually by negotiation.  The O&M margin is paid to cover 
corporate costs and to provide profit.  The initial base margin was a competitive 
criterion at the time of tender and it is this that is adjusted every four months to be 
applied during the following four months.  The margin applied for the period 
November 2007 to February 2008 was 1.1% over the initial base margin (Auditor-
General, 2010) resulting in a significant ‘gain share’ for the private participants. 
For capital works The Agreement guarantees that The Alliance performs 
some of the capital works (initially those which were less than $10m but that 
threshold has since been increased).  The Alliance has the option of engaging and 
project managing one or more contractors for a fee equivalent to the base margin, or 
using The Alliance staff and resources to carry out the project to a target cost 
including the margin agreed in advance with GovCom.  If the actual cost is less, then 
the ‘gain’ is shared equally between GovCom and the private participants; that is, 
50% to GovCom and 50% shared between the two private participants.  If completed 
for more, then the ‘pain’ is also shared equally but for the private participants is 
capped at the amount of the margin (Auditor-General, 2010). 
These payment and incentive arrangements are dependent upon the high 
level of transparency of the costs of all parties and the sharing of all documentation 
relevant to The Alliance’s work.  This extensive and complete sharing of information 
within The Alliance meets the Agency Theory conceptualisation of information 
symmetry; that is, no party has an advantage over another by way of having 
knowledge or data that offers the possibility of being used to act against the interests 
of the other party. 
5.2.3 The findings 
This section first explores whether there was stewardship of the infrastructure 
and then explores the nature of any stewardship behaviour.  Secondly, whether there 
was sense of responsibility on the part of The Alliance to GovCom is explored 
together with an analysis of how important sense of responsibility was to the agent or 
steward acting in the interests of the principal.  Thirdly, the actions taken to increase 
sense of responsibility are unpacked. 
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5.2.3.1 Stewardship of infrastructure 
Section 2.2.3 Stewardship of public values concluded that the achievement 
of the desired stewardship outcome for critical infrastructures can be measured using 
public values chosen from the framework assembled by Van Gestel et al. (2008).  
Utilising that framework the data showed that GovCom was driven by two themes of 
values: the efficient use of public resources and the quality of services provided to 
customers.  The data are analysed to understand the level of performance of the 
steward. 
5.2.3.1.1 Efficient use of public resources 
The efficiency of use of public resources is assessed in two ways: firstly by 
comparing against the performance of the system before The Alliance was 
introduced and secondly against similar water systems.  Comparison with the pre-
alliance arrangements was made by the Auditor-General (Auditor-General, 2010) 
who estimated O&M work cost 6.4% less than if the schedule of rates arrangements 
which predated The Alliance had continued.  The Auditor-General estimated that for 
capital works the costs were 6.5% less, mainly as the result of eliminating works 
variations (Auditor-General, 2010).  The Auditor-General concluded that the savings 
from The Alliance represented “…a good commercial outcome for its customers and 
shareholders…” (Auditor-General, 2010). 
The efficiencies were found to have been achieved by making decisions 
with a longer-term view and by changing the duties of staff.  Private Company Two 
informant A4 said that involving the people who will operate or maintain a particular 
plant in the construction of that plant allowed informed decisions to be made about 
the design of operations and the maintenance for the next 20 or 30 years.  Private 
Company Two informant A4 said “…how we deliver an asset is not cutting out costs 
or cutting corners…like you might do in a lump sum or schedule of rates contract.”  
Informant A4 advised that The Alliance had made long-term productivity 
improvements such as the same call-out team working on both ‘dirty’ and ‘clean’ 
water emergencies by gaining union agreement. 
A comparison against other systems in the annual National Report: Urban 
water utilities showed that GovCom’s combined operating costs for water and 
sewage per property were the lowest of the three adjacent utilities for the fifth year in 
a row (National Water Commission, 2011).  As this high level of efficiency was 
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achieved whilst servicing additional areas and additional customers, and responding 
to ‘drought’ conditions, it is concluded that efficient use of public resources has been 
achieved. 
5.2.3.1.2 Quality of services 
The quality of services provided by all case study water systems are 
measured by using the National Performance Report: Urban water utilities.  The 
report adopts the number of complaints as an indicator of the level of customer 
service and satisfaction.  GovCom reported the lowest levels of complaints for the 
three adjacent utilities reporting a 2009-10 result of fewer than five complaints for 
every 1,000 properties, such a standard being achieved by only one other water 
entity.  Of the eight utilities compared, GovCom was the second lowest in 2010.  The 
average duration of an unplanned interruption to the customer’s water supply is 
considered to be a partial indicator of customer service, and of how effectively the 
network is being operated and maintained.  GovCom has for the three reporting years 
achieved the lowest levels of unplanned interruptions for the three adjacent utilities, 
and in 2009–10, 2008–09 and 2007–08 it was the lowest of all nine utilities.  The 
percentage of calls answered by an operator within 30 seconds is held to indicate the 
efficiency of the customer service centre.  GovCom achieved the highest percentage 
of calls answered within 30 seconds for the adjacent utilities, with the 2009–10, 
2008–09 and 2007–08 results equalling the highest performing utility in Australia. 
To understand the quality of services provided by The Alliance the archival 
and informant studies sought out any significant adverse mention as to service 
quality.  None was found in the archival study and all five informants asserted that 
the quality of the services provided was high, proudly citing a water mains 
replacement project as an example of an unprecedented, high standard of customer 
satisfaction.  GovCom informant A1 said “…at the end of that we got quite a few 
letters of thanks from affected stakeholders and the innovations that were brought in 
through Private Company Two…were quite outstanding.” 
Brought together, the evidence of the Auditor-General, the National Water 
Commission and the archival and informant studies is that the public values of 
efficient use of public resources and quality of service have been well satisfied by 
The Alliance.  Before proceeding to form a conclusion as to stewardship based on 
that evidence, evidence as to any other event or conduct on the part of The Alliance 
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or GovCom which would suggest that there had not been stewardship was sought out 
by way of a review of relevant media.  No adverse mention was found and it was 
concluded that The Alliance has achieved strong stewardship of the water system. 
5.2.3.1.3 Stewardship behaviour 
This section seeks to identify data which will clarify Davis et al.’s (1997, p. 
24) assertion that the steward “...will not depart from the interests of his or her 
organisation.”  The following paragraphs assemble the data as to the nature of 
stewardship behaviour in this case study.  In Section 2.3.2.1 Concept of stewardship 
behaviour contractual compliance featured as an outcome in one variation of the 
Agency Theory model and as an essential feature of the Stewardship Theory model.  
The following distinctions and ‘common ground’ between the theories were 
identified: 
 no contractual compliance (Agency Theory); 
 contractual compliance (Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory); and 
 acting in the interests of the principal (Stewardship Theory). 
In all studies (literature, archival and informant) there was no instance of 
there not being contractual compliance by The Alliance. 
The question of whether The Alliance had acted in the interests of GovCom 
was pursued initially with the report of the Auditor-General (Auditor-General, 2010), 
followed by GovCom’s annual reports.  A consistently strong theme of the two 
private companies acting in the interests of GovCom was found.  The interviews with 
the GovCom informants confirmed that strong theme of the companies acting in 
GovCom’s interest.  The informants and the archival study, in particular a formal 
search of the media, did not reveal any evidence of The Alliance or individual private 
participants acting against the interests of GovCom.  However this evidence of acting 
in the interests positioned that attribute as a requirement of the contract and, as such, 
within contractual compliance. 
This thesis then explored the extent of, or limit to, this acting in the interests 
of GovCom.  GovCom informants A1 and A2 separately presented the view that the 
private participants do put the interests of The Alliance and GovCom over the 
interests of their own companies.  Informant A1 said the reasons for this were the 
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long-term relationship extending 10 years before The Alliance started and also the 
contract provision for the adjustment of KPIs and gain–share/pain–share 
arrangements which are very clear as to what is expected of alliance participants.  
GovCom informant A2 later built on this thread, explaining that rather than 
expecting that The Alliance participants take the initiative and take some 
extraordinary action GovCom utilises the mechanisms of The Agreement to focus the 
private participants on the areas GovCom wants addressed.  GovCom informants A1 
and A2 separately explained that GovCom acknowledges that the private participants 
are commercial, that the participants won’t exist if they don’t make a profit and that 
commercial needs must be respected. 
An alternate conceptualisation of the behaviour in the context of an alliance 
was put by Private Company Two informant A4 who said:  
…It works both ways.  No decision should be to the benefit of one or two of the 
parties and the other one is losing big time, because that would be anti-alliance 
behaviour.  But also it would not be meeting (our) fiduciary duty, so you are doing 
it for the benefit of the alliance and the alliance has to take into account the benefit 
of all the parties. It can’t just be good for one, and that is why it is unanimous 
decision-making, it’s not majority, it is unanimous decision-making…[the Alliance 
Governance Board members] have a fiduciary duty to uphold the interests of those 
other companies, and at times over and above their own company.   
In this way the formal Alliance Agreement requires that decisions be both in 
the interests of The Alliance (and therefore GovCom) and not to the detriment of a 
party (e.g. a private participant).  It appears that there is a tacit assumption within 
The Alliance that if a member of The Alliance believes that a particular action is 
necessary then the issue must be brought to the AGB and a decision made 
collectively, removing the option for a private participant to independently embark 
upon an extraordinary action, notwithstanding that action being in the interests of the 
principal. 
In summary, The Alliance was found to have achieved stewardship of the 
system and that the behaviour of the private companies was that of consistently 
acting in the interests of the principal but not characterised by any extraordinary 
action or initiative.  It was further found that GovCom did not expect any such 
extraordinary action and that such expectation was considered unrealistic as the 
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private companies had the commercial need to make a profit.  That perspective was 
consistent with the terms of The Agreement which required that alliance participants 
only act in the interests of The Alliance, and in accordance with a unanimous 
decision.  Thus the finding then is that the stewardship of the water system was 
characterised by the behaviour of a steward—that is, actively act in the interests of 
the principal (p. 18) — but that this behaviour was that required by the contract.  
However, there was no evidence of the Stewardship Theory behaviour (Davis et al., 
1997, p. 24) of the private company placing higher value on the interests of the 
principal than its own interests.  Collectively, these findings suggest that the private 
participants are not required to, and are not, doing more than complying with the 
contract.  The findings thus provide evidence of the operation of an Agency Theory 
model where the goals of the parties are aligned, albeit that the behaviour of the 
private participants is like that of stewardship. 
5.2.3.2 Sense of responsibility 
Earlier in this thesis, in Section 2.3.2 Stewardship Theory, it was reasoned 
that there was a strong possibility that sense of responsibility to the principal on the 
part of the steward was highly important — possibly essential — to there being 
stewardship behaviour.  Indeed that examination of the literature suggested that there 
is a possibility that sense of responsibility is the attribute which distinguishes a 
steward from an Agency Theory agent. 
Sense of responsibility is not a concept or language which is routinely used 
within GovCom or The Alliance, yet this research found that there was a consistently 
strong sense of responsibility demonstrated by The Alliance participants.  The 
performance of The Alliance is measured by a significant number of the performance 
standards and objectives required of GovCom by the regulatory arrangements 
outlined in Section 5.2.2.3 Regulation and reporting.  The Alliance participant 
organisations and individual informants each evidenced an unequivocal sense of 
responsibility to achieving GovCom’s goals and objectives.  Indeed the two Private 
Company Two informants put forward the perspective that they (Private Company 
Two) should not expect to stay as a partner if the company is not innovating and is 
not “…delivering the outcomes that are expected…”.  The informants from both 
GovCom and the private participants all separately referred to a project to replace the 
water mains in a very busy street as a demonstration of sense of responsibility to both 
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GovCom and the community.  This project involved the renewal during 2009 and 
2010 of several kilometres of water main which runs under the main street in a high 
profile commercial, restaurant and retail precinct.  The Alliance introduced 
significant civil works’ innovation and actively engaged with its customers 
throughout the project to minimise disruption to local businesses and residents 
(GovCom AR 2010).  GovCom informant A1 advised that The Alliance performed 
well, with GovCom receiving “…quite a few letters of thanks from affected 
stakeholders.”  The annual reports of GovCom confirm the difficulty and success of 
this project, in 2009–10 describing the upcoming challenges of minimising 
disruption to businesses and residents and in the 2010–11 report describing the 
success of the work by The Alliance. 
However, GovCom informant A1 also conceptualised the sense of 
responsibility demonstrated in this water mains project as being directed or 
motivated by the KPIs and financial rewards for the participants.  Informant A1 
commented that the project was carried out during a period for which the KPIs which 
trigger gain–share payments had been adjusted to provide a greater emphasis upon 
community engagement.  Informant A1 considered that “…basically it is a 
commercial arrangement, if there are areas that we as the client want the 
commercial partners to focus on then [we] put it into the commercial 
framework…and they will focus on it.”  Informant A1 observed that the sense of 
responsibility on the part of The Alliance was an evolution resulting in there being 
“…no huge gap…it’s not as though we’ve suddenly had a new partner.”  In 
summary, the five informants presented a consistent, strong belief that the alliance 
participants display a strong sense of responsibility to GovCom.  There was clear 
evidence that GovCom had taken action to direct or create that sense of responsibility 
by establishing and utilising the gain–share incentive payment arrangements.  The 
operation of such arrangements is considered in greater detail in the next section of 
this chapter.  However, such incentive payments, and the terms under which they are 
made in this case study, fully align with the Agency Theory prescription that 
extrinsic rewards will motivate the agent to achieve the goals of the principal (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). 
This finding that The Alliance participants had demonstrated sense of 
responsibility was tested by returning to the archival documents and interview data to 
 Chapter 5: Analysis 99 
search for contrary data.  The Auditor-General’s report (Auditor-General, 2010), the 
search of the press and the data gathered in response to the Interview Protocol all 
failed to find any disconfirming evidence.  In particular the Interview Protocol 
document specifically put questions as to whether The Alliance members had ever 
acted against the interests of the principal and the position taken by the private 
participants in respect of any subsequent problems with the quality of their work.  
The data obtained revealed that at no time had the two private companies not shown 
a sense of responsibility to GovCom but that some individual employees had not 
evidenced such sense of responsibility.  Private Company One informant A5 and 
GovCom informant A1 both gave examples of where individual new employees of 
Private Company One working on capital projects had acted as if they were in a 
conventional contractual arrangement and pursued the interests of their employer to 
the detriment of The Alliance and GovCom. 
The issue then is how important is sense of responsibility to stewardship 
behaviour on the part of the private participants?  The earlier unpacking of the 
Stewardship Theory literature found that there was a strong possibility that sense of 
responsibility to the principal was highly important, possibly essential, to there being 
stewardship behaviour.  Accordingly the findings from all case studies are evaluated 
to understand the importance of sense of responsibility, whether it is highly 
important or essential. 
Returning then to The Alliance, an unpacking of the findings suggests that 
the importance of sense of responsibility can be seen from two perspectives: one, the 
causal link between sense of responsibility and stewardship behaviour; and the other 
the requirement of the principal as to whether sense of responsibility is essential. 
The data attributed efficiencies and success with service quality to the 
actions of The Alliance participants and showed a strong causal link between those 
efficiencies and service quality success and the stewardship-like behaviour of the 
alliance participants.  As has been outlined earlier in this sub-section, all informants 
were unequivocal in their belief that there was a strong sense of responsibility to 
GovCom’s goals and objectives.  The two Private Company Two informants put the 
perspective of intense focus on the goals and objectives of GovCom.  Private 
Company Two informant A3 said “If we don’t perform and we don’t keep improving 
and aren’t innovating and aren’t delivering the outcomes that are expected, then we 
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shouldn’t expect to stay there and be a partner.”  Private Company One informant 
A5 set out his company’s belief system as “…being honest, acting with integrity and 
making sure that everything you do is genuinely for the best for The Alliance…”.  It 
would seem then that this very strong sense of responsibility has had a strong causal 
link to there being stewardship-like behaviour and in turn stewardship of the system. 
To test this tentative conclusion it was hypothesised that this stewardship 
could have been achieved without there being a sense of responsibility on the part of 
the private participants.  This hypothetical situation would involve the participants 
not acting to give GovCom the full benefit of their expertise and not protecting them 
from the possibility of adverse outcomes in matters such as the water mains 
replacement project, but still satisfying the public values.  That would be possible but 
not probable given the customer service nature of the water system business.  In 
summary, looking through the causal-link lens it is concluded that sense of 
responsibility on the part of the private participants was highly important to 
stewardship-like behaviour. 
Focusing upon the data with the lens of the principal’s contractual 
requirements, the data from the five informants and the report of the Auditor-General 
(2010) reveals that GovCom set goals and objectives for The Alliance which amount 
to stewardship of the water system.  Similarly, in creating The Alliance governance 
arrangements with the emphasis upon ‘best for alliance’ and ‘for the benefit of all 
parties’, and unanimous decisions and the incentives based on KPI achievement, the 
principal would appear to be establishing the requirement that The Alliance 
participants act with a sense of responsibility to GovCom.  Indeed the informants 
were all of the view that those governance requirements and incentives had a strong 
causal link to the sense of responsibility evidenced by the private participants.  It is 
concluded that for the principal sense of responsibility was essential.  No 
disconfirming evidence was found — that is, evidence that GovCom would accept 
that one or both of the private participant companies could act without a sense of 
responsibility.  This is to be expected as it is highly unlikely that a principal in a 
contractual relationship to provide critical services would allow the agent or steward 
to have any perception whatsoever that it was acceptable that their behaviour could 
be less than acting with a sense of responsibility.  Accordingly, testing this finding 
would require a methodological design different from this research, one which 
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focuses upon the expectations of principals, possibly requiring a much larger 
population of principals. 
In summary, it is concluded that looking through the causal link lens sense 
of responsibility on the part of the private participants was highly important to 
achieve stewardship of the water system and that looking through the lens of 
GovCom (the principal) sense of responsibility was essential. 
5.2.3.3 Actions to increase sense of responsibility 
The preceding section of this thesis assembled the data in respect of 
evidence of sense of responsibility and the link to stewardship-like behaviour.  This 
section brings together the data in respect of the actions which the parties took to 
increase sense of responsibility on the part of the steward.  The data formed into four 
themes which are explored in the following subsections: 
 ensuring suitable participants; 
 the culture; 
 clear contractual outcomes; and 
 incentives to private participants. 
5.2.3.3.1 Ensuring suitable participants 
The importance of government choosing suitable private participants with 
which to contract was a theme common to all informants.  The informant study also 
revealed the suitability of the government entity and its employees to enter into an 
alliance to be important.  The informants specified experience in ongoing O&M 
contracts, employees being suitable to work within the alliance relationship, 
knowledge of what mattered to the partner, and reputation.  These attributes are 
unpacked in the following paragraphs. 
Private participants having experience in an alliance delivering ongoing 
O&M was highlighted by the GovCom informants A1 and A2 as making a 
significant contribution to the sense of responsibility to GovCom.  Private Company 
Two informants A3 and A4 confirmed that both private company participants 
brought substantial knowledge of alliances, with A4 observing that the private 
companies had created and still jointly own a private company which delivers 
performance-based contracts for O&M in a wide range of industries across Australia. 
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The importance of the employees of private and government participants 
in alliances being suitable for alliances was outlined by Private Company One 
informant A5, who vehemently put the view that the “…biggest single driver in a 
successful alliance is having people on both sides who understand …what alliances 
do and believe in it as a business model concept…”.  He conceptualised this belief in 
the alliance business model as ‘commitment’, explaining that the commitment to the 
alliance objectives achieves stewardship of the system infrastructure.  Stewardship 
theorist Hernandez (2012) has utilised the term ‘commitment’ in the same context as 
sense of responsibility.  Private Company One informant A5 explained his point with 
the example of “…one of the best managers we have in our organisation…I took him 
out of the alliance, because he …just didn’t understand that there were compromises 
to be made here…”.  Similarly the three private participant informants revealed that 
the GovCom Board, executive and employees had generally proven suitable for the 
alliance model.  Private Company Two informant A4 advised that there had never 
been a case of GovCom employees displaying any ‘trouble’ with Private Company 
Two employees being there.  In contradiction, Private Company One informant A5 
recounted his experience of some GovCom employees not being suitable for the 
alliance saying:  
…the biggest level of tension…was when people came into the alliance from 
GovCom side who hadn’t been a party to the alliance…either at a managerial 
level or at the Alliance Leadership Team (ALT) level and I used to notice how 
much we had progressed from the old master/slave mentality.  A particular 
individual who was put onto the ALT …it was like going back five years, because 
it was about well what are we going to get for this, what have you done for this, 
rather than having an understanding that we had built up through trust and 
confidence that what we were doing for each other was beneficial for each other. 
Knowledge of what mattered to the partner emerged as a distinct theme 
both from direct questioning of the informants and then from the indirect references 
and language of the private participant informants.  The private informants 
demonstrated a clear understanding of what mattered to GovCom, both those issues 
generated within GovCom and those from the larger government as owner and public 
as stakeholder environment.  At the GovCom level, Private Company Two informant 
A4 gave the example of the need for an independent third party assessment of 
alliance estimates of cost for capital project work, commenting that “It is in the 
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interests of everybody in the Alliance that GovCom can demonstrate that value for 
money has been achieved.”  Private Company Two informant A3 gave the examples 
of GovCom recently putting a small job out to market and the cost to The Alliance of 
external third party reviews observing that “ … it really gets down to making sure 
that there is ample evidence … that the right things are being done …”.  Private 
Company Two informant A4 said that “… it is incumbent on GovCom that it is 
answerable to government …” and that that accountability “… would incorporate 
how can you demonstrate value for money?”  Informant A4 observed that if 
GovCom did not do this “it would cause problems for everybody [in the alliance].”  
At the higher level of ‘government as owner’ Private Company Two informant A4 
described the issue as the need for private companies to understand the interest and 
involvement of governments and government departments and agencies saying that 
understanding “… is something that is a requirement of doing business in a 
government environment.”  A similar level of understanding of what matters to the 
private participants was shown by GovCom informant A1 who said “…at the end of 
the day they are there as a commercial entity and GovCom has to respect that as 
well.” 
The reputation of private participants emerged as being a key element of 
their suitability and being intertwined with, if not inseparable from, the sense of 
responsibility of the private participants.  Private Company Two informants A3 and 
A4 said that for Private Company Two their Company’s reputation is paramount as 
the work in The Alliance is crucial to their obtaining future additional contracts with 
the client and other customers.  Informant A3 said that this focus leads to Private 
Company Two continually taking decisions which build that reputation by 
demonstrating a strong sense of responsibility to GovCom and the community.  
Private Company Two informant A4 unpacked his perspective as to what constitutes 
reputation saying:  
…it’s not just the gain–share/pain–share but rather for a business like Private 
Company Two there are all the other elements that flow from that.  Having good 
customer references which The Alliance is, it clearly being number one in this 
country and in the top 10% in the world in terms of independent benchmarking on 
performance, that’s a great thing for us to develop and have contributed to. 
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GovCom’s reputation as both a government organisation and successful 
water system emerged as an attraction and incentive for the private participants, as 
the association with GovCom was a declaration of the quality of the service provided 
by the private company which assists them in gaining work from other organisations.  
This further work could be in the company’s own name or services to other water 
entities through, and in the name of, The Alliance.  This access by the private 
participants to the GovCom reputation was conceptualised by the Auditor-General as 
part of the intellectual property that the parties brought to The Alliance.  The 
Auditor-General observed that GovCom brought its reputation as an established 
public sector water and sewerage entity to The Alliance and acknowledged the 
argument by The Alliance that this reputation is a major asset when selling services 
to the conservative, risk-averse water sector (Auditor-General, 2010). 
5.2.3.3.2 The culture 
The informants advised that at the time of establishing The Alliance 
GovCom and the two private companies gave particular attention to matters which 
would contribute to the culture they wanted to establish within The Alliance.  Several 
of those matters went specifically to the issue of bringing together employees from 
three organisations and ensuring a sense of responsibility within the new 
organisation, The Alliance.  The key actions which were taken to craft The 
Alliance’s culture were: 
 the Agreement principles; 
 brand alignment; and 
 people initiatives. 
5.2.3.3.2.1 Alliance agreement principles 
The principles established in The Agreement were held by informants to 
be crucial to the achievement of sense of responsibility.  Private Company One 
informant A5 described the principles being “…as corny as they sound…being 
honest, acting with integrity and making sure that everything you do is genuinely for 
the best of [The Alliance]…”.  The Agreement was not made available but the 
Auditor-General’s report (Auditor-General, 2010) and the data from the informants 
showed three principles to be critical to sense of responsibility on the part of The 
Alliance: transparency of costs, payments and decision-making; decisions being 
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unanimous; and the requirement that decisions must be in the best interests of The 
Alliance. 
The Agreement commits all parties to ensuring the highest standards of 
probity, full transparency and open discussion of all financial and operational matters 
and documents, including open-book accounting (Auditor-General, 2010).  The three 
private informants were comfortable with this approach, with Private Company Two 
informant A3 saying that “… every cost, every cent that [Private Company Two] has 
in delivering the services is known by [GovCom].”  These requirements were 
mentioned by the informants in language which was positive and without 
qualification.  It would appear that for all informants the environment and 
relationship created by these probity and transparency requirements engenders a 
sense of responsibility to all participants, including GovCom as principal. 
The requirement that all decisions of The Alliance AGB be unanimous 
was seen by all informants as a strong contributor to both stewardship and sense of 
responsibility on the part of the participants.  The contribution to stewardship was 
explored earlier.  The contribution to sense of responsibility may possibly come from 
the commitment achieved by the contractual provision that no one party is able to 
impose their will on the other parties.  An example was the attitude of the three 
private participant informants when separately discussing the annual adjustment to 
the KPI targets and related margin payments.  Each of the three were positive and 
accepting of the annual adjustment, emphasising that this annual adjustment decision 
was an AGB decision and therefore unanimous and was made on the basis of it being 
best for The Alliance. 
The requirement that the decisions must be best for The Alliance or for 
the benefit of all parties was explained by Private Company Two informant A4 who 
said that each of the four AGB members “… have a fiduciary duty to uphold the 
interests of the other companies, and at times over and above their own 
company…your fiduciary duty is to look after the interests of the other parties as 
well.”  Further evidence that The Agreement rejects the concept of each participant 
acting in their own interests and emphasises the interests of The Alliance was found 
in the report of the Auditor-General which recorded that The Agreement commits all 
parties to avoiding contract disputation and cost variations by adopting a ‘no-blame, 
no-disputes’ culture (Auditor-General, 2010).  The outcome of this focus on the 
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interests of The Alliance or the interests of the other participants is that any capacity 
for self-interest is redirected to a sense of responsibility to The Alliance or the other 
participants — one of which is the principal, GovCom. 
5.2.3.3.2.2 Brand alignment 
The branding of The Alliance was seen by the AGB as being crucial to 
the forming of the required culture.  Private Company Two informant A4 (at the time 
a member of the AGB) said that the AGB gave specific attention to “…the symbolic 
aspects of that identity, that get people together, the new blue and black uniform, 
having a new logo, having a social club…”.  Private Company Two informant A5, a 
member of the AGB from the start, said that the intention from the start was to “…be 
a new brand, we are a separate entity from either of our parent companies…a whole 
fresh one, new branding, new name that everyone agrees on.” 
The new identity presents distinctly at the office/depot and on motor 
vehicles and equipment.  All employees of all three alliance participants are located 
in the one three-year old, spacious, well maintained building.  These premises 
compare favourably with the GovCom headquarters building which is 10–15 year old 
and worn.  The Alliance premises were newer and fresher, suggesting that this 
artefact of The Alliance and GovCom culture would not be creating any issue of 
relative importance or worthiness between the employees of the principal and 
steward.  The Alliance premises, staff uniforms, motor vehicles and major equipment 
bear only the business name and logo of The Alliance, with those of the three 
participants not being used at all.  Importantly the Auditor-General (2010) observed 
that the employees of the three alliance members work closely together and identify 
by using the shared, new business name (Auditor-General, 2010).  Private Company 
Two informant A4 said the culture of The Alliance “…was separate from that of 
each member that they identify with their parent companies but that they identify 
more with the team that is delivering under the brand of The Alliance.” 
5.2.3.3.2.3 People initiatives 
Private Company Two informant A4 said that in 2005 the AGB realised 
that the operational changes which were the objective of the new alliance would 
require change in the behaviour of all alliance employees: “…because going from a 
schedule of rates to an alliance…” amounted to “…changing roles from command 
and control to collectively collaborate in a work relationship.”  To achieve this 
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change in the behaviour of individuals the AGB opened up all positions to all 
Alliance employees and required in the contract that a significant proportion of The 
Alliance be GovCom employees. 
Opening up all positions to employees of the three participant 
organisations who were employed in The Alliance was an AGB policy decision with 
the objective “… to attract, retain and develop skilled staff, through staff exchanges 
within The Alliance, and enhancing the commercial skills of GovCom staff through 
partnering with the private sector” (Auditor-General, 2010).  If a position within The 
Alliance becomes vacant the appointment is made against the criteria of ‘Best for 
Alliance’.  An example provided was the Customer Relations Position which was 
held by a GovCom person but when it became vacant during 2010 a Private 
Company One person from within The Alliance was appointed.  This increased 
career opportunities both by way of the larger, combined organisation and by the 
extra scope created by steadily increasing the capital works.  Private Company Two 
informant A4 said “…it created the ability to bring young people into the 
organisation, into an aging workforce which is the water industry.”  In addition the 
Auditor-General accepted GovCom’s opinion that the low turn-over rate was 
achieved because The Alliance “…provides staff with more interesting and diverse 
jobs, with greater opportunities for new experiences and learning, than was the 
case… [before the alliance]” (Auditor-General, 2010). 
The decision to retain a significant proportion of GovCom employees in 
The Alliance was reported by the informants to have contributed to the alliance’s 
success in achieving its sense of responsibility to GovCom and the water system.  
Since commencement the GovCom staffing has remained at approximately 30% of 
the employees in The Alliance.  Quite pointedly GovCom informant A2 said that 
GovCom “…wanted to maintain a legacy of its own people who had the necessary 
knowledge of the water system….to actually know the intricacies of the system and to 
actually be able to operate the system [which]…was not a skill we wanted to 
contract out.” 
5.2.3.3.3 Clear contractual outcomes 
All five informants said the annual adjustment of KPI targets was central 
to promoting a sense of responsibility on the part of The Alliance participants.  The 
Agreement provides that the targets be adjusted annually by a unanimous decision by 
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AGB in advance of the next financial year.  Examples of targets provided by 
informants were: more focus on safety and less focus on community, less focus on 
innovation, and more focus on timely delivery of projects.  GovCom informant A1 
characterised this adjustment as “…part of the continuous improvement cycle, just 
trying to modify how we can get the best out of The Alliance.”  The two Private 
Company Two informants A3 and A4 were comfortable about the annual adjustment 
process, with A3 saying “They are re-weighting and re-wording slightly the 
emphasis of the KPIs this coming year.  You always review it and always make 
adjustments and the bar rises every year, it doesn’t stay static so we take great pride 
in The Alliance being number one.” 
GovCom informant A1 said that the practice is for these to be proposed by 
GovCom, negotiated and then signed off.  This adjustment to the targets is 
conditional upon the unanimous agreement of all three participants.  Private 
Company Two informant A4 said that their company looks at the plans of GovCom 
and seeks to be a part of that plan, giving specific attention to customers, the 
government stakeholders, the environment and innovation.  Private Company One 
informant A5 saw the annual adjustment as a way to clearly signal the importance of 
one particular objective and bring focus and achieve substantial improvement in 
performance.  It was apparent that the informants saw this adjustment not only as a 
financial reward system but also as a way of ensuring clear focus and agreement as to 
what counts to the principal.  Private Company One informant A5 gave the example 
of burst water mains repairs which typically had cost from $2,000 to $3,000 per 
event.  The target cost was then set at $2,000.  Informant A5 advised that through the 
KPIs and the margin adjustment “…today, the average burst main costs about 
$1,300 or $1,400 because the price has been driven down because people have been 
concentrating on doing it better.” 
This refocusing of objectives is particularly important in the water industry 
where contract terms of 25 years are not uncommon and in The Alliance case the 
term is about 10 years.  If there was not a mechanism to adjust the immediate 
objectives then it is highly likely that the combination of the principal not specifying 
what is important and the agent being rewarded for outcomes which are no longer 
important to the principal would result in a failure of stewardship of the 
infrastructure. 
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This contractually-based, genuine preparedness of all participants to 
regularly adjust the immediate objectives of the long-term contract would appear to 
be a good fit with the long-term and evolutionary nature of urban water services.  
Whilst the unqualified acceptance by private company informants of the right of 
GovCom to adjust performance requirements might of itself be unremarkable, what 
is highly important is the demonstrated consistent capability of a government entity 
to negotiate targets for the private companies which are actually the current goals and 
objectives of the government entity.  This complete convergence of the goals of the 
principal and the agent presents as a model which governments as principals can 
adopt to achieve stewardship of critical infrastructures. 
5.2.3.3.4 Incentives to private participants 
Direct incentives were seen by the informants as crucial to sense of 
responsibility on the part of The Alliance participants.  These incentives are: the 
longer-term contract for maintenance work than was the norm for the more common 
construction work, the gain–share payment arrangements, and the possibility of 
gaining additional work. 
No data was available in respect of any contractual provision for the 
extension of the contract beyond the 10-year term and the matter of the term of the 
contract was literally not remarkable for the five informants. The exception was 
Private Company One informant A5 who from his perspective as the civil works 
participant saw benefit in the longer term because “…the alliances that we [Private 
Company Two] have with government are beneficial in different ways for both 
parties, I mean we are more outcome-orientated than government, so they don’t have 
that drive that we have, but they are more likely to invest in innovation and strategies 
that may cost money but have a longer-term effect …”.  The 10-year term made it 
viable for Private Company One to introduce extensive technological innovation, in 
particular the water mains relining technologies (Auditor-General, 2010).  This 
finding would appear to be an extension of the findings that The Alliance with its 
inclusion of employees who operate and maintain the system in the capital works 
decision-making leads to benefits which are realised in the longer term. 
The financial incentives to the private participants applied to O&M and 
capital works were set out in Section 5.2.2.4 Payment arrangements.  All three 
private participant informants were strongly of the view that these arrangements, 
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with their combination of annual refocusing of KPI targets and reward linked to the 
achievement of those targets or the sharing of gain, had a strong positive impact upon 
the sense of responsibility of Alliance participants. 
The sense of responsibility to GovCom on the part of Alliance participants 
was particularly apparent in respect of winning capital works projects for The 
Alliance.  As the entire share of the ‘gain’ is net of any costs the private participants 
are incentivised to contribute to The Alliance winning the bids to carry out the 
projects.  This was held to lead to the lowest possible estimated cost for the job so 
that the work did not go to another party.  GovCom was found to then benefit further, 
as once the job was won by The Alliance the private participants then sought to 
innovate to better the performance indicators attached to the individual project and 
share the gain.  GovCom similarly benefits monetarily by way of the gain–
share/pain–share provision and also by way of satisfaction of goals and objectives, 
for example replacing water mains and more efficient treatment of sewage. 
Additional work came from growth in the capital works performed for 
GovCom and from work for other water entities in the name of The Alliance.  
Capital work that is allocated to The Alliance has increased.  The Auditor-General 
recorded that in 2006–07 The Alliance was awarded about $30m of the GovCom 
capital works expenditure (Auditor-General, 2010).  Informants advised that capital 
works of about $50m were awarded to The Alliance in 2011.  In 2011 the scope of 
the capital works performed by The Alliance was further expanded by the transfer of 
the capital works design and feasibility function from GovCom into The Alliance.  
The possibility of obtaining a similar, continuing amount of capital work or indeed 
an even greater amount is held by informants to engender a very strong sense of 
responsibility on the part of Alliance participants.  The additional work for other 
water entities in the name of The Alliance has increased from a negligible amount at 
the time of forming The Alliance to being a significant component of the $22m 
unregulated revenue reported in 2006–07 (Auditor-General, 2010). 
5.2.4 Significance of the findings 
These findings strongly suggest that The Alliance offers an innovative example 
of the alliance model which has achieved stewardship of critical infrastructure.  Of 
interest is the progression of alliances since Rees (1998) categorised alliances as a 
type of the partial divestiture form of privatisation.  As there was no divestiture of 
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assets by GovCom when it formed The Alliance it is clear that this innovation has 
extended the options as to the forms of privatisation.  The key findings were: 
 The Alliance operates in a highly regulated and mature industry 
environment. 
 The Alliance is an innovative, ‘virtual’ form of alliance characterised by 
all participants retaining their respective legal identities. 
 This form of privatisation allowed the government to retain ownership of 
the water infrastructure assets. 
 The mixed government/private sector form of alliance has achieved 
stewardship of the infrastructure, with greater efficiency than the previous 
schedule of rates arrangements. 
 Such stewardship included a legacy for future generations in that GovCom 
has maintained the capability to operate the system within its staff. 
 The private companies acted in the interests of the principal.  The private 
companies had not performed any extraordinary acts when acting in the 
interests of the principal and the principal had no expectation that they do 
so. 
 The acting in the interests was within a contractual relationship configured 
in accordance with Agency Theory prescriptions, particularly the incentive 
payments which were found to link strongly to goal alignment and 
contractual compliance. 
 All alliance participants evidenced a strong sense of responsibility to the 
principal, GovCom. 
 Such a sense of responsibility was highly important to achieving 
stewardship behaviour, and from the perspective of the principal was 
essential to the relationship. 
 GovCom consciously took a number of actions which have contributed 
strongly to the sense of responsibility on the part of The Alliance 
participants and their employees. 
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A strong theme across the findings was that GovCom had an initial disposition 
to configuring a highly collaborative relationship which capitalised upon the 
strengths of government or private participants and allocated risk to the participant 
who could best bear that particular risk.  GovCom chose private participants who had 
existing experience in carrying out O&M work and in alliances.  In turn the principal 
mixed the workforces together and had them present as a single, new brand identity.  
The activities of the combined staff were focused by transparent shared information, 
close measurement and reporting of services through KPIs which were adjusted 
annually to reflect GovCom’s evolving goals and objectives.  Payment to the private 
participants was dependent on achieving of those KPIs and by achieving a gain on 
capital works.  Those payments together with the availability of additional work were 
found to motivate the private participants to act with a strong sense of responsibility. 
The most significant finding is that the principal has had a vision or objective 
of achieving a high level of stewardship of the water system and has achieved this by 
a highly integrated configuration of contractual and structural arrangements, 
according to the prescriptions of Agency Theory, but with the private companies 
demonstrating stewardship-like behaviours as prescribed by Stewardship Theory.  
The principal had a clear understanding of stewardship and actions that would lead to 
a sense of responsibility by private participant companies and Alliance employees.  
Further, notwithstanding being a government entity, GovCom demonstrated very 
precise knowledge of its own business and the capability to manage this highly 
commercial relationship. 
5.3 CASE STUDY B 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Case Study B is the joint venture (Joint Venture) created by a government-
owned company referred to in this thesis as GOCO, and two private companies: one, 
an Australian-based energy company (Energy Co.); and the other an overseas-based 
utilities company (Overseas Utilities Co.).  GOCO is responsible for the provision of 
energy, water and waste water services to 150,000 customers (GOCO A R 2011) in a 
regional centre, an area of approximately 2,400 square kilometres (Professor, 2008).  
It is the water and waste water services operations of the joint venture that form this 
case study. 
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This thesis firstly describes the key features of the joint venture.  Secondly, the 
findings from this case study are assembled utilising a framework constructed around 
the three areas targeted by this research: stewardship behaviour, sense of 
responsibility and actions to increase sense of responsibility.  Thirdly, the findings 
are probed to understand their significance. 
5.3.2 Key features of the joint venture 
The Joint Venture exists to carry out the operation, maintenance and some of 
the capital works of the regional centre’s water services infrastructure.  This section 
first describes that water system to provide a context for the findings as to 
stewardship and sense of responsibility.  Secondly, the legal form of the Joint 
Venture and the objectives which the regional centre’s government sought to achieve 
when establishing the Joint Venture are described.  Thirdly, the environment of 
regulation and reporting within which the Joint Venture operates are examined.  
Fourthly, the Joint Venture payment arrangements are explained. 
5.3.2.1 The water service 
The regional centre’s water service is comprised of water catchments, 
storage reservoirs, treatment plants and pipelines, and sewage treatment plants which 
provide water, sewerage and recycled water services (GOCO AR 2011).  Water and 
sewerage services provided to customers in 2011 amounted to $220m and net assets 
were $1b (GOCO AR 2011).  The Joint Venture has approximately 1,100 employees 
(JV AR 2011). 
5.3.2.2 Legal form and objectives 
The Joint Venture is not itself a company but rather is two partnerships 
involving three parties. GOCO is an unlisted public company owned by the regional 
centre government with two government Ministers being the shareholders.  By way 
of regional centre legislation GOCO’s main objectives are: to operate at least as 
efficiently as any comparable business, to maximise the sustainable return to the 
regional centre, to have regard to the interests of the community and encourage those 
interests, and to operate with the objective of ecologically sustainable development.  
In 1999, to meet the challenges of an energy market about to be subject to full 
competition, the government of the regional centre sought expressions of interest 
from possible joint venture partners, limiting them by legislation which required that 
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GOCO “…maintain at least 50 per cent interest in the partnership…” (Professor, 
2008).  In 1999 the GOCO Board selected Energy Co. and both GOCO and Energy 
Co. contributed assets to the partnerships with the exception of the water and 
sewerage network which remains owned by GOCO.  Because of regulatory 
requirements to separate the electricity distribution role from the electricity retailing 
role Energy Co. subsequently sold its interest in the distribution partnership to 
Overseas Utilities Co.  The responsibilities of the two partnerships in respect of 
water matters are specified in the Services Agreement made between GOCO and the 
two private companies. 
Energy Co. is a company listed on the Australian Stock Exchange website 
as operating Australia's largest retail energy and dual fuel customer base.  In 2011 its 
approximate revenue was $7b and assets $6b (Energy Co. AR 2011).  Overseas 
Utilities Co. is 100% owned by an overseas-based energy and utility company, 
having an approximate revenue of $5b and net assets of about $7b (OUC AR 2011). 
The retail partnership is formed between GOCO and Energy Co.  The 
distribution partnership is between GOCO and Overseas Utilities Co.  The 
organisational structure and contractual outcomes are depicted diagrammatically in 
Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2 Joint Venture 
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The focus of the case study is the ‘Partnerships Joint Venture’ within the red 
box.  The structuring of retail activities separate from distribution anticipated 
requirements of the independent regulator that there be a clear separation between 
distribution and retail activities for the imminent opening of the electricity industry 
to competition.  Electricity infrastructure assets previously owned by the regional 
centre government were sold into the distribution partnership, but the water and 
sewerage systems remain owned by GOCO (Professor, 2008), with the Joint Venture 
operating and maintaining these systems and providing services.  As explained by 
GOCO informant B4 “…the Corp. has become by way of structure of the contract, 
manager, negotiator as well as representative of the government as far as outcomes 
and objectives.” 
An insight as to why the water assets were not fully privatised is provided 
by a 1997 survey of the community which indicated that about 75% of the 
community did not want electricity sold but that about 85% did not want water and 
sewerage sold (Professor, 2008). 
Whilst the legislation contains precautionary provisions to enable the 
dissolution of the partnership there is no term set for the operation of the partnership 
and all parties conduct themselves on the basis that the partnership is perpetual 
(Professor, 2008). 
The two partnerships are governed by the Joint Governance Board (JGB) 
which is comprised of six members, of which three are appointed by GOCO and 
three are appointed by Energy Co. and Overseas Utilities Co.  Board members are 
not directors in terms of the Corporations Act 2001; however, they adhere to the 
standards of integrity and performance required of directors under that Act.  An 
overarching agreement requires board members to exercise their powers “in the best 
interests of the partnerships as a whole” (Professor, 2008, p. 629).  This feature of the 
overarching agreement is explored in greater detail in Section 5.3.3.1 Stewardship of 
infrastructure and Section 5.3.3.3 Actions to increase sense of responsibility. 
5.3.2.3 Regulation and reporting 
The Joint Venture operates under the licences issued to GOCO within a 
regulatory environment that is very similar to that of other Australian urban water 
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systems, highly regulated and rich in publicly available information.  The key 
elements of the environment are as follows. 
The regional centre’s utility services are regulated by the regional centre’s 
independent regulator which licenses utility services and ensures compliance with 
licence conditions by requiring annual compliance and performance reporting.  
GOCO is subject to environmental regulation enacted by the regional centre (GOCO 
AR 2011). 
The quality of drinking water is controlled by way of regional centre public 
health legislation which provides for the regional centre health department to issue 
drinking water licences (in this case to GOCO).  The licence requires drinking water 
to be produced to the standards specified in the Australian Drinking Water 
Guidelines 2004 (ADWG).  These Guidelines have been adopted by all case study 
water systems. 
Prices for services are determined by the independent regulator.  The 
independent regulator has set the price direction for the five-year period from 1 July 
2008. 
Financial management of the Joint Venture is achieved by GOCO through 
its membership of the JGB.  The management by the JGB is in practical terms 
managing and monitoring a Services Agreement which informant B3 advises “…is 
used to make clear what is the responsibility of the Joint Venture…the Services 
Agreement contains 160 services, 50 KPIs and has a 20-year term.” 
Financial management of GOCO is the responsibility of the shareholder 
Ministers.  GOCO must agree on objectives and priorities with the shareholders and 
detail these in a Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI) which is tabled in the regional 
centre parliament annually.  Quarterly reporting against the SCI is made to the 
shareholders. 
Customers not satisfied with Joint Venture decisions about their complaint 
have a right of review by the regional centre administrative tribunal, notwithstanding 
that the services are provided jointly by a private company. 
GOCO submits an annual report which includes financial statements for 
GOCO Retail Co., GOCO Distribution Co., the Joint Venture and the consolidated 
financial statements for GOCO.  GOCO makes an annual compliance and 
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performance report to the independent regulator as required by the issued licence.  
As a water service provider GOCO is required to report the occurrence of ‘notifiable’ 
incidents to the regional centre health department and to report annually in 
compliance with the drinking water licence as to actions taken by the Joint Venture 
to address any such incidents and generally manage and protect the quality of 
drinking water (Joint Venture: Annual Drinking Water Quality Report, 2010-11). 
In addition GOCO participates in the National Water Commission annual 
comparison between like urban water services (National Water Commission, 2011). 
There is significant detailed information available publicly on each 
organisation’s internet site.  This reporting results in a high level of transparency as 
to the issues and outcomes of Joint Venture activities and in turn confidence in the 
data gathered in this research. 
5.3.2.4 Payment arrangements 
A more detailed explanation of the roles of GOCO and the Joint Venture is 
essential to understanding the arrangements for payment to the Joint Venture.  
GOCO informant B4 explained that “…the difference between the two entities is that 
GOCO is to serve the customer, the community. …For the Joint Venture the primary 
focus is on the bottom line.”  The JGB sets the profit target each year by negotiation 
within the GOCO Board, resolving the tensions between meeting the requirements of 
the private company shareholders for a commercial return and meeting the 
requirements of GOCO that the Service Agreement requirements are met and an 
adequate dividend paid. 
The contract underpinning the Service Agreement has a term of 20 years 
and in 2010–11 provided payment to the Joint Venture of approximately $100m.  
The payment is calculated on estimated total operating costs plus a fee (WSP, 2004).  
The contract provides for payment to the Joint Venture for the 160 services on a 
fixed price basis set in advance and for a fixed amount for each of the next four or 
five years and then a ‘reset’.  The reset at four or five years integrates with the 
duration of the price path determined by the independent regulator for the particular 
service.  Joint Venture informant B3 advised that “...for four years, there is a four 
year price … we get a bucket of money every year … and we know what the services 
are [to be provided] … we [Joint Venture] carry the risks … increased salaries, 
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chemicals and energy.  We can’t go back to GOCO and ask for extra.” This long-
term (up to five years) fixed price creates tensions as the Joint Venture shareholders 
seek to maintain their profit.  Capital work carried out by the Joint Venture ($50m in 
2010-11) is funded by GOCO on a per project basis with the Joint Venture seeking to 
make its profit by carrying out the works at a cost less than the price negotiated with 
GOCO. 
The payment arrangements require regular reporting against the 
performance indicators (50 of the 160 services have KPIs) and against the financial 
performance of the Joint Venture.  This information is generated by the Joint Venture 
which provides corporate services to GOCO, reflecting the small, 30-person staff of 
this multi-utility policy and service purchaser entity.  No issue as to information 
asymmetry was detected in the study, with the GOCO informant providing evidence 
of satisfaction with the information provided and shared between the Joint Venture 
and GOCO. 
5.3.3 The findings 
This section first explores whether there was stewardship of the infrastructure, 
and, if so, the nature of the stewardship behaviour of the Joint Venture.  Secondly, 
whether there was sense of responsibility on the part of the Joint Venture to GOCO is 
explored together with an analysis of how important sense of responsibility was to 
there being stewardship behaviour.  Thirdly, the actions taken to increase sense of 
responsibility are unpacked. 
5.3.3.1 Stewardship of infrastructure 
In the preceding Alliance case study the public values of efficient use of 
public resources and quality of services provided to customers were found to be most 
important to the public.  Consideration of the public values in play in respect of the 
regional centre’s water system revealed that those same two values were the most 
important.  Accordingly, this section first examines whether there has been efficient 
use of public resources, followed by an examination of the quality of services 
provided.  The data are analysed to understand the level of performance of the Joint 
Venture. 
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5.3.3.1.1 Efficient use of public resources 
The efficiency of use of public resources was assessed in the preceding 
case study by way of the comparison made in the annual National Water Commission 
Report: Urban water utilities.  The 2010 operating costs for GOCO for water and 
sewage per property are the second highest of the 11 water systems in the 100,000 
plus connected properties, with GOCO being the highest or second highest in each of 
the four preceding years (National Water Commission, 2011).  Similarly the data in 
respect of the typical residential water and sewerage bill showed that in 2009–10 
GOCO was the fourth highest in Australia, and third highest and highest in the two 
preceding years. 
This consistent position as highest or near highest in cost of production 
and billing suggests the possibility of either GOCO not efficiently using public 
resources or the comparison between systems not being valid because the systems 
are not sufficiently similar with regards to the physical dimensions, for example 
scarcity of water, differing investments as to sustainability or policy decisions which 
amount to a subsidisation external to the accounts of an entity.  However, the 
archival study revealed substantial ongoing capital expenditure to address drought 
conditions and provide water security on a sustainable basis.  The regional centre is 
situated inland in a region characterised by rainfall lower than that enjoyed by many 
of the other urban water services in the National Performance Report 2009-2010: 
Urban water utilities comparison.  Accordingly it may be reasonable to conclude that 
the water service for this regional centre must continually incur costs above those of 
the other systems in the report.  This ongoing additional cost may be the reason the 
operating cost has been virtually the highest in Australia for the last three years and 
the actual amount billed is near the highest.  The independent regulator has 
acknowledged the significant capital cost of the water security initiatives as 
necessary to meet the needs of the regional centre, noting that the cost will put 
further upward pressure on water prices.  The paper does not criticise GOCO or the 
Joint Venture in respect of the efficient use of public resources.  Accordingly, 
notwithstanding the high cost and charges for services, it is concluded that the Joint 
Venture has achieved efficient use of public resources. 
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5.3.3.1.2 Quality of services 
The quality of services was measured by the performance indicators 
reported in the National Performance Report: Urban water utilities.  GOCO reported 
consistently fewer than five complaints for every 1,000 properties for the three years 
to 2009–10, such a standard being achieved by five of the eight other comparable 
water entities (National Water Commission, 2011).  GOCO has for the three years to 
2009–10 reported a consistent level of unplanned interruptions which is below the 
median for the nine utilities compared (National Water Commission, 2011).  In 
respect of the efficiency of the customer service centre the report of the independent 
regulator revealed that in 2009–10 the average waiting time for calls to be answered 
on non-emergency numbers was 33 seconds and for emergency numbers 23 seconds.  
Over the five-year period emergency call centre performance has improved on a 
number of indicators and remained steady on others (Independent Regulator: Report, 
2011). 
A search of archival sources and specific questioning in the informant 
study sought to identify any significant adverse mention of the quality of services but 
none was found; it was found that the quality of services was high. 
In summary, the evidence of the National Water Commission and the 
archival and informant studies is that the public values of efficient use of public 
resources and quality of service have been satisfied by the Joint Venture.  It is 
concluded that the Joint Venture has achieved stewardship of the water system. 
5.3.3.1.3 Stewardship behaviour 
The following paragraphs assemble the data as to the nature of stewardship 
behaviour, whether there was contractual compliance, or the steward acted in the 
interests of the principal, or further where the Joint Venture sometimes took an 
extraordinary act in the interests of GOCO. 
The literature, archival and informant interview studies revealed no 
instance of there not being contractual compliance.  Indeed there was found to be a 
strong culture of meeting contractual requirements on the part of the Joint Venture. 
The thesis then sought to examine whether the Joint Venture acted in the 
interests of the principal, and whether the actions were at a level that is something 
more than contractual compliance, as is the tenet of Stewardship Theory.  This case 
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study water system is characterised by two unique features which created 
considerable difficulty in identifying whether the very credible outcomes of the work 
of the Joint Venture were attributable to the Joint Venture and its employees doing 
something more as suggested by Stewardship theorists or were compliance with 
highly specified contractual arrangements; that is Stewardship Theory behaviour or 
Agency Theory behaviour.  The features are the 50% ownership of the Joint Venture 
by GOCO and the legislative requirement that GOCO act in the interests of the 
regional centre in several specific respects.  These requirements have been passed on 
to the Joint Venture by way of such contractual devices as the Joint Venture 
overarching agreement (Professor, 2008) and the Services Agreement which 
specifies the 160 services, performance indicators and targets. 
The 50% ownership by GOCO of the Joint Venture was offered by 
informants as a universal explanation for the significant achievements of the Joint 
Venture.  The head of the Joint Venture water division, informant B3, when asked 
what GOCO did that resulted in the evident high level of responsibility on the part of 
the Joint Venture to GOCO responded with an explanation of the membership of the 
governance board, the monthly reporting against KPIs and the transparency, saying 
that the only thing which could be skimped upon was the maintenance and then that 
would show up in service levels not being maintained.  A second Joint Venture 
informant, B1, when asked what GOCO does to encourage the Joint Venture to 
continue to act with genuine responsibility to the community for the water system 
said “…when you own 50% of the company you’ve got a fair bit of influence…and if 
you think it is a good idea…then nine times out of ten then they [Joint Venture] will 
do it…”.  Yet both these informants portrayed the Joint Venture as being closely 
aligned with the goals of GOCO, confirming the findings of Professor (2008) and 
archival studies that the Joint Venture continually acts in the interests of GOCO.  
Informant B1 said “we have a very strong working relationship and partnership” 
and gave the example of water system staff working unstintingly during a suburban 
bushfire tragedy to restore water treatment and sewerage treatment plants in the 
absence of electricity supply.  Similarly, informant B3 gave an elegant example of 
staff acting in the interests of GOCO saying that staff are quite conscious that they 
need to do the best job ‘for water’: “…the guy who is digging up a hole to fix a pipe, 
he does care about GOCO because he used to be a GOCO employee…”. 
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The second distinguishing feature was the legislative requirement that 
GOCO act in the interests of the regional centre in several specific respects.  GOCO 
informant B4 had made the point that understanding whether the Joint Venture had 
acted in the interests of GOCO was clear as the requirements of the legislation were 
set out in the Service Agreement which bound the Joint Venture and which was the 
subject of quite comprehensive regulation and reporting to the JGB, shareholder 
ministers and independent regulators.  The legislation requires that GOCO is to: 
operate at least as efficiently as any comparable business, maximise the sustainable 
return to the regional centre, to have regard to the interests of the community and 
encourage those interests, and to operate in accordance with the objective of 
ecologically sustainable development.  GOCO informant B4 said the Services 
Agreement has “all the services listed out and 50 KPIs [not all services have 
KPIs]…”.  The archival study and informant study found that there was a strong 
record of the Joint Venture complying with contractual terms, budgets and KPIs, in 
particular the regular findings of the independent regulator that GOCO has met the 
comprehensive requirements of the legislation.  This strong satisfaction of quite 
comprehensive and highly specified contractual terms begs the question as to what 
constitutes that Stewardship Theory’s higher level of behaviour; that is, what is the 
notion of acting in the interests of the principal if the contractual terms set the level 
of performance quite high and comprehensively? 
The final aspect of performance to be explored is whether the Joint 
Venture contributed that something more which Stewardship Theory asserts 
characterises the behaviour of the steward.  The Interview Protocol was used to 
explore whether the Joint Venture sometimes performed an extraordinary act in the 
interests of GOCO.  There were no findings as to extraordinary actions that brought 
benefit to GOCO.  There were findings that show that the Joint Venture ownership 
and governance arrangements would preclude the Joint Venture or a member 
behaving in that manner.  GOCO and Joint Venture informants saw the concept of an 
entity performing an extraordinary act as being the incurring of costs which were not 
going to be reimbursed by GOCO and did not see a place in the operation of the Joint 
Venture for such actions.  Joint Venture informant B3 explained that all planned 
work must be put to the JGB and a determination is made whether the matter is in the 
scope of the Service Agreement.  If the JGB determines that the matter is within the 
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scope of the agreement then the Joint Venture must do the work within the existing 
payment from GOCO.  If determined that the matter is outside the scope of the 
Service Agreement then it is the responsibility of the JGB to determine whether to do 
the work and if so determine the source of funding, for example the Joint Venture out 
of funds that would be utilised to pay dividends to owners or for GOCO to be 
requested to pay.  Either scenario requires that the JGB with its 50% membership 
from GOCO representatives make the decision, thereby involving GOCO in the 
decision.  In this way the very design of the Joint Venture establishes limits upon 
expectations and pressures for the Joint Venture to contribute any more than the 
overall deliverables contemplated in the contractual arrangements. 
In summary, it was found that the level of stewardship behaviour of the 
Joint Venture was contractual compliance which encompasses acting in the interests 
of GOCO.  Indeed for all informants it was unchallengeable that the Joint Venture 
conducts itself in the interests of GOCO, pointing to the strength of this Joint 
Venture privatisation model — 50% ownership by government, strong government 
membership of the governance mechanism and staff with a very strong sense of 
responsibility to the particular water system.  It was found that there was a limit to 
the Joint Venture acting in the interests of GOCO, such a limit being established by 
the governance and ownership arrangements; that is the contractual terms.  This 
thesis now moves to the findings in respect of sense of responsibility and then the 
actions which were taken by the principal or agent to increase that sense of 
responsibility on the part of the Joint Venture. 
5.3.3.2 Sense of responsibility 
This section first explores whether there was sense of responsibility on the 
part of the Joint Venture to GOCO and then explores how important that sense of 
responsibility was to stewardship behaviour on the part of the Joint Venture. 
The Joint Venture demonstrated a highly professional focus upon the goals 
and objectives of GOCO.  An examination of the GOCO annual reports revealed that 
for all services a high standard had been achieved by the Joint Venture and there had 
been no failures to achieve GOCO’s published targets.  Regard was had to the annual 
and ad hoc reports of the independent regulator.  The independent regulator conducts 
an annual review of the performance of utilities licenced to operate in its jurisdiction, 
the review also encompasses the data reported to other agencies such as the 
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administrative tribunal.  The latest independent regulator’s review report revealed no 
criticism or indication that the Joint Venture had acted other than with a sense of 
responsibility to GOCO. 
The informant study revealed that the informants considered sense of 
responsibility on the part of the Joint Venture to be absolute, and near 
unchallengeable, presenting a continuation of the previously discussed theme that the 
preparedness of the Joint Venture to behave as a steward was unchallengeable.  The 
informants invariably explained what caused that sense of responsibility by turning 
to: the long-term water industry staff, 50% ownership by GOCO, and the Joint 
Venture’s tight ‘belonging’ to the close-knit local community.  Further, the area 
served by Joint Venture is virtually only the regional centre and, as it is inland from 
the east coast of Australia, it is so separate from other dormitory areas that all Joint 
Venture employees reside in the area they serve.  Many are long-term water industry 
staff.  Joint Venture is the only water sector employer in the regional centre resulting 
in those employees who were employed by GOCO at the time of privatisation being 
seconded to the Joint Venture and remaining there.  As put by Joint Venture 
informant B1, “I’ve been with this organisation coming close to 30 years.  So I 
worked for GOCO prior to the joint venture and I think a lot of the employees still 
see themselves as delivering services for regional centre, for the local community.  
So whether it’s GOCO or Joint Venture it doesn’t matter.”   An example of how this 
perspective benefits the principal was provided by Joint Venture informant B3, who 
said that “…the staff of Joint Venture do not distinguish between GOCO and Joint 
Venture.  Everybody mixes up the two … my message to my staff is that if they fail we 
fail.”  Having regard to the data from the studies it is concluded that there is a very 
strong sense of responsibility on the part of the Joint Venture. 
This research now examines how important sense of responsibility was to 
there being stewardship-like behaviour on the part of the Joint Venture.  This 
research concluded that there was a very strong sense of responsibility, having 
considered the evidence as to the strong stewardship of the system by the Joint 
Venture and the evidence from the informants as to the strong alignment of the Joint 
Venture and its employees with GOCO’s goals and objectives.  These findings of 
strong alignment would reasonably lead to the conclusion that sense of responsibility 
is important but the next step, the determination of whether that importance is so 
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great that sense of responsibility is essential, proves difficult as the Joint Venture 
case study does not offer a scenario where there was no sense of responsibility.  Put 
simply, an exhaustive search for evidence in the literature, archival sources and the 
informant interviews did not reveal any evidence of the Joint Venture acting other 
than in the interests of the principal GOCO. If there was any evidence of the Joint 
Venture not acting in the interests of the principal this scenario would then allow a 
comparison and several possible conclusions dependent upon whether stewardship 
was also found.  Accordingly, within the limits of the data, the possibilities are 
explored by speculating as to the probability of there being stewardship behaviour by 
the Joint Venture if there was no sense of responsibility. 
Any scenario which portrayed stewardship behaviour and no sense of 
responsibility to the principal would have the steward acting in the interests of the 
principal, pursuing the goals and objectives of the principal but with the steward 
organisation having its sense of responsibility directed towards another party, such as 
its owner or a conflicting ideology like user pays.  Alternatively, in this scenario the 
organisation which is achieving the goals of the principal could have no sense of 
responsibility to any organisation or ideology.  This would appear to be a scenario of 
a typical Agency Theory relationship, where the contractual terms have been 
specified with such clarity and foresight that the goals and objectives of the principal 
are capable of being met and have been met.  This is highly unlikely in the 
circumstances of a contractual period of any more than 12 months and not at all 
possible in the context of the regional centre water system infrastructure O&M where 
the contract is for a 20-year term with four- and five-year resets of payments and 
performance measure targets.  The literal contract could not alone ensure the 
alignment of the steward with the goals and objectives of the principal over those 
timeframes.  Yet there was stewardship of the water system and there was sense of 
responsibility and the stewardship-like behaviour of acting in the interests of the 
principal, suggesting that it is highly likely that the sense of responsibility to the 
principal motivates the steward to be so aligned and therefore is highly important to 
the agent acting in the interests of the principal. 
Another perspective on the importance of sense of responsibility is the 
requirement by the principal, GOCO.  The scenario would be the Joint Venture 
pursuing the goals and objectives of the principal and complying with all contractual 
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requirements but having no sense of responsibility to GOCO, notwithstanding 
GOCO being both the principal and a 50% owner of the Joint Venture.  Whilst it is 
possible that a principal who is at arm’s length from the agent/steward might accept a 
contractual relationship that delivers the contractual outcomes and where the 
agent/steward has no sense of responsibility it is unlikely that a 50% owner would.  
That 50% ownership brings with it a 50% membership of the JGB.  The GOCO 
involvement and control is further tightened by those three JGB members also being 
GOCO Board Members.  It is highly unlikely, indeed beyond probability, that those 
board members in common would permit the Joint Venture to evolve into an 
organisation that did not have an absolute sense of responsibility to GOCO.  This is 
particularly so in respect to safe drinking water as in that water system the Joint 
Venture is required to treat and deliver safe drinking water.  Similarly, when treating 
waste water for release into the environment the Joint Venture has the potential to 
impact adversely on GOCO’s goals, objectives and reputation.  The risk to the 
principal if the agent does not have a sense of responsibility is immense and it is not 
possible to conceive of a principal being content to have a contractual party which 
has such impact on the principal not having a sense of responsibility to the principal.  
For those reasons, taking the perspective of the principal, it is concluded that it is 
essential that the participants of the Joint Venture at all times have a sense of 
responsibility to GOCO. 
In summary, it was found that there was a very strong sense of 
responsibility on the part of the Joint Venture to GOCO.  The importance of sense of 
responsibility to the agent acting in the interests of the principal was examined 
through two lenses.  The first was an examination of the data for a causal link which 
revealed that sense of responsibility was highly important to the agent acting in the 
interests of the principal.  The second was an examination from the perspective of the 
principal and shareholder which revealed that sense of responsibility was essential.  
This development of the findings now turns to the actions which impact upon this 
sense of responsibility. 
5.3.3.3 Actions to increase sense of responsibility 
The preceding section of this thesis assembled the evidence as to sense of 
responsibility and the link between sense of responsibility and the agent acting in the 
interests of the principal.  This section examines the data in respect of the actions of 
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GOCO (the principal) which were found to have established or increased sense of 
responsibility on the part of the Joint Venture.  The data formed into three themes 
which are explored in the following paragraphs: 
 configuration of the Joint Venture; 
 employee dedication to the water industry; and 
 brand alignment. 
5.3.3.3.1 Configuration of the joint venture 
Two aspects of the configuration of the Joint Venture which were found to 
be key to achieving sense of responsibility are the 50% ownership by the principal, 
GOCO, and the arrangements as to the JGB membership. 
The 50% ownership of the two partnerships (distribution and retail) is 
inviolate, having been mandated by legislation passed by the regional centre 
government which prescribes that GOCO “…maintain at least 50 per cent interest in 
the partnership…” (Professor, 2008).  The informants provided a body of comment 
regarding sense of responsibility to the principal (GOCO) which was premised upon 
the significant ownership (50%).  Joint Venture informant B1 when asked what 
GOCO did to encourage sense of responsibility on the part of the Joint Venture said 
that “…when you own 50% of the company you’ve got a fair bit of influence … and 
they’re basically interested if it is good for [regional centre].”  Again the ‘local’ 
alignment of owner to board, to Joint Venture, to service, to local community 
emerged as removing the possibility of the agent acting in a manner other than with 
sense of responsibility. 
The contribution of the board to sense of responsibility on the part of the 
Joint Venture was described by Joint Venture informant B3 who said: “Board-to-
board responsibility is very strong.  Very transparent as to what we are providing to 
GOCO.  Could skimp on maintenance, doesn’t happen.”  The relationship between 
the entities which constituted the Joint Venture, GOCO and Energy Co. was 
examined by Professor (2008) who observed that “In many respects the two parties 
retain their distinct identities …But, within the joint venture, there is clearly a central 
organisational structure in which neither party is subservient to the other, so that one 
of the primary conditions for a real partnership seems to be satisfied.” 
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An insight into the strong relationship between boards was provided by 
Joint Venture informant B1 who said that “We [Joint Venture] have a very strong 
working relationship and partnership [with GOCO].  I suppose what helps there as 
well, is that we both have the same chairman.”  Interrogation of the 2011 annual 
reports by the two entities revealed that: the chair of each is the same person, three of 
the GOCO Board Members are JGB members, and one of those is also Managing 
Director of GOCO.  Of the other three members of the JGB one represents Energy 
Co. and two represent International Utilities Co.  All six JGB members are required 
by the Joint Venture overarching agreement to exercise their powers “in the best 
interests of the partnerships as a whole” (Professor, 2008, p. 604).  In summary the 
authority conferred that the 50% ownership of the privatised entity has allowed the 
government entity to firmly direct the activities of the steward to those wanted by the 
government entity, principally by way of establishing a strong presence on the JGB 
and also by overlapping the membership of the steward entity board with the board 
and management of the principal entity. 
5.3.3.3.2 Employee dedication to the water industry 
The long service of employees with both the water industry and with the 
Joint Venture and its predecessors was a strong thread through the stories related by 
the informants.  Joint Venture informant B3 recounted difficulties experienced by 
staff in moving from federal government funding for capital works to a ‘value for 
money’ basis which could withstand the scrutiny of the independent regulator.  
However, informant B3, together with other informants, went on to describe the 
strong sense of responsibility saying “…the majority of the technical people and the 
operational people…they are responsible for building some of these things, it is their 
little baby…so there is significant buy-in from Joint Venture staff to the business…”.  
GOCO informant B4 confirmed there was a strong sense of responsibility to the 
regional centre water system on the part of these long-term employees saying “…it 
was their water and sewerage business … they always had their ownership … 
engineers in utilities never strike, well water and utilities, because their community 
focus is too high.” 
Questioning of informants as to why employees stayed such long times 
elicited from GOCO informant B3 the observation that “…part of the reason is that 
if you are in water there is usually only one provider in the city so you have to stick 
 Chapter 5: Analysis 129 
with that provider, more or less, water supply.  There is some movement, but 
generally there are a lot of long lifers.”  Joint Venture informant A1 had himself 
worked for the Joint Venture or its predecessors for 30 years and provided a telling 
insight saying “…I think a lot of employees still see themselves as delivering services 
for the regional centre, for the local community, so whether its GOCO or Joint 
Venture, it doesn’t matter.”  The learning then is that employees who were 
previously employed by a government operator of a water system when transitioned 
to a privatised operator of that same system display a strong sense of responsibility to 
the system and the government entity responsible for the system. 
5.3.3.3.3 Brand alignment 
The Joint Venture’s brand emerged as a major driver of sense of 
responsibility and was a topic which provided valuable insights into the principal–
steward relationship.  This section firstly discusses the history of the development of 
the Joint Venture brand.  Secondly, the special way in which the brand drives sense 
of responsibility is unpacked.  Thirdly, several instances of attitude to the brand on 
the part of Joint Venture participants and the community are related to obtain insights 
into the relationship between steward and principal. 
The Joint Venture was created as an alternative to full privatisation of 
electricity, water and waste water services, and the multi-utility model reflects the 
relatively small population which in 2012 was approximately 370,000.  Because the 
joint venture arrangement brought together electricity and water/waste water with 
gas a shared Joint Venture brand was adopted.  The aggressive competition in the 
retail energy services market required that the brand be strongly promoted.  This was 
(and still is) achieved through advertising and promotion, community grants, 
assistance and sponsorships.  This visibility of the brand is extremely high with the 
brand being dominant at many regional centre events.  In essence a water service 
monopoly provider has had the benefit of a brand development program largely 
funded by activities other than the water services. 
This very strong brand under which the water services are supplied is 
overlaid with a near exact match between the regional centre served and the area 
served by the Joint Venture.  Because that regional centre is surrounded by land 
dedicated to rural activities there is a strong sense of community in the area served 
by the Joint Venture.  Joint Venture informant B2 observed that “…the size of 
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[regional centre] is a small country town …[which] makes the Joint Venture multi-
utility model a good fit which leads to …efficiencies, benefits, one answer shop for 
customers.”  In respect of Joint Venture employees’ sense of responsibility 
informant B2 said “…we are like a country town and we are very proud of our 
brand, and while GOCO are in their own brand…we try to have a unified brand in 
terms of our retail distribution…we do believe in a unified culture and one of the 
things we do is having a common EBA [Enterprise Bargaining Agreement] across 
the different organisations [GOCO and Joint Venture] as well, there isn’t any 
favouritism.”  Joint Venture informant B3 put the impact of the strong local 
alignment succinctly “…if you do something wrong people will complain and people 
in [regional centre] are pretty quick to complain.  It is a small town.” 
Yet GOCO has its own brand with GOCO informant B4 observing that 
“Basically Joint Venture is the face because they do electricity, gas and the water 
and deal with our customers, so they are the face, GOCO has to stay in the 
background…We [GOCO] do sponsor things, but it’s at a lot lower level than Joint 
Venture…”.  The brand of the steward is derived principally from that of the 
principal, and Joint Venture informant B3 observed that “…the staff of Joint Venture 
do not distinguish between GOCO and Joint Venture.  Everybody mixes up the two.”  
Joint Venture informant B1 said:  
Joint Venture still gets called GOCO.  People don’t really differentiate.  As far as 
they are concerned we provide their electricity, their gas and their water and 
their waste water services.  It’s more historical than anything else, you know 
Joint Venture and its predecessors have been around since the early 1900s in 
[regional centre]. 
5.3.4 Significance of findings 
At the highest level the findings reveal that the joint venture partnership in 
combination with a traditional highly specified principal/agent contract and service 
agreement between GOCO and the Joint Venture have achieved stewardship of the 
water service.  In addition it was found that this stewardship was accompanied by a 
strong sense of responsibility to GOCO, and to providing water services to the 
regional centre’s community.  Significant findings were developed based upon data 
which, because of the highly regulated and public nature of the water industry and 
availability of several informants who had been employed by GOCO at the time of 
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forming the joint venture, was found to be highly reliable.  The key findings were 
that: 
 The Joint Venture operates in a highly regulated and mature industry 
environment viz. the regional centre utilities licensing regime. 
 The government and private companies have created an authentic joint 
venture which has achieved stewardship of the water service. 
 The Joint Venture as agent in a contractual relationship configured in 
accordance with Agency Theory, acted strongly in the interests of the 
principal, but within the contractual terms. 
 There was no extraordinary action on the part of the Joint Venture which 
was not expected by its owners (one of which was the principal) to act to 
its own detriment.  The governance arrangements did not allow the Joint 
Venture (or its two private shareholders) any discretion to decide to 
independently act in the interests of the principal. 
 There was a very strong sense of responsibility on the part of the agent to 
the principal.  The attribute was highly important to the stewardship-like 
behaviour of acting in the interests of the principal.  In addition it was 
concluded that from the perspective of the principal and shareholder sense 
of responsibility was essential. 
 The Joint Venture staff had a strong sense of responsibility to the provision 
of water services to the regional centre community. 
 GOCO consciously took actions which have contributed strongly to the 
sense of responsibility on the part of the Joint Venture. 
 There is a strong possibility that stewardship of the water service was 
achieved because of the carefully configured example of joint venture privatisation.  
In respect of the nature of stewardship-like behaviour by the Joint Venture the 
finding was that the agent acted strongly in the interests of the principal but within 
the bounds of compliance with the contract. 
The significance then is that this case study has provided an example where 
there has not merely been contractual compliance but a steward acting strongly in the 
interests of the principal and demonstrating a strong sense of responsibility to the 
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principal — all in the context of formal contractual arrangements which are highly 
specified.  The unpacking of this tangle of Stewardship Theory and Agency Theory 
characteristics is made in Chapter 6: Discussion. 
5.4 CASE STUDY C 
5.4.1 Introduction 
In the mid1990s the government entity, State Corp., established two alliances 
(North Alliance and South Alliance) to carry out O&M services and a small volume 
of minor capital works (less than $1m) for drinking water, waste water, drainage and 
related customer services to adjacent segments of a metropolitan area (Development 
Bank, 2007).  The water system remained owned by State Corp. with the O&M 
responsibilities of the alliances being specified in alliance contracts each made 
between State Corp. and two private participants: North Private Co. and South 
Private Co.  These contracts were extended after some years and put to market with 
the new contracts running with an extension to 2011 (one of the two private 
participants was replaced).  It is these early alliances collectively which are the focus 
of this case study.  The term ‘early alliances’ reflects the pioneering application of 
alliance configurations to O&M and achieves de-identification. 
The following sections of this thesis first describe the key features of the early 
alliances, including some detail of a single ‘Next Generation’ (NG) Alliance which 
replaced the two early alliances in 2011.  Secondly, the findings as to stewardship 
behaviour, sense of responsibility and actions to increase sense of responsibility are 
assembled.  These findings include deficiencies in the early alliance arrangements 
and the changes to address them introduced by State Corp. in 2011 by way of the 
NG Alliance.  Thirdly, the key findings are probed to understand the possible 
significance of the findings from the early alliances case study. 
5.4.2 Key features of the early alliances 
Publicly-available documentation regarding the early alliances (i.e. their 
formation), the Development Bank reports of 2007 and 2011, and the 2011 Request 
for Proposals (RFP) by which State Corp. went to the market for the NG Alliance, 
allow a valuable longitudinal study of the progression through in-house, contract for 
services to alliance models of service delivery.  This section firstly describes the 
water services.  Secondly, the legal form of the two alliances and the objectives 
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which State Corp. sought to achieve when establishing the alliances are described.  
Thirdly, the environment of regulation and reporting within which the two alliances 
operate are assembled and examined.  Fourthly, the payment arrangements for 
alliance participants are explained.  Finally, key features of the NG Alliance, which 
commenced operation in 2011, are set out to provide a foundation for later 
examination of how State Corp. has sought to improve aspects of the early alliances 
which were found to impact upon the sense of responsibility of the alliances as 
stewards. 
5.4.2.1 The water service 
The water service provides services to a metropolitan area which has a 
population of about 1.5m and 750,000 connected properties.  The water service is 
comprised of assets with a replacement value of “more than $10b” which are 
operated and maintained by 400 employees, drawn from State Corp. and the alliances 
(RFP, 2011, p. 34).  Overall expenditure for the two alliances was about $70m.  State 
Corp. in its state-wide water services role collects $2b in revenue and about $9b in 
net assets (State Corp. AR 2011, p. 66). 
5.4.2.2 Legal form and objectives 
The term ‘alliance’ was adopted when the entities were initially formed; 
however, this description has been shown to be aspirational as some of the key 
features of an alliance were not put in place or were underdeveloped.  The 
perspectives of State Corp. informants in this regard and the actions taken in 2011 by 
State Corp. to create a replacement single NG Alliance are examined later in this 
section.  Thus the early alliances are more correctly described as a traditional 
contract between State Corp. and North (or South) Private Co. for the provision of 
services as specified in the Alliance Contract and for the creation of a company 
North (or South) Service Co. by North (or South) Private Co., who each retained 
ownership of their company.  The service company purchased materials, engaged 
contractors and carried out the works in its own name and not that of State Corp.  
The service company was the employer of whomever North (or South) Private Co. 
chose to employ in the name of that company, and the field staff of State Corp. who 
State Corp. transferred into that alliance when the alliance was first formed.  All 
system assets remained owned by State Corp. and a small number of employees (i.e. 
two or three) were seconded into each alliance.  These arrangements and the NG 
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Alliance changes from the early alliances make this case study invaluable in 
understanding the features which contribute to stewardship and sense of 
responsibility. 
The organisational structure is depicted diagrammatically in Figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.3 Early alliances 
 
The focus of the case study is the two traditional contracts within the red 
box.  State Corp. is a statutory corporation established pursuant to the powers of 
water-specific state legislation.  North Service Co. was wholly owned by an 
Australian Stock Exchange-listed large international contracting group.  While South 
Service Co. was wholly owned by an Australian Stock Exchange-listed engineering 
and property services company. 
Governance of each alliance was provided by a separate Alliance Board 
(AB) comprised of three senior State Corp. representatives and three North (or 
South) Service Co. representatives, which met at least quarterly.  The AB members 
were generally at general manager level in their own organisations, participating 
 Chapter 5: Analysis 135 
monthly in the AB for 6–8 hours and being paid only by their respective 
organisations.  The managers of each alliance were employees of North (or South) 
Private Co. and interfaced with the State Corp. Regional Manager and were members 
of the metropolitan region management team (Development Bank, 2007).  The AB 
decides upon key works, annual budget and performance targets, with the State 
Corp.-appointed chairman providing final arbitration.  The privately-owned service 
companies were subject to the scrutiny of the AB and were conducted on an open-
book basis.  This transparency supports the scheme of payment to the private 
companies whereby they were paid direct operating and maintenance costs, a 
management fee, and an annual performance bonus calculated having regard to the 
service company data. 
The objectives of State Corp. in adopting the alliance model were to address 
the complexity inherent in the day-to-day operation of water systems in metropolitan 
areas and to alleviate the difficulty and bureaucratic workload entailed in managing 
O&M contracts on a schedule-of-rates basis (World Bank, 2007).  The satisfaction of 
these objectives is assessed in the section of this thesis which explores Section 
5.4.3.1 Stewardship of infrastructure. 
5.4.2.3 Regulation and reporting 
State Corp. and the early alliances operated within a regulatory environment 
that is very similar to that of other Australian urban water systems: highly regulated 
with a high level of publicly-available information.  The key elements of the 
environment are as follows. 
State Corp. is regulated in four major areas, namely: licensing to operate as 
a water services provider, licensing to take water, licensing from an environmental 
perspective and water quality.  State Corp. has been issued an operating licence 
through to 2022 (RFP, 2011) by the economic regulator.  This licence sets standards 
for asset management and service delivery, including the requirement to comply with 
the Australian Drinking Water Quality Guidelines 2004.  State Corp. has been issued 
licences to take water.  The environment department has issued licences to State 
Corp. to operate waste water treatment plants, conditional upon standards as to 
discharges and odour emissions.  The health department sets requirements as to water 
quality (RFP, 2011). 
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Regulation of the finances of State Corp. is achieved through legislation 
which establishes the independence of the entity then makes it subject to Ministerial 
approval, in particular where matters are of public interest, a major initiative or 
require expenditure over $25m.  Charges for State Corp. services are decided by the 
state government which is required to balance the impact of water pricing and the 
total social, economic and environmental needs of the state. 
Reporting to external parties is made by a combination of the reporting to 
parliament and government required of any government entity and that required of a 
water services operator plus other reporting which State Corp. makes voluntarily by 
way of its internet site.  An annual report is made to the economic regulator as to 
compliance with the requirements set in the operating licence (State Corp. AR 2011, 
p. 49).  State Corp. provides quarterly reports and an annual report to the Minister 
responsible for water (State Corp. AR 2011, p. 49). 
State Corp. provides extensive data as to performance against targets for 
drinking water quality, waste water, water recycling and republishes reports 
previously made to regulatory bodies, for example water quality reporting to the 
health department, on the State Corp. internet site. 
5.4.2.4 Payment arrangements 
Three different forms of payment are made to the North and South Service 
Companies, the direct operating and maintenance costs, a management fee and an 
annual performance bonus (Development Bank, 2007, p. 9). 
Operating and maintenance costs incurred by the service company (costs of 
employing alliance staff, materials and contractors) are reimbursed.  The 
management fee covers overheads and profit.  It is based on the reimbursed O&M 
costs and the quantum of this fee was set by the original competitive bidding process 
(Development Bank, 2006, p. 12).  The annual performance bonus is based on a 
number of factors, including meeting KPI targets, and the degree to which the budget 
is met or bettered.  Bonuses are paid for that year’s achievement only, further 
improvement being required for a bonus to be paid in a subsequent year 
(Development Bank, 2007, p. 9). 
These payments and bonuses are dependent upon extensive reporting as to 
each expenditure item, performance against KPIs and performance against budget.  
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This results in a high level of transparency with there being no evidence of a possible 
information asymmetry favouring either State Corp. or one of the private companies. 
5.4.2.5 Next Generation Alliance 
The case study interviews were conducted in 2011.  At that time State Corp. 
was finalising the selection of the private participant in a single alliance which would 
carry out the combined roles of the North and South alliances and subsume existing 
functional units from within State Corp.’s metropolitan operations.  As the 
configuration of the new alliance acknowledges the learnings from the early alliances 
and alliances in other water systems, and for the purpose of de-identification, this 
new alliance is denoted as the NG Alliance.  The objectives of State Corp. in 
adopting the NG Alliance model are first examined, followed by setting out the 
features of the NG Alliance which seek to resolve deficiencies of the early alliances.  
This thesis does not examine the NG Alliance as a case study itself but rather as a 
rich source of data to increase the understanding of the early alliances. 
The need for State Corp. to form the NG Alliance was earlier signalled by 
the Development Bank’s (2007) observations that the “…alliances reached a point 
where significant improvements had been made, and diminishing returns 
occurred.…the Alliance Agreement must be flexible enough to accommodate 
revitalisation through the enlargement of scope, vertical and/or lateral integration of 
staff and processes, and removal of process impediments” (Development Bank, 
2007).  In 2011 State Corp. commenced the process of selecting a participant for the 
alliance.  The State Corp. annual report in August 2011 described the NG Alliance as 
a single, integrated entity which would gain efficiencies and improve performance in 
the delivery of services. (State Corp. AR 2011, p. 45).  The NG Alliance extended 
the scope of services to include all State Corp. employees and functions in the 
region, using a single service company, managed by the AB as a single point of 
accountability, to oversee all the activities (RFP, 2011, p. 31). 
New Private Co. was selected and established its own service company 
(New Service Co.) which took over the role of employer from North (and South) 
Service Co.  Put in its most simple way, the two previously regionally-based 
alliances have been combined with the asset management function and smaller State 
Corp. functional groups to form a single alliance covering the combined metropolitan 
area and being staffed by about 90 employees from State Corp. and about 
 138 Chapter 5: Analysis 
300 employees from the service company owned by New Private Co.  This progress 
of privatisation was noted by State Corp. informant C5 who said “Management of 
services is the role of State Corp., not the doing.” 
The NG Alliance changes by State Corp. provide a body of significant data 
to aid in the understanding of the effectiveness of the early alliances model of 
privatisation, and details of the NG Alliance are given in the following sections 
which set out the findings in respect of the early alliances. 
5.4.3 The findings 
This section firstly explores whether there was stewardship of the water service 
by the early alliances, and the nature of stewardship behaviour of the early alliances.  
Secondly, the evidence as to whether there was a sense of responsibility on the part 
of the early alliances to State Corp. is assembled and an analysis made of how 
important that sense of responsibility was to stewardship on the part of the early 
alliances.  Thirdly, the data as to actions to increase the sense of responsibility of the 
early alliances are assembled and analysed. 
5.4.3.1 Stewardship of infrastructure 
This research has proceeded on the basis that public values provide a 
suitable measure of the stewardship of critical infrastructures and in the preceding 
Case Studies A and B the public values of efficient use of public resources and 
quality of services provided to customers were found to be the most important to the 
public.  Consideration of the public values in play in respect of the metropolitan 
water system in Case Study C revealed that those same two values are the most 
important.  Accordingly, this section first examines whether there has been efficient 
use of public resources.  Second, the quality of services provided is examined.  
Third, the data is analysed to understand the nature of the behaviour of the agent or 
steward. 
5.4.3.1.1 Efficient use of public resources 
The efficient use of public resources is measured by comparison against 
the performance of the system before the early alliances were established, and by 
comparison against similar water systems.  Comparison against performance before 
the early alliances was made by the Development Bank (2007), which used four 
measures — activity-based productivity, customer reported water and sewer faults 
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attended to within the target time, lost time injury frequency rate, and direct customer 
contact satisfaction — utilising data up to 2004.  There had been 18% productivity 
savings over a nine-year period but, importantly, most of the savings were achieved 
in the first five years (Development Bank, 2007).  Response times were found to 
have decreased “dramatically” and the Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate 
improvement was found to be “outstanding” (Development Bank, 2007, p. 16).  
Direct customer satisfaction surveys revealed 90% of customers were “satisfied” or 
“very satisfied” (Development Bank, 2007, p. 17).  The Development Bank (2006) 
concluded that “By almost any measure these alliances have been highly 
successful…” (Development Bank, 2007, p. 2). 
Comparison against other systems is made in the annual National 
Performance Report: Urban water utilities.  State Corp.’s combined operating costs 
for water and sewerage per property in comparison with 10 other like-sized systems 
is shown to be the second lowest cost in 2009–10 and the lowest in 2008–09 
(National Water Commission, 2011).  Whilst lowest cost alone is not sufficient 
evidence of effective use of public resources when considered in the context of the 
achievements reported by the Development Bank (2007) it is reasonable to conclude 
the early alliances satisfied the public value of efficient use of public resources. 
5.4.3.1.2 Quality of services 
State Corp. reported the highest number of complaints for the three years 
to 2009–10 when compared with seven like-sized water systems (National Water 
Commission, 2011).  In 2009-10 five of the utilities reported fewer than five 
complaints per 1,000 properties but State Corp. reported more than 15 complaints per 
1,000 properties (National Water Commission, 2011).  Whilst not directly conflicting 
with the 2004 data that “Direct customer satisfaction surveys revealed 90% of 
customers were “satisfied” or “very satisfied” on which the Development Bank relied 
(Development Bank, 2007, p. 17), the 2010 comparison with other utilities suggests 
that State Corp. may now be evidencing an unfavourable trend, or at the least a 
plateau in State Corp.’s ability to satisfy customers.  State Corp. had for the three 
years to 2009–10 reported a consistent level of unplanned interruptions which is 
marginally higher than the median for the nine utilities compared, but consistently 
within the 100- to 140-minute level achieved by seven participant utilities (National 
Water Commission, 2011).  State Corp. had for the three years to 2009–10 
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consistently reported the second lowest percentage of calls answered within 30 
seconds for the eight utilities compared (National Water Commission, 2011). 
Further understanding of the quality of services was sought by searching 
for adverse mention as to quality of services in the archival and informant studies.  
The archival study found no instances; however, the informant study elicited from 
comments from the State Corp. informants CI and C2 that unsatisfactory quality of 
service does happen, attributing this to the alliances focusing on the KPIs to achieve 
bonus payments rather than providing a sound quality of service.  State Corp. 
informant C1 said “…they [the alliances] focus on transactional, individual items, 
not looking across [the system]...[they] seek to satisfy the KPI rather than [satisfy 
the] reason for the KPI.”  State Corp. informant C2 said “…you get inappropriate 
drivers when you focus on KPIs and dollars.”  When asked for an example informant 
C2 said:  
One of our KPIs under our operating licence is responsiveness to customers…we 
record how many meters we install within fourteen days, and as soon as 
somebody books time to do a work order, the clock stops because you’ve started 
the job. ..It might be another twenty days before you get to the site, but you have 
passed the KPI…We had a customer who paid to have their water service 
relocated.  Now that’s not a KPI under the contract.  The customer was told by 
one of the alliances, that's not a KPI…so we will do it when we get around to it. 
The question then is whether State Corp. has achieved stewardship of the 
water service.  The conclusion of the Development Bank (2007) is that State Corp. 
through the early alliances has achieved efficient use of public monies and much 
improved quality of services when compared with the arrangements in place before 
the alliances commenced.  However, that conclusion was formed in 2007 based in 
part on 2004 data.  The State Corp. 2011 RFP document for the NG Alliance 
acknowledged deficiencies in the early alliances saying that the arrangements 
applying to the “early alliances…have not always encouraged a strong co-operative 
focus on business improvement” and that there are a “…lack of alignment of goals 
and objectives…[and] collective responsibility for outcomes…”.  This ominous 
terminology in a public document may signal that State Corp. had formed the view 
that it was not achieving an appropriate outcome from the early alliances.  This 
concern, when brought together with the mildly adverse archival document findings 
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and the advice from State Corp. informants CI and C2 that unsatisfactory quality of 
service does happen, would reasonably lead to the conclusion that the principal (State 
Corp.) formed the opinion that the early alliances were not achieving stewardship of 
the water service.  That conclusion is reinforced by the State Corp. action of 
terminating the use of the early alliance form of relationship.  It was concluded that 
the early alliances did not achieve stewardship of the water service. 
5.4.3.1.3 Stewardship behaviour 
On the basis that stewardship of the water service was not achieved, this 
thesis proceeds to explore the behaviour of the agent/steward and whether there was 
a causal link between that behaviour and there not being stewardship. 
The literature, archival and informant interview studies revealed no 
instance of there not being contractual compliance.  However, contractual 
compliance was found to have a negative connotation for State Corp. informants.  As 
discussed in the preceding sub-section regarding quality of services, informants CI 
and C2 attributed unsatisfactory quality of service to the alliances focusing on KPIs 
to achieve bonus payments rather than providing a sound quality of service.  State 
Corp. informant C2 conceptualised this issue as ‘inappropriate drivers’ but it is also 
literal contractual compliance with the alliance acting in its own interests without a 
sense of responsibility to the principal.  In the example given by State Corp. 
informant C2, where the KPI was satisfied by booking time to the customer’s job as 
distinct from satisfying the customer’s needs, the agent is clearly acting against the 
interests of the principal. 
Thus the performance of the early alliances at the higher level of 
behaviour, that of acting in the interests of the principal, becomes highly unlikely.  
The possibility that the early alliances have acted against the interests of the principal 
was increased by State Corp. informant C1 who clearly understood the concept of a 
contractor acting in the interests of the principal, recounting the response of the 
Mechanical and Electrical (M&E) alliance (not the subject of this case study) to a 
death caused by a steel mesh platform collapsing under the weight of the employee.  
The State Corp. Board required that each of the thousands of platforms be assessed, 
faults identified and made safe.  Informant C1 said the “…M&E Alliance took the 
attitude that there were no barriers, no issues of priorities and did the work on time.  
In contrast the O&M alliances…saw the work as a lesser priority, needed a work 
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order.”  In these examples the data revealed a belief on the part of the State Corp. 
informants that at least one of the early alliances had not acted in the interests of 
State Corp. (the principal). 
Yet, in contrast, informant C1 went on to say that “…in the time of 
incidents (call outs, burst water mains) the alliances do better than contract 
[requirements].”  North Service Co. informant C8 when asked about going above 
and beyond the contract said “…if something needs to be done it is going to get done 
and if they [State Corp.] say what about the cost, we say well we will sort that out 
later.” 
These findings from the informant study were corroborated in the State 
Corp. RFP (2011, p. 31) which commented “… the current arrangements do not 
always provide the best opportunity for the achievement of overall business 
objectives: Measures taken by the O&M alliances to achieve cost reduction 
sometimes resulted in increased cost elsewhere in State Corp. and the current 
arrangements have not always encouraged a strong cooperative focus on business 
improvement”, it also went on to identify a lack of alignment of goals and objectives 
and a lack of collective responsibility for outcomes as ‘defects’ in the ‘early alliance’ 
arrangements.  These findings were consistent with the conclusion, in Section 5.4.3.1 
Stewardship of infrastructure, that the early alliances had not achieved stewardship 
of the water service.  The archival and informant studies were not constructed to 
reveal whether this lower level of performance was limited to only one of the early 
alliances or applied to both. 
The next and final level of performance to be explored is whether the early 
alliances have acted in the interests of the principal to the extent of performing 
exceptional acts that might have amounted to the alliance doing something to its own 
detriment.  There was no evidence of either alliance doing anything extraordinary, 
which in the commercial context of privatised water services would translate to 
financial or reputational costs.  State Corp. informants consistently adopted the 
perspective that the relationship was commercial and that there was no expectation 
that the early alliances act against their own interests in a significant way. 
Bringing the data together for the early alliances it was found that 
stewardship of the water service had not been achieved and that the nature of 
behaviour of the North and South alliances was that of contractual compliance, and 
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not acting in the interests of State Corp. (the principal).  The question arises as to 
whether there is a causal link between not acting in the interests of the principal and 
there not being stewardship of the service.  A review of the data from the two State 
Corp. informants revealed that their view was that the acting with self-interest was 
linked to there not being stewardship of the service.  The 2010 NG Alliance RFP 
data revealed that State Corp. had formed the view that it was not achieving an 
appropriate outcome from the early alliances.  Whilst the data does not specifically 
state that stewardship was not being achieved the fact that State Corp. abandoned the 
‘early alliance’ form of contractual relationship suggests that State Corp. saw a very 
strong link between the behaviour of the early alliances and an unacceptable 
outcome.  It is concluded that the case study demonstrated a strong causal link 
between acting with self-interest (or against the interests of the principal) and 
stewardship of the service not being achieved. 
In summary, it was found that the behaviour of the early alliances was 
contractual compliance but that a significant body of evidence showed that State 
Corp. was of the opinion that the early alliances were not acting in the interests of 
State Corp.  No example of the alliances performing an extraordinary act to the 
benefit of the principal and acting against their own interests was found, nor was 
there an expectation by State Corp. that the early alliances act against their own 
interests as the relationship was commercial. 
5.4.3.2 Sense of responsibility 
This section assembles evidence as to whether there was a sense of 
responsibility on the part of the early alliances to State Corp. and then analyses how 
important that sense of responsibility was to the achievement (or not) of stewardship 
behaviour. 
Sense of responsibility was a term which resonated with private company 
informants.  The two private participant informants from the North alliance 
demonstrated a straightforward sense of responsibility to the government entity.  
South Service Co. informant C6 said:  
…I do think that myself and South Service Co. we really do take responsibility, we 
almost take more responsibility than State Corp. itself.  They have outsourced this 
for such a long time that they have no expertise in doing it at all anymore…they 
don’t know if they are getting a good service or a bad service…this inbuilt culture 
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[in State Corp.] where you really think that the contractors are ripping you off all 
the time….   
Further, South Service Co. informant C7 said:  
…South Service Co. is responsible in spite of all the goading to be irresponsible 
from State Corp.  I think State Corp. if they had their way, we would just spend less 
money, that’s the big driver … but at the same time make sure the assets don’t 
degenerate and we do all these things.  I do think that we are responsible managers 
of State Corp’s asset and their customers, but as I say it is almost in spite of State 
Corp. 
When asked what engendered this sense of responsibility in the absence of a 
reciprocating spirit from State Corp. South Service Co. informant C6 revealed an 
immensely strong personal sense of responsibility for providing the community’s 
water service (or to the water industry) as distinct from responsibility to State Corp.  
This issue goes right to the point of how important it is that sense of responsibility to 
the principal be present for there to be stewardship.  Informant C6 had been put a 
question as to whether there was a tension between sense of responsibility to State 
Corp. and sense of responsibility to his employer South Service Co.  Informant C6 
said:  
South Private Co. has very little to do with us…so my own sense of responsibility 
comes from my career in water.  I do have State Corp.’s interests at heart…You 
are talking to someone who is a career water person whose sole purpose is to 
provide this service.  We live and breathe it almost…  “I read some of your 
questions here: ‘What do people from State Corp. do to engender a sense of 
responsibility?’  They don’t really have to in this case…they don’t do anything, we 
are the dirty contractor, that is how the vast majority of State Corp. treat us…. 
It would seem then that there is another form of sense of responsibility in 
play with at least one of the two South Service Co. informants: a sense of 
responsibility directed to the water sector and the community.  This other sense of 
responsibility offers the possibility of being a criterion or factor which complements 
and reinforces sense of responsibility to the principal. 
The data from the government entity informants was interrogated for 
evidence as to whether the steward private companies acted with a sense of 
responsibility.  State Corp. informant C1 explained that the alliances approach 
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matters at a transaction level, focusing on individual items and do not look to the 
impact on the whole system saying “…[they] seek to satisfy the KPI rather than 
[satisfy the] reason for the KPI.”  This focus on KPIs resulting in inappropriate 
outcomes for the principal was reiterated by State Corp. informant C2.  Put simply, 
there was negligible positive evidence to support the claim of the private company 
informants that there was sense of responsibility to the principal.  This low level of 
sense of responsibility (and stewardship) may have been acknowledged by State 
Corp.  The RFP document for the NG Alliance says: 
… the current arrangements have not always encouraged a strong 
cooperative focus on business improvement.  It was recognised that these 
issues…largely come about due to some of the fundamental principles and 
features of successful alliances not being reflected in the structure and 
understanding of, or behaviour within, the current arrangements.  Examples 
are lack of alignment of goals and objectives, collective responsibility for 
outcomes and integrated management of resources. (RFP, 2011, p.31) 
Drawing these findings together, whilst there was some evidence of the 
early alliances having a sense of responsibility, the evidence from the 2011 NG 
Alliance RFP, the evidence of the State Corp. informants of the early alliances focus 
on the KPIs and not the maintenance of the water service and at least one the two 
South Private Co. informants directing their sense of responsibility to the water 
sector and the community it is reasonable to conclude that, on balance, there was not 
an adequate sense of responsibility to the principal. 
The second focus of this sense of responsibility research is to understand 
how important sense of responsibility was (or not) to there being stewardship 
behaviour.  In this case study the finding was that there was only limited 
stewardship-like behaviour and that the sense of responsibility was judged by the 
principal to be not adequate to the role.  The issue then is whether this inadequate 
sense of responsibility had a causal link to there not being stewardship behaviour on 
the part of the early alliances.  That such a conclusion was the case would ideally 
require evidence that the inadequate sense of responsibility was the antecedent of the 
early alliances acting in their own interests.  That clear evidence was not available.  
However, evidence was available that an inadequate sense of responsibility did 
accompany the early alliances not acting in the interests of State Corp.  Accordingly, 
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on the balance of probabilities it is concluded that for the early alliances there was a 
causal link between there not being an adequate sense of responsibility and there not 
being stewardship behaviour.  It would follow then that sense of responsibility is 
shown to be important to stewardship behaviour. 
Indication that State Corp. believes that there is a stronger causal link might 
be found in the actions of State Corp. in replacing the early alliance contractual 
relationship.  The RFP for the NG Alliance referenced earlier in this section shows 
that State Corp. has been prepared to say that the arrangements applying to the early 
alliances “…have not always encouraged a strong co-operative focus on business 
improvement” and that there is a “…lack of alignment of goals and 
objectives…[and] collective responsibility for outcomes …” (RFP, 2011 p. 31).  
These terms can reasonably be concluded to have the meaning of there not being a 
sense of responsibility and that it is an important requirement for State Corp. that the 
agent possess this sense of responsibility in the stewardship of the water service — 
so important in fact that State Corp. has terminated the use of the ‘early alliance’ 
form of relationship.  State Corp. clearly wants to contract with an agent who 
exemplifies stewardship behaviour by delivering “…further and ongoing business 
improvement in a way that maintains high standards of service within budgetary 
constraints” (RFP, 2011, p. 31).  Thus we are given the insight that State Corp. 
believes that there is a link between sense of responsibility and an improved level of 
stewardship behaviour, a link so strong or possibly essential that State Corp. has 
configured the replacement alliance with features that emphasise that sense of 
responsibility.  The RFP for the replacement alliance specified that the suitability of 
proposals would be assessed against, amongst other things, the commitment of 
nominated key representatives.  State Corp. informant C3 had used this term when 
describing what State Corp. was looking for in the private participant for the NG 
Alliance as “…the five c’s that we look for, culture and commitment, … capability, 
capacity and their commercial offer…”.  Hernandez (2012) has utilised the term 
commitment in the same context as sense of responsibility. Thus if commitment is a 
requirement by the government entity both at the organisational level and at the 
individual level then it is not a large step to characterise an organisation who 
evidences commitment as one which evidences sense of responsibility.  Thus the 
government entity has publicly required that the private participant demonstrate a 
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sense of responsibility.  It would then seem, beyond a reasonable doubt, that for the 
government entity sense of responsibility to the principal is essential. 
In summary, whilst there was some evidence of the early alliances having a 
sense of responsibility the evidence from the 2011 NG Alliance RFP and the two 
South Private Co. informants directing their sense of responsibility to the water 
industry and to providing water to the community when brought together lead to the 
conclusion that there was not a sense of responsibility to the principal.  It was found 
that there was a strong possibility that the absence of a sense of responsibility to the 
principal did have a causal link to there not being stewardship behaviour of the 
system.  It was found that the inadequate sense of responsibility was a key reason 
State Corp. replaced the early alliance relationship signalling that for State Corp. it is 
so highly important to the stewardship behaviour required of the agent that there be 
sense of responsibility that State Corp. considers that attribute on the part of the 
agent as essential.  In configuring the replacement contractual relationship State 
Corp. has given extensive consideration to the features which will maximise the 
performance with regard to sense of responsibility-related issues, such as “…lack of 
alignment of goals and objectives…[and] collective responsibility for outcomes …” 
(RFP, 2011, p. 31).  These are explored in the following section. 
5.4.3.3 Actions to increase sense of responsibility 
The early alliances case study is distinguished by a significant body of 
findings as to actions which impact negatively on sense of responsibility and these 
have been included along with the findings as to actions which were found to impact 
positively on sense of responsibility.  Those findings formed into the following 
themes which are explored in following sections: 
 ensuring suitable participants; 
 branding of alliances; and 
 incentives to private participants 
5.4.3.3.1 Ensuring suitable participants 
When sense of responsibility on the part of the steward was unpacked the 
suitability of the government entity was raised by both State Corp. and Private Co. 
informants.  This section first examines aspects of the private participants which 
were put forward as impacting on the steward having a sense of responsibility to the 
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principal (State Corp.).  Evidence as to the suitability of the government entity (State 
Corp.) and its employees to support or increase the steward’s sense of responsibility 
is then examined. 
5.4.3.3.1.1 Suitability of private participants 
Key aspects of the suitability of the private sector participants and their 
employees were addressed earlier in this section of the thesis which explored the 
extent to which the early alliances (the stewards) acted in the interests of State Corp. 
(the principal) and the importance of sense of responsibility.  This sub-section of the 
thesis firstly restates those briefly from the perspective of the shortcomings which 
State Corp. identified, and then considers the data in relation to other features of the 
early alliances’ private participants which impacted on their acting with a sense of 
responsibility to the principal (State Corp.). 
State Corp., in the NG Alliance RFP, identified a “lack of alignment of 
goals and objectives” and a lack of “collective responsibility for outcomes” (RFP, 
2011, p. 31) as the key deficiencies of the early alliances.  By way of the RFP, State 
Corp. established evaluation criteria against which those responding to the RFP 
would be measured including the record of the proposer of providing similar 
services, and the culture and alignment of the objectives, values, visions etc. of the 
proposer’s business with those of State Corp.  In turn the proposer was required to 
specify the names of the individual key staff members nominated to work in the NG 
Alliance with the RFP establishing criteria of competency, commitment and culture 
against which those individuals will be measured (RFP, 2011, p. 56).  The State 
Corp. RFP is an invaluable tool for those seeking to develop the criteria required of 
private participants in long-term alliance contracts. 
Another feature of the private participants which impacted on the sense 
of responsibility was the belief in alliance philosophies.  State Corp. informant C3 
said “You have to have the corporate non-owner participant people believe that this 
is where they want to be.  This is about a long-term relationship of sharing values, 
sharing goals…”.  Several of the State Corp. informants recounted State Corp. 
experience with alliances in construction projects, describing the contribution of 
private participants as being invariably highly suitable.  State Corp. informant C3 
summed up what State Corp. is looking for in the private participant for the NG 
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Alliance as “…the five c’s that we look for, culture and commitment…capability, 
capacity and their commercial offer…”. 
5.4.3.3.1.2 Suitability of State Corp. 
The issues as to suitability settled into two themes: State Corp. and its 
employees not recognising that the privatised operations were legitimate operations, 
and the need for the government organisation to be structured and resourced to 
capably interface with the privatised operations.  This sub-section first considers 
those issues and then considers how State Corp. sought to address them through the 
NG Alliance. 
State Corp. not recognising the legitimacy of the privatised operations 
State Corp. and its employees not recognising that the privatised 
activities were legitimate operations of the government entity was offered by both 
government entity informants and private company informants as impacting 
adversely on the sense of responsibility on the part of the stewards, the two early 
alliances. 
South Private Co. informant C7 when asked if State Corp. fostered a 
sense of responsibility said “I think State Corp. is so bound up in bureaucracies and 
targets...I don’t get a sense that people take a real interest in the whole 
business…they lose sight of the big goal.  They seem to forget they’ve got 
custodianship of an entire water system and waste water system …”.  South Private 
Co. informant C6 said “…I interact with an awful lot of other people, and they all 
tend to say well we are State Corp, you are the contractor, we are one step higher up 
the ladder than you guys.  …we react very well to that and we do our best for State 
Corp…We are the dirty contractor, that is what [sic] the vast majority of the State 
Corp. treat us…”.  North Private Co. informant C9 explained the demanding nature 
of many of the State Corp. employees saying “State Corp. people do not understand 
that requests for help go in both directions.  Not master–slave.  It should all be 
reciprocal…”.  South Private Co. informant C6 took a less personalised, more 
system-based perspective saying “ … I don’t think a lot of people [in State Corp.] 
know … [State Corp.] did this because we thought this other organisation [the 
alliance] could add value, do this part of our business better.”  In summary, the 
private participant informants believe that rather than fostering a sense of 
responsibility State Corp. has adversely affected the sense of responsibility of the 
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steward early alliances by not establishing within the State Corp. organisation the 
understanding and belief that the early alliance privatisation was a legitimate part of 
State Corp.’s operations. 
Capability to interface with the privatised operations 
During questioning of informants as to what might cause this lack of 
understanding of their own organisation, including its operations carried out by the 
early alliances, South Private Co. informant C6 said:  
They [State Corp.] have outsourced this for such a long time that they have no 
expertise in doing it at all anymore … they don’t know if they are getting a 
good service or a bad service and you’ve got this inbuilt culture where they 
really think that the contractors are ripping them off all the time…My view is 
that they are not very good at managing contracts…   
When asked for an example of the effect of State Corp. employees not 
being competent, South Private Co. informant C6 said “…there are seven different 
places in State Corp. from which the work comes to South Alliance and these come 
together in the Manager’s position [his own].  We are measured to the nth degree 
and there are very specific requests which are contradictory so far as priorities.” 
A dimension within this issue of State Corp. not having the capability to 
adequately manage the early alliances, which were in fact traditional contracts, was 
the State Corp. staff not having the knowledge of how to operate the system.  State 
Corp. informant C3 said that since the 1995 privatisation:  
…there has been very little participation within the alliances by State Corp. 
people which is maybe not historically the concept that alliances were 
designed to be…even though they operate with all the principles of alliancing 
they don’t actually have large numbers of owner’s people embedded in the 
alliance.  We have had one or two people as against several hundred of non-
owner participant’s people within the alliance.   
South Private Co. informant C7 said:  
…they built the alliances to deliver families of jobs...these alliances doing the 
O&M aren’t really alliances because there are not people from State Corp. 
embedded in them…they want people embedded this time…So I think they’ve 
recognised that as one of the ways forward and a way of developing people. 
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State Corp.’s rectification through the NG Alliance 
The common theme to these issues is that of the perceived 
inappropriateness of the State Corp. people for the role of interfacing with private 
operations.  For clarity, these State Corp. people are those with whom the alliance 
people interface, not those who were in the early alliances nor the increased number 
who are in the NG Alliance.  This distinction has been acknowledged by State Corp. 
who in a presentation regarding the then upcoming RFP process asserted that the 
“Focus of our change efforts [was on] … finding the right partner, …getting people 
involved ready … getting the rest of State Corp. ready” (State Corp. Conference slide 
presentation Sept 2010). 
Indeed State Corp. has reconfigured the early alliances into the NG 
Alliance contributing a significant number of State Corp. employees (i.e. 90 State 
Corp.) as against 300 from the combined service Co.s (2011 RFP, p. 44).  The 
objectives have been “A capable, motivated workforce with robust succession 
arrangements … and State Corp. … retaining the skills to be an ‘intelligent manager’ 
of the services…” (RFP, 2011, RFP, p. 31).  Placing these additional employees 
within the alliance is a major reconfiguration of the alliance which will address the 
issues which were found to impact negatively on the sense of responsibility of the 
steward (the alliance). 
In respect of the State Corp. employees who will remain outside the NG 
Alliance it would appear that State Corp. has configured the NG Alliance with an 
“…increased scope…which minimises the interfaces between the NG Alliance and 
State Corp.” (2011 RFP, p. 42.).  The scope of services includes all State Corp. 
functions in the metropolitan region and that of the previous two early alliances with 
the key additional functions being Operational Asset Management, regional customer 
service office and supporting business services (2011 RFP, p. 36).  This increase of 
scope to draw into the alliance those State Corp. employees who have an impact 
upon the success of the alliance resonates with an observation of State Corp. 
informant C3 who, when differentiating between traditional contractual relationships 
and alliances, related that “The contractor wants a way for understanding the 
owner’s requirements…  If the owner is outside [The Alliance] then the owner has no 
skin in the game.  If it is the regular contract where the contractor is required to 
‘come in’ then there is mistrust.”  Interestingly, North Private Co. informant C8 used 
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the same vernacular saying that “…the big plus from the NG Alliance is the asset 
management guys coming into the alliance. …there would be a bit of a feeling that 
they don’t have enough skin in the game, [if you asked] … the guys who are having 
to return to the same street and there have been three bursts there in the last six 
months. … they’ve [State Corp. asset management] got issues with spending the 
capital on replacing that section of pipe.”  The other side of the coin was put by 
State Corp. informant C5 who likened the current early alliances to traditional 
contracts saying “…you get things done if you put additional monies on the table.  If 
you have water leaks you pay a bonus for quick response.  The new alliance will 
expect that these are part of business as usual…it will address the responsibility to 
maintain the system so the leaks are reduced and the cost is in the overall alliance 
cost.” 
In summary, the findings were that the early alliances did not have 
several of the key features now acknowledged as the essence of alliances and were in 
fact traditional contracts.  These traditional contracts were characterised by 
behaviour on the part of the State Corp. employees outside the alliances which 
negatively impacted upon the sense of responsibility and motivation of the alliances 
to act in the interests of the principal.  State Corp. identified those adversely 
impacting issues and configured the replacement NG Alliance in accordance with 
principles of modern alliance design, in particular including a significant number of 
the principal’s employees within the alliance workforce and encompassing additional 
functions for the purpose of minimising the interfaces between the alliance and the 
government entity, the principal. 
5.4.3.3.2 Branding of the alliances 
Branding the alliances differently from the State Corp. brand and the 
perceived lesser importance of the alliance brands emerged as an action which has 
had a negative impact on the sense of responsibility on the part of the alliances.  
South Private Co. informant C6 when describing the discrimination associated with 
office accommodation said “…it is a condition of the contract that the State Corp. 
logo is bigger and comes first.”  Yet that informant said “…all the people who work 
for us…wear uniforms and wear a badge for State Corp., they drive State Corp. 
vehicles, they interact with customers and say ‘we are from State Corp…’”.  
Informant C6 put forward this issue of subjugation of the brand of his alliance as 
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indicative of the attitude adopted by State Corp. when responding to questions as to 
what State Corp. does to promote sense of responsibility.  There was no archival data 
available as to the rationale for the 1995 decision to create and publicly display 
alliance brand names rather than conduct this O&M business under the principal’s 
brand name. 
This unfavourable differentiation between State Corp. and the early 
alliances was clearly apparent in the office and depot accommodation allocated to the 
alliances.  The accommodation for each alliance was located in larger, acreage 
compounds shared with the respective State Corp. regional operations.  The 
accommodation occupied by State Corp. is 10 to 15 years old and built and 
maintained to a higher standard than that occupied by the alliances.  The alliance 
accommodation is 20–30 years old with the interior being of that age, worn and not 
maintained.  South Private Co. informant C6 said South Service Co. was the “poor 
cousin” and highlighted the noticeably better carpet and audio-visual equipment in 
the room in which we met, saying that that was because State Corp. employees also 
used the meeting room.  State Corp. is responsible for premises maintenance.  The 
accommodation is sub-standard by any Australian standard, private or public sectors.  
As well as the unfavourable comparison between alliance accommodation and State 
Corp. accommodation on site, the State Corp. headquarters presented an even greater 
disparity being a purpose built, spacious, average-to-superior quality of commercial 
fit-out with generous common spaces and internal café.  The disadvantage of the 
alliance employees when compared to State Corp. employees was a distinct source of 
dissatisfaction which appeared to alienate the alliance informants from State Corp. 
raising the possibility that there was a negative effect upon the sense of responsibility 
on the part of the alliance employees. 
The NG Alliance RFP (2011, p. 35) specifies “Existing operations-specific 
facilities will be retained and the management and support groups of the NG Alliance 
will be co-located at the State Corp. Southern Suburbs Regional Office.”  It is this 
regional office, being of a distinctly better standard, which attracted the criticism of 
informant C6.  This common location may remove a source of perceived 
disadvantage. 
In summary, it is concluded that the conscious decision by State Corp. to 
allow two ‘early alliance’ brands but to require that the State Corp. brand be also 
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displayed, larger or more prominently, created a negative perception on the part of 
alliance participants.  There is the possibility that creation of two identities by State 
Corp. and subjugation of brands has diminished the sense of responsibility to State 
Corp.  Intriguingly, there was no evidence of advantage being gained by the alliances 
trading under names other than State Corp. and in fact alliance employees naturally 
gravitate to identifying themselves to customers as being from State Corp.  It may be 
the case that the concept of the alliance trading under a brand different from that of 
State Corp. no longer has utility.  In respect of the disadvantage of the alliances as to 
accommodation when compared with that of State Corp. it is concluded that such 
disparity has undermined a sense of responsibility and fails to take the opportunity to 
build a sense of responsibility by providing similar or shared accommodation.  It 
would appear that State Corp. has addressed the issue of disparity of accommodation 
by providing common accommodation for the NG Alliance members.  There is no 
data available as to whether the NG Alliance will trade under its own brand or that of 
State Corp. 
5.4.3.3.3 Incentives to private participants 
Direct incentives were seen by the informants as strongly impacting on the 
sense of responsibility of the alliance participants.  These incentives are: the 
relatively long term of the alliance contract, the financial incentive arrangements, and 
the additional work which can be obtained. 
The term of the contracts offered by State Corp. for O&M alliances is an 
example of the evolving sophistication of the State Corp. approach to alliancing and 
the innovation achieved in the NG Alliance.  The early alliances were offered an 
initial five-year term which was extended for a further seven years, followed by a re-
bid process which delivered new alliances for a five-year term which was extended 
to 2011.  The NG Alliance commenced in 2011 for an initial term of five years, with 
rolling extensions possible dependent upon performance against set criteria for the 
first five years up to a total of 10 years.  A further five-year extension is also 
available at the discretion of State Corp, amounting to a total of 15 years (RFP, 2011, 
p. 63). 
These relatively long-term contracts were referenced by State Corp. 
informant C3 as being a way of increasing the sense of responsibility, when 
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compared to the shorter-term contracts typical for traditional contracts for schedule 
of rates O&M work.  State Corp. informant C3 said: 
For the contractors the alliances are a blue chip base because of the long-term 
nature of alliances.  If a company has five or more alliances it starts to be seen by 
shareholders as a stable client base.  This is viewed disproportionately 
favourably when compared with the actual commercial rate [of return from the 
alliance]…because the stability allows the company to pay its bills and plan and 
act from a long-term perspective.   
Another State Corp. informant C4 reinforced that perspective saying 
“…most are about ten years and [plus] renewal so if you are a company and have an 
overhead, you need a base load to keep that overhead and to be available to bid on 
the opportunities…Knowing there might be an opportunity to build something else.”  
However, it should be recorded that the private company informants did not offer the 
term of the contract, nor the prospect of extension of a contract, as an incentive to act 
with a sense of responsibility.  The importance of the contract term may have been 
diminished as at the time of interviews South Private Co. had made known its 
decision to not tender for the NG Alliance and North Private Co. was not then 
experiencing any benefit as it was required to compete in the NG Alliance tender 
process. 
The financial incentives to the private participants in the early alliances 
were set out in Section 5.4.2.4 Payment arrangements.  The four private company 
informants at no time suggested that the financial payment arrangements were an 
incentive for increased sense of responsibility.  One State Corp. informant, C1, 
believed the link between the satisfaction of KPI targets and the annual bonus caused 
a perverse result as the alliances would “… seek to satisfy the KPI rather than 
[satisfy the] reason for the KPI.”  A further criticism of the early alliance payments 
was made by North Private Co. informant C8 who said that “…we get paid a fixed 
management fee so it doesn’t matter if we do more or less work ... in dollar terms it 
is a fixed amount.”  Yet the RFP reveals “…the margin for the year will be a fixed 
dollar sum, fixed at the commencement of each year” (2011, RFP,  p. 65) suggesting 
that that fixed management fee, criticised by North Private Co. informant C8, will 
continue.  In addition, a risk/reward scheme whereby the under-run/over-run of the 
annual budget is shared equally between State Corp. and the NG private participant 
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is in place.  It is this sharing of the savings which was seen by State Corp. informant 
C3 as:  
…the opportunity for abnormally good outcomes … because typically they are 
getting as a minimum, all their direct costs paid regardless of whether they 
absolutely screw up.  They are normally going to get their margin or they may have 
to sacrifice part of the margin, because normally the margin is risk/reward.  Then 
if you are able to bring it in under target-costs…you share in more money…all of a 
sudden you can have quite significantly better than normal business outcomes…   
The risk to the private participant is capped at the amount of the margin for 
that year.  In addition there is now a business innovation scheme whereby the private 
participant can propose innovations and be paid an innovation payment approved at 
the total discretion of the alliance board. 
Additional work has not to date been made available to the private 
participants in the early alliances.  Rather, the topic was raised by State Corp. 
informants as both a reason why private companies sought to participate in alliances 
and an incentive that the government entity (State Corp.) can offer to prospective or 
existing private participants in alliances.  In the State Corp. context there has not 
been, nor is there any intent to, have an O&M alliance carry out work for third 
parties such as other water systems.  Accordingly the only possibility for a private 
participant in an alliance with State Corp. is that they will obtain more of the day-to-
day work which is currently performed by State Corp. or obtain more of the capital 
work which is currently put to market.  State Corp. informant C4 when explaining 
how the O&M alliance is attractive to construction companies said that such 
contracts cover the company’s overheads and allow the company to “…wait for the 
opportunity.  Knowing us, there might be the opportunity to build something else [for 
State Corp.].  They [State Corp.] want the comfort to know that you can build it.”  
The extent of the available, additional day-to-day work may be limited as the NG 
Alliance has encompassed functions previously carried out within State Corp. for the 
metropolitan region, most notably the Operational Asset Management unit.  The 
early alliances had performed a limited amount of capital works, being allocated 
some of those which were up to a value of $1m, with North Private Co. informant C8 
advising that the capacity of the alliance to do such capital works was limited and 
that there was no strategy in play for the North Alliance to seek out such additional 
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work.  The 2011 RFP specifies the scope of the alliance as “…project management 
and delivery of assigned minor capital projects…” (RFP, 2011, p. 34).  It would 
appear that State Corp. has not sought to enhance the attractiveness of participation 
in the early alliances or NG Alliance by offering the possibility of additional capital 
work.  This would appear to be a lost opportunity to introduce an incentive utilised 
by other similar water utilities, notwithstanding State Corp. having adopted other 
incentives modelled by those other water utilities.  Whilst not a major focus of this 
research, further detailed investigation of this aspect of the NG Alliance would be 
highly likely to be of interest to scholars seeking to understand the nuances of the 
variations to the alliance model. 
5.4.4 Significance of findings 
This case study, providing findings that stewardship of the service was not 
achieved and that the sense of responsibility was inadequate, provided a rich 
opportunity for later comparison against the findings of the case studies where 
system stewardship and sense of responsibility were found.  In addition the relatively 
long term of experience (about 15 years) with the early alliance model and the 
subsequent reform effected through the NG Alliance changes, described in the 
publicly-available Development Bank (2007, 2011) and RFP (2011) documents, 
resulted in a high level of confidence in the data gathered.  The most important 
findings from the early alliance case study are: 
 That the early alliance model, whilst being denoted with the term 
‘alliance’, was in fact a traditional contract rather than an alliance. 
 That there was extensive sharing of information resulting in there being no 
evidence of information asymmetry favouring any party. 
 That the early alliances did not achieve stewardship of the water service. 
 That the behaviour of the alliances was that of contractual compliance but 
not acting in the interests of the principal. 
 That there were ongoing areas where the early alliances acted against the 
interests of State Corp. 
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 That the case study demonstrated a strong causal link between acting with 
self-interest (or against the interests of the principal) and stewardship of 
the service not being achieved. 
 That there was not an adequate sense of responsibility to the principal. 
 That it was probable that the inadequate sense of responsibility did have a 
causal link to there not being stewardship behaviour. 
 That State Corp., by replacing the early alliance relationship, indicated that 
the principal considered sense of responsibility on the part of the steward 
to be essential. 
 That there was another form of sense of responsibility in play with at least 
one of the two South Private Co. informants indicating a sense of 
responsibility directed to the water industry and the community.  As this 
other sense of responsibility was also found to be in play in the Joint 
Venture case study there is the possibility that this factor complements and 
reinforces sense of responsibility to the principal. 
The reform of the early alliances achieved through the NG Alliance provided a 
highly valuable critique (as owner) of the effectiveness of the early alliance form of 
privatisation, essentially the traditional management contract form.  This critique 
allowed understanding of the factors and issues which diminished the sense of 
responsibility that the alliances brought to the relationship.  Key negative factors and 
issues were State Corp. and its staff not recognising the legitimacy of the privatised 
operations and State Corp. not having the capability to manage the contract and 
operate the system.  State Corp. addressed those negative factors principally by 
expanding the scope of the new single NG Alliance to include many of its own staff 
who had previously interfaced with the early alliances.  This allowed the adoption of 
the modern alliance principle of all parties committing resources and being involved 
and no one party being subservient to the other, as is the case with the management 
contract. 
Other decisions of the principal had a negative impact on sense of 
responsibility.  The State Corp. decision to have each early alliance operate under its 
own new brand but to subjugate those brands to the State Corp. brand, as well as the 
decision to provide accommodation to the early alliances which was inferior to that 
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provided to State Corp. staff on the same site was found to diminish the sense of 
responsibility. 
In respect of incentives to the early alliances to act with a sense of 
responsibility it was found that incentives such as relatively long-term contracts with 
extensions, and performance-based payments whilst in operation were not front-of-
mind with the informants, perhaps reflecting the imminent re-tendering of the work 
by way of the NG Alliance. 
In summary, seen from another perspective, State Corp. in its configuration and 
management of the early alliances had not integrated the activities of the early 
alliances with those of State Corp.  In addition State Corp. was found to have not 
demonstrated an understanding of actions that could be taken within the early 
alliances contractual relationship to increase sense of responsibility of the early 
alliances.  The implications of this finding are unpacked using Agency and 
Stewardship theories in Chapter 6: Discussion.  However, State Corp. was found to 
have identified many of the deficiencies in recent years and implemented structural 
changes to adopt a model similar to The Alliance model examined in Case Study A 
— a model which has achieved strong stewardship of a water service. 
5.5  CASE STUDY D  
5.5.1 Introduction 
This case study encompasses two near-identical long-term contractual 
relationships, one between the government water entity, Metropolis Water Corp. 
(Metropolis) and International Utilities Company for the construction, ownership and 
operation of a very large water filtration plant, and the other between Metropolis and 
Global Utilities and Transportation Company for the same outcomes in respect of 
two smaller plants.  The three water filtration plants together treat virtually all of the 
drinking water for a large metropolitan area with Metropolis itself owning and 
operating a further six filtration plants.  This BOOT form of concession was chosen 
as a case study because the private company has ownership of the critical 
infrastructure; that is, the plant which manufactures safe drinking water.  This case 
study allows the opportunity to understand the operation of stewardship in a model 
where government has elected to not retain ownership of the critical infrastructure.  
Examining both contractual relationships provided a very rich source of secondary 
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and primary data and provided the opportunity to compare and verify data.  A further 
attraction of the water filtration plant BOOT case study was a series of contamination 
events involving the drinking water supplied by the large plant which led to public 
examination of the conduct of the principal and steward and the stewardship of the 
most fundamental element of a water service: safe drinking water.  This public 
examination has provided a substantial body of highly relevant public data, which 
together with the literature and data obtained through the archival and informant 
studies established these two BOOT contractual relationships as a case study suitable 
for exploring the operation of stewardship in the context of privatisation. 
The following sections of this thesis firstly describe the key features of the two 
BOOTs, including the water contamination events, to provide a foundation for the 
subsequent development of the findings from this case study.  Secondly, the findings 
are assembled in a structure based on the areas targeted by the three research 
questions: stewardship behaviour, sense of responsibility and actions to increase 
sense of responsibility.  Thirdly, the key findings are probed to understand the 
possible significance of the findings from this BOOT case study. 
5.5.2 Key features of the BOOTs 
Each of the plants has no role other than the manufacture of treated drinking 
water.  Raw water as one input and treated water as the output remain owned by 
Metropolis.  Each contract requires collaborative research between Metropolis and 
the respective private company which keeps the two parties abreast of technology 
and provides that they perform on-site research and exchange findings (Mumford, 
1996; Implementation Review, 2008).  This section firstly describes the water service 
to provide a context for the findings as to stewardship and sense of responsibility.  
Secondly, the legal form of the BOOTs and the objectives of Metropolis when 
establishing the BOOTs are described.  Thirdly, the environment of regulation and 
reporting within which each BOOT operates is examined.  Fourthly, the payment 
arrangements are explained. 
5.5.2.1 The water service 
The Metropolis water service is comprehensive, commencing with raw 
water supplied by the catchment authority and comprising all drinking water and 
waste water system infrastructure through to the customer.  Within that chain are the 
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case study water treatment plants.  The area served is approximately 13,000 km2 and 
the number of connected properties is 1.8m.  Charges for water services provided in 
2010 amounted to approximately $2.2b and net assets were $5.5b (Metropolis AR, 
2010).  The largest filtration plant treats approximately 80% of the drinking water 
(Implementation Review, 2008). 
5.5.2.2 Legal form and objectives 
For the period of the contract “…the operator shall be the legal owner of a 
filtration plant …At the end of 25 years Metropolis will be required either to renew 
the arrangements or, alternatively, purchase the plant at market value” 
(Auditor-General, 1996, p. 91).  Metropolis is a state-owned statutory corporation.  
The private participant for the large filtration plant is International Utilities Company 
which has an annual revenue of approximately $20b.  Similarly, for the two small 
filtration plants the private participant is Global Utilities and Transportation 
Company with an annual revenue of $50b.  The relationships which are the subject of 
this BOOT case study are illustrated out within the red box of Figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4 Water filtration plants: BOOT concessions 
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The governance of these relatively simple contractual relationships is 
affected by way of Metropolis establishing a section within its organisational 
structure which is allocated the responsibility and authority to manage contracts for 
the treatment of water, be that drinking water from surface catchments and 
desalination plants, or sewage and waste water.  The section was found by this 
research to be effective.  These contract management arrangements are examined in 
greater detail in Section 5.5.3.3.1 Ensuring suitable participants. 
Metropolis had two major objectives in entering into the BOOT contracts: 
one, obtaining a sufficient quantity of drinking water of a quality higher than was 
then available; and having another party fund the plants at a time of financial 
pressures, both those general to the public sector in the 1990s and those unique to 
Metropolis’s predecessor which was being prepared for corporatisation.  The 
increasing customer population and the raising of national water quality standards 
converged to result in Metropolis adopting the strategy of filtering water to provide 
both increased volume and increased quality of drinking water.  The preparation of 
Metropolis’s predecessor for corporatisation required that it minimise its 
commitments to servicing debt and generate relatively high dividends for the 
government as owner.  The state government was subject to limitations upon 
borrowings imposed by the federal government at the same time as Metropolis was 
required to make major capital outlays to address waste water issues and fund the 
water filtration.  Also, Metropolis was not confident that the pricing regulator would 
approve the flow-on of all of these capital costs.  The BOOT concession was 
attractive because it required no capital contribution by Metropolis and because the 
costs of treatment of water by the privatised BOOT model were estimated to be less 
than if Metropolis itself constructed and operated the plants (Mumford, 1996). 
5.5.2.3 Regulation and reporting 
The regulatory and reporting environment which applies to Metropolis (and 
thus the drinking water and the operation of the plants) is state-based and applies to 
drinking water, sewerage and waste water systems state-wide.  There is no material 
difference between the regulation and reporting environment applying to Metropolis 
and those applying to each of the three previously described case studies.  For that 
reason this thesis proceeds on the basis of not further explaining the regulation and 
reporting applying to Metropolis. 
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There is significant accessibility to detailed information on Metropolis’s 
Internet site, including the quality of drinking water at the filtration plants and at 
customers’ taps. 
5.5.2.4 Payment arrangements 
The payments to the private participant in both BOOT contracts are 
structured identically.  The literature from 1996 indicates the quantum of payments 
was then different.  Metropolis is required to pay the plant owners a tariff comprised 
of two components: an availability charge and a usage charge.  The availability 
charge is a minimum, fixed payment stream, which is directly related to repayment 
and servicing of the underlying debt and the operator’s investment.  The usage 
charge varies with the quantity and quality of raw water delivered to the private plant 
operator and delivered by the private plant operator to Metropolis (Mumford, 1996).  
This feature reflects the additional costs incurred by the plant operator if the raw 
water supplied is of poor quality.  In addition the payment to the operator is reduced 
if the treated water supplied by the operator falls below the quality level specified in 
the contract. 
Directly related to these payments, linked to the quality of the water 
produced, is the availability of information between the parties; that is, the symmetry 
or asymmetry of information.  As a consequence of the 1999 contaminations a very 
high level of sharing of information between the private operators has been 
institutionalised, both to meet the needs of the ongoing collaborative research and to 
provide immediate knowledge as to water quality and plant malfunction.  The large 
filtration plant is subject to continuous electronic monitoring, with malfunctions 
being immediately detected electronically, recorded and shown on the relevant 
screens in the control room, which are under constant surveillance and backed up 
with electronic alarms (Implementation Review, 2008).  This real-time testing and 
monitoring is backed up with manual, immediate testing every six hours.  
Information from the electronic monitoring and manual tests as to major treated 
water characteristics is transmitted real-time to both Metropolis and the catchment 
authority.  Metropolis can view all the system data, but only at the plant 
(Implementation Review, 2008). 
This immediate sharing of information and transparency of operational 
inputs and outputs, quality etc. negates the possibility of the agent (the plant 
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operator) having an advantage by way of information asymmetry.  This was 
confirmed through the Metropolis informants and private operator informants who 
collectively portrayed the situation of the principal (Metropolis) having extensive 
detailed information as to the O&M of the filtration plant and, through its contract 
management section, responding to that information to achieve stewardship of the 
quality of water and O&M of the plants.  This exhaustive sharing of information and 
information symmetry suggests that the Agency Theory conceptualisation of 
information asymmetry is not in operation in the BOOT water treatment case studies. 
5.5.3 The findings 
This section firstly explores whether there was stewardship of the water quality 
and of the filtration plant and, if so, the nature of stewardship behaviour.  Secondly, 
the evidence as to whether there was a sense of responsibility on the part of each 
filtration plant operator is assembled and an analysis made of how important that 
sense of responsibility was to the stewardship behaviour on the part of the agent.  
Thirdly, the data as to actions to increase the sense of responsibility of the agent or 
steward are assembled and analysed. 
5.5.3.1 Stewardship of infrastructure 
In the preceding three case studies two key themes as to public values, the 
efficient use of public resources and the quality of services provided to water system 
customers, were identified.  The BOOT water filtration plant case study archival and 
informant data had an overwhelming focus on the quality of the service provided — 
safe drinking water.  Yet this thesis focuses on the stewardship of critical 
infrastructures to the standard of meeting evolving public requirements.  Accordingly 
the data are interrogated for evidence of stewardship of the infrastructure assets: the 
filtration plants.  This section firstly examines the stewardship of the quality of the 
drinking water produced by the plants.  Secondly, the maintenance of the plants to 
meet emerging public needs, both now and in the period leading up to the end of the 
25-year term, is examined.  Thirdly, if stewardship of the plants is shown to have 
been achieved, then the data will be analysed to understand the level of behaviour of 
the steward. 
Before commencing the examination the performance of the Metropolis 
water system against like utilities utilising the National Water Commission report is 
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compared so that the water quality achieved can be seen in the context of 
Metropolis’s overall satisfaction (or otherwise) of public values.  As to the efficient 
use of public resources, the combined operating costs for water and sewerage per 
property when compared with 10 other like-sized services was shown to be the fifth 
lowest in 2009–10 and the sixth lowest in 2008–09 (National Water Commission, 
2011).  Metropolis reported the lowest level of customer complaints of the eight 
utilities compared during 2010 (National Water Commission, 2011).  However, it 
reported the second highest average duration of unplanned interruption to customers’ 
water supply when compared to eight other utilities.  The Metropolis service 
recorded the third highest percentage of calls answered by an operator within 30 
seconds when compared to seven other utilities. 
To complement this data, and to understand the less favourable performance 
as to the duration of unplanned interruption to services, the archival and informant 
studies sought out any significant adverse mention as to service quality.  This 
questioning revealed only the contaminations of drinking water which are addressed 
in the following paragraphs regarding the stewardship of water quality.  Overall, it 
was found that a high quality of services was provided indicating that Metropolis had 
achieved stewardship of the overall water system of which the BOOT water filtration 
plants were crucial elements. 
5.5.3.1.1 Stewardship of water quality 
Improving the quality of the Metropolis drinking water was one of 
Metropolis’s two major objectives in the 1990s in entering into the BOOT contracts 
for the water filtration plants.  An absence of expertise in filtration technology 
influenced Metropolis to go to the market.  In 2000, possible contaminants were 
found in the drinking water which originated from the large filtration plant.  During 
the revelation of the ongoing contamination the government established a Royal 
Commission to inquire into the contaminations (Royal Commission, 2000).  The 
Royal Commission found that it was likely that the contaminants were in the raw 
water provided to the private operator by Metropolis.  A subsequent review of the 
implementation of the Royal Commission recommendations (Implementation 
Review, 2008) observed that in 2000 there had been a breakdown in communications 
and the procedures for such emergencies were so inadequate that contradictory 
statements were issued by the state health department and Metropolis.  By the end of 
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the year 2000 when the supply of contaminated water ceased, consumer confidence 
of the safety of their water was severely undermined and the reputation of Metropolis 
was damaged. 
The 2000 Royal Commission made nearly 100 recommendations directed 
at ensuring that all water providers supply water which was clear of the 
contaminants.  The Implementation Review in 2008 reported that the standard for the 
permitted turbidity (a surrogate for contamination) specified in plant operation 
contracts had been made more stringent.  The Implementation Review found that 
Metropolis and the filtration plant operator had adopted (and delivered) a standard of 
water quality that was equal to the world’s best practice (Implementation Review, 
2008, p. 35). 
Neither the archival nor informant studies revealed any subsequent 
drinking water contamination events.  The focus of the private participant and 
Metropolis informants at the time of this thesis was invariably upon the safety 
aspects of water quality.  Other issues were consistently portrayed as being of lesser 
importance.  A feature which distinguishes the Metropolis Board from that of other 
government water entities in the case studies is the highly visible reference to a 
“material water quality event which may threaten public health …” as one of the top 
five strategic risks specified in the 2010 Metropolis Annual Report.  The importance 
of the stewardship of the quality of the drinking water is demonstrated by the 
Metropolis Board having established within its membership a Public Health 
Committee which oversees drinking water quality reviews, analyses and monitors 
public health matters, oversees the research and development strategy, and oversees 
the management of the Metropolis response to material public health issues 
(Metropolis AR, 2010). 
In summary, the water contamination events led to an exceptionally high 
level of scrutiny of the quality of drinking water provided by the BOOT water 
filtration plants and the establishment of very stringent measures and controls.  In 
addition to those controls the 2008 Review provided a very public assessment of 
compliance with those requirements by all water filtration plants providing water to 
Metropolis.  The archival and informant studies confirmed that the water quality that 
was found by the Implementation Review has continued.  It is concluded that the 
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private filtration plant operators now continually achieve stewardship of the quality 
of the Metropolis drinking water. 
5.5.3.1.2 Stewardship of infrastructure 
In Chapter 2: Literature Review this thesis formed the proposal that in the 
context of critical infrastructures the appropriate conceptualisation of stewardship 
was one which encompasses the public’s requirement for continual improvement, 
above the maintenance of the asset to the standard when entrusted to the steward.  
The case study water filtration plants have been shown by the 2000 contamination 
events to be essential to the water system and the health and peace of mind of the 
Metropolis public.  This thesis found that that there is now stewardship of the quality 
of the drinking water produced by the plants.  The question then is whether there is 
stewardship of the privatised plants as critical infrastructures both now and in the 
lead up to the possible transfer of the assets from the private owner operators to 
Metropolis at the end of the 25-year contract term. 
There is significant data as to the extent of stewardship of the large 
filtration plant by way of the very public Royal Commission and 2008 
Implementation Review.  The 2008 review chronicled the changes that have been 
made and acknowledged that the large filtration plant had been re-constructed to the 
world’s highest standards (Implementation Review, 2008).  Similarly the two 
Metropolis informants in 2011 were of the view that the contractual requirement to 
maintain the output of the plants at specified levels of quality and quantity resulted in 
the case study plants being maintained to a high standard.  This data suggests that 
there is now strong stewardship of the privatised water filtration plants. 
The remaining question then is whether stewardship to meet evolving 
requirements will continue in the period leading up to the end of the 25-year 
contractual term.  The literature revealed that “At the end of the contract period the 
operators have the expectation that contracts will be renewed” (Mumford, 1996, p. 
66).  Mumford (1996, p. 66) goes on to say “This, and a provision for Metropolis to 
buy back at its own evaluation, provide incentives for the operators not to run down 
the assets toward the end of the contract period.”  The Auditor-General in his 1994 
Annual Report noted that “At the end of the 25 years Metropolis will be required 
either to renew the arrangements or, alternatively, purchase the plant at market 
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value” (Auditor-General, 1994, p. 91).  Clearly both options remain available and 
both reward the operator for maintaining the plant to a high standard. 
The informant interview study was used to put the question in the 
negative: that is, will the private operators cease investment and reduce maintenance 
so as to maximise profit in the years immediately before the end of the 25 years?  
Metropolis informant D3 said that:  
They [the operators] have to ensure the plant is available all the time.  That 
means if the plant is shut down there is a penalty against them, so they have to 
have a maintenance management system and we audit that system.  They can’t 
run it down and not replace [it], it is not possible because we have access to all 
the maintenance management systems and we can predict.   
All informants approached the matter of what would happen at the end of 
the 25 years from the unstated assumption that the status quo would continue; that is, 
that the contracts would be extended.  Informant D5, from the private operator of the 
two small plants, described the approach as “...the BOO delivery model, with a silent 
T to transfer at a later date.” 
In summary, having regard to the rigorous regime of contractual measures 
and scrutiny by Metropolis it is reasonable to conclude that there is currently strong 
stewardship of these critical infrastructures.  In respect of the stewardship of these 
infrastructures in the lead up to the end of the 25-year term the literature, archival 
data and views of the Metropolis and private informants suggested strongly that the 
contractual terms as to extension or transfer of the assets to Metropolis at a market 
price will result in the maintenance of the treatment plants to a high standard.  It is 
concluded that there will be stewardship of these critical infrastructures. 
5.5.3.1.3 Stewardship behaviour 
Having established that the private operators have achieved stewardship of 
the quality of the drinking water and of the filtration plants this thesis now explores 
the nature of the stewardship behaviour of the agent or steward and whether that was 
something more than contractual compliance, which is the aspiration of the Agency 
Theory model.  The following paragraphs assemble the data as to the behaviour of 
the steward, whether there was contractual compliance, and the extent to which the 
steward acted in the interests of the principal. 
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Having regard to the public availability of key documentation resulting 
from the contaminations, literature and archival documents were first interrogated 
and then the stewardship behaviour issue pursued with the informants.  The original 
contracts apportioned risks related to quality and quantity performance to the plant 
operator, giving Metropolis monitoring rights and the right to conduct its own water 
quality tests to satisfy itself that the operator was operating and maintaining the plant 
in accordance with the contract (Mumford, 2000).  The issue of whom or what was 
responsible for the contaminations vexed the Royal Commission.  The Commission 
could not obtain a satisfactory explanation of reasons for the first contamination 
event and concluded that the cause of the later events remained unresolved between 
the parties with the private company claiming the contaminations were 
misidentifications by Metropolis’s laboratory (Royal Commission, 2000).  The 
adequacy of testing procedures was further put into question by there being no 
increased incidence of attributable illnesses following the contamination events 
(Mumford, 2000), all in all suggesting that information was inadequate and 
inaccurate and far from the desirable state of information symmetry.  
Notwithstanding the International Utilities Company’s dispute with Metropolis 
regarding the correctness of the identification of the later contamination events, a 
thorough search of the literature and archival documents revealed no suggestion that 
the behaviour of the plant operator was against the interests of Metropolis. 
The 2008 Implementation Review revealed significant improvements to 
the equipment and procedures at the plant and much more rigorous monitoring and 
testing by the operators and Metropolis.  It is clear from the Implementation Review 
that new tariffs have been negotiated, particularly as Metropolis instituted much 
more demanding standards as to water quality.  There is no information to suggest 
that the additional equipment and procedures were introduced on terms to the 
detriment of the operator.  The informants from International Utilities Company had 
no knowledge of the detail of what changed and who paid, consequent upon the 
contamination events.  The evidence was that the company operating the large 
filtration plant had met the contractual requirements and had acted strongly in the 
interests of Metropolis but in so doing had not at any stage done anything 
extraordinary; that is, anything for which it was not compensated in accordance with 
the contract. 
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Turning to the informant study, Metropolis informant D4 related his 
experience of the large plant operator as being one of a partnership working on the 
operational outcomes but with the operator having “... a commercial bent...and we 
have to as well...we have to look rationally at what they propose…”.  In response to 
questioning as to whether the operator approached the contract in a literal manner 
Metropolis informant D3, who has been involved in the large filtration plant since 
1996, said that “...in 1996 they [the operator] were mainly concerned about the 
commercial aspect, the contractual requirements.”  The same informant then 
outlined a steady transition to the present time whereby changes to the contract and 
structured communication at the operational level and contract management level 
have resulted in the operator taking the holistic ‘catchment to tap’ perspective.  The 
day-to-day operational relationship at the various levels was described by operator 
company informant D1 as “very cooperative” and this perspective was confirmed by 
the other informants from that plant.  The discussion as to cooperation flowed into 
the shared research activities which were described by both Metropolis and private 
operator informants at the large filtration plant in very positive terms such as 
‘collaboration’ and ‘partnership’, revealing a high degree of integration between the 
entities and the private company acting strongly in accordance with Stewardship 
Theory prescriptions (e.g. very closely shared goals and the steward completely 
acting in the interests of the principal).  In respect of the contract for the two small 
filtration plants the operator company informant D5 conveyed a perspective of acting 
in the interests of Metropolis and being very outcome-oriented.  The two small plants 
were not involved in the contamination events although outcomes such as higher 
water quality targets, intense monitoring and testing were applied to all water 
filtration plants.  The Global Utilities and Transportation Company informant D5 is 
responsible for the provision of other services to Metropolis, such as the operation of 
a desalination plant and O&M of waste water treatment plants, and consistently 
portrayed the perspective that his company not only met the terms of the contract but 
also “...see ourselves as an extension of the client...”.  This conceptualisation of the 
steward as an ‘extension’ is a powerful way of depicting an alignment of goals and 
actions that is so complete that, to the external observer, there is no discernible gap 
between the principal and steward. 
 Chapter 5: Analysis 171 
The remaining question then is the extent to which the agents or stewards 
acted in the interests of the principal.  Importantly, the ease by which the contractual 
outcome (i.e. safe drinking water) could be specified in precise terms and the 
criticality of those terms being met, led the informants to talk in terms of very precise 
compliance with the contract, notwithstanding the previously discussed strong 
relationship characterised by Stewardship Theory prescriptions of coordination, 
collaboration and partnership.  When asked whether the private operator would do 
anything to their own detriment such as paying for something not included in the 
contract Metropolis informant D4 said:  
There aren’t many grey areas, because they own the site and are responsible for 
the site, they own the plant and are responsible for the plant, they manage all 
operations within that site and deliver us performance, outcome-based.  So there 
might be a few other things depending on arrangements for procurement for 
energy those sorts of things, but essentially they are responsible for that side of 
things, in outcomes-based contracts.   
The other informants reflected this perspective saying that neither 
Metropolis nor the private companies expected that the companies to do anything 
extraordinary, alluding to the commercial nature of the relationship and highlighting 
the simplicity of the contractual terms and outputs as encompassing anything that 
might arise. 
Drawing this data together it was found that the operators of the filtration 
plants acted strongly in the interests of Metropolis, identifying strongly with the 
goals and objectives of Metropolis but within a scheme of rigid contractual 
monitoring and compliance.  Such contractual arrangements are characteristic of the 
Agency Theory model suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) wherein the strict model of 
goal conflict is relaxed, allowing for goals to be shared. 
5.5.3.2 Sense of responsibility 
This section assembles evidence as to whether there was a sense of 
responsibility on the part of the BOOT filtration plants to Metropolis and then 
analyses how important that sense of responsibility was to stewardship behaviour on 
the part of the private companies. 
There was significant evidence that the two water filtration plant private 
operators have conducted themselves with a strong sense of responsibility to 
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Metropolis.  For the large filtration plant this sense of responsibility was tested by the 
water contamination events.  The opportunity existed for International Utilities 
Company to not act in the interests of Metropolis but rather seek to blame Metropolis 
and not pursue the goals and objectives of Metropolis (e.g. safe drinking water and 
reputation).  The evidence is that International Utilities Company committed 
additional resources, called on its expertise from elsewhere in the world and took 
whatever steps were necessary to remove any possibility of the future supply of 
contaminated drinking water (Implementation Review, 2008). 
Safe drinking water being the sole output or outcome from the contractual 
relationship and the criticality of the water being safe brings a sharp focus to the role 
of sense of responsibility on the part of the steward — the water filtration plant 
operator.  Is sense of responsibility on the part of the steward essential when the 
output is critical?  Is sense of responsibility essential to there being stewardship of 
the drinking water?  The evidence was of immediate and subsequent actions by 
International Utilities Company to remove any possibility of the future supply of 
contaminated drinking water.  As safe drinking water is the inviolate goal of the 
principal it would seem essential that the steward act with such an unequivocal sense 
of responsibility.  This finding was tested by examining the obverse scenario.  If the 
company had not acted so decisively to remove any possibility of future 
contamination then the sense of responsibility to the principal would be incomplete 
or inadequate, with the company acting against the interests of the principal.  In 
essence the agent would have goals divergent from the principal and would be acting 
in an untrustworthy manner — all Agency Theory normative behaviour.  This line of 
argument leads to the conclusion that it is essential that there be sense of 
responsibility to the principal on the part of the filtration plant operator for there to 
be stewardship of the drinking water.  Further it is apparent that in the instance of an 
infrastructure with a critical outcome, such as drinking water, the principal would see 
the operator having a sense of responsibility as essential. 
Yet the data gathered by the informant study raised the possibility that the 
sense of responsibility is not directed solely to the principal (Metropolis) but that 
there was sense of responsibility to another party: the public or the public’s health.  
International Utilities Company informant D1 reflected upon the risk to private 
operators from a water contamination event saying “...anything that is water quality 
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which is health related...can affect the share price back in Europe...it can damage 
our Group’s business opportunities in the future...so it [water quality] is something 
that is very important to us as the operator...It is an essential service and you are 
dealing with public health, so there is a very high level of responsibility in the 
industry...”.  Unpacking this data reveals a mixture of motives: financial in respect of 
the impact on share price, and benefiting the public by providing essential health 
services.  On their internet sites, the International Utilities Company and Global 
Utilities and Transportation Company outline strong claims to being authentic 
providers of drinking water, sewage and waste water services, acknowledging 
“access to drinking water and sanitation as being a fundamental human right.” 
(United Nations General Assembly, 28 July 2010).  Whist this research is 
circumspect as to claims made in such corporate-controlled media it would be 
reasonable to acknowledge that there is a possibility that both private companies, by 
way of their long histories of providing water services throughout the world, have 
demonstrated a sense of responsibility to those publics or humanity generally.  The 
question then is in what way does this sense of responsibility to the public impact 
upon the sense of responsibility to the principal.  The data provided by the other four 
informants established that there was a very strong sense of responsibility to 
Metropolis on the part of both private companies and did not reveal any indication 
that sense of responsibility on the part of the private operators to the health of the 
public conflicted with their sense of responsibility to the principal. 
In summary, there was significant evidence that the private water filtration 
plant operators felt a strong sense of responsibility to the principal, Metropolis.  That 
sense of responsibility to the principal was concluded to be essential to achieving 
stewardship behaviour on the part of the agents, the private companies.  However, 
there were data which suggested that the international water services companies 
which are the operators of the filtration plants are jealous of their reputation and have 
a sense of responsibility to the public.  This other sense of responsibility was found 
to not conflict with sense of responsibility to the principal.  However, how the 
jealous protection of reputation and sense of responsibility to the public has impacted 
upon the sense of responsibility to the principal in these case study filtration plants is 
examined in the next section. 
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5.5.3.3 Actions to increase sense of responsibility 
The preceding section of this thesis established that there was sense of 
responsibility on the part of the two steward private operators to Metropolis.  This 
section examines the actions which were thought to impact upon the sense of 
responsibility on the part of the steward private operators.  The data formed into 
themes which are explored in the following sections: 
 ensuring suitable participants; 
 clear contractual terms; and 
 incentives to private participants. 
5.5.3.3.1 Ensuring suitable participants 
The notion that the suitability of the private participants in the two BOOT 
water filtration plant contracts impacted on the sense of responsibility first emerged 
in the literature study and was a prominent matter in the archival study and in turn 
the informant study.  Similarly, data as to the suitability of Metropolis emerged in the 
literature, archival and informant studies providing a significant body of data as to 
how Metropolis has supported the private operators to act with a sense of 
responsibility.  This section first examines the criteria as to the suitability of private 
participants.  Then evidence as to the suitability of the government entity 
(Metropolis) and its employees is then examined. 
5.5.3.3.1.1 Suitability of private entity 
The criteria as to suitability that emerged ranged from capability for the 
technical aspects, ongoing technological transfer, to suitability to work in a long-
term, highly collaborative relationship, and reputation. 
In respect of technical suitability, Metropolis went to the market in the 
mid-1990s to have the water filtration plants constructed and operated 
acknowledging Metropolis as being relatively inexperienced with filtration systems.  
Its procurement strategy of opting for several operators gained access to a wider 
range of treatment technologies and treatment performance data to be used to assess 
the performance of the other company (Mumford, 2000). 
The contractual requirement of ongoing technology transfer was a 
strategy to develop the capability of Metropolis.  Long-term Metropolis water 
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treatment engineer informant D3 advised that each of the private operator companies 
had “... brought aspects of technology that brought actual benefits to Metropolis and 
the wider [Australian] water industry by bringing international treatment expertise.”  
Metropolis informant D4 advised that “The idea is that we will work with them on 
joint R&D [research and development] and Metropolis will fund it and bring 
improvements to Metropolis.” 
The suitability of the private participants to work in a long-term, highly 
collaborative relationship was raised by both Metropolis and private informants in 
the context of the long-term nature of the contract and long-term impacts of decisions 
and actions inherent in the provision of safe drinking water.  The large filtration plant 
operator private company informant D1 described the necessity for a strong 
relationship to support the operator acting with a sense of responsibility and asserted 
that the relationship was “very strong”.  When questioned as to evidence of the 
strength of the relationship he advised that the parent company, International Utilities 
Company, requires that for all such long-term contracts a formal customer 
relationship survey of the client by a third party be carried out regularly.  Informant 
D1 said that the most recent customer relationship survey in 2010:  
...gives us some comfort about the day-to-day operational relationship at 
various levels in the organisation...it is very cooperative and we have been very 
happy with the relationship all the way through... Metropolis is a major player 
in the industry in Australia, it is a valued client, we would do everything to keep 
our client happy.   
Private company informant D1 raised the matter of the risk to Metropolis 
in contracting long-term for a company to own the asset which:  
…really tied you to those people, so … they have to find the right partner, that 
comes back to the issue about barriers to entry and, the market being controlled 
by a couple of very reputable companies.  Let’s say we had a buy-out and they 
[the new owners] were less interested in the water industry and maybe were 
focusing more on energy and diverted resources away and didn’t have a long-
term view, I guess there is a risk to the principal.   
When asked how a government could protect against ending up with an 
unsuitable partner private company informant D1 said They [Metropolis] mitigate 
that.  They have stepping stones in the contract.  If you don’t do x, y and z we will 
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come in and take over and we [Metropolis] will operate the plant and fix it, and 
charge you, so they protect themselves contractually.  The reputation of the filtration 
plant operators was a dominant theme throughout the archival and informant studies, 
distinguishing the BOOT case study from the other three.  In the literature regarding 
the awarding of contracts to private operators the term ‘reputation’ was not used, but 
rather the discussion went to selecting companies which had the ‘technical 
capability’ to construct and operate water filtration plants.  Following up on the 
contamination events the matter of reputation was all-pervading in the context of the 
protection provided by the operator being intensely motivated to ensure that safe 
drinking water is seen to be provided, so that the international reputation for safe 
drinking water is not adversely affected.  The conduct of International Utilities 
Company in responding to the contamination events was acknowledged in the 
Implementation Review (2008) report which emphasised the world-wide operations 
of the company and its jealous protection of its high reputation and recorded that the 
company was fully meeting contractual requirements and providing the highest 
standards of water purity. 
The perspective of the private company informant D1 was: 
There was a lot of good that had come from it [the contamination events] 
because of the responses afterwards.  Both organisations had reputational risk 
through the incident so anything that is water quality which is health related ... 
can affect the share price back in Europe ... it can damage our Group’s 
business opportunities in the future ...so it [water quality] is something that is 
very important to us as the operator ... 
Metropolis informant D4 said “Reputational risk has a key 
influence...International Utilities Company and International Utilities and 
Transportation Company ... are here for the long haul, they’re not here for four or 
five years.” 
5.5.3.3.1.2 Suitability of government entity 
The private informants said that the capability of Metropolis and its 
employees to interface with their respective companies was key to their being able to 
act with a sense of responsibility.  The evidence went to the capability of Metropolis 
to manage contracts generally and the capacity and practices that Metropolis had 
developed to manage the water treatment contracts. 
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It is highly likely that Metropolis has a deep capability to manage 
contracts for construction and O&M.  The 2010 Metropolis Annual Report reported 
procurement of about $2b of services by over 300 contracts together with the 
ongoing management of nearly 700 contracts with a value of nearly $8b.  When 
asked whether Metropolis had the capability to manage contracts such as the 
filtration plant construction and operation private operator informant D5 advised that 
“...they either bring an independent verifier, or for the XYZ treatment 
plant…Metropolis themselves reviewed their assets and made a detailed analysis of 
whether we are looking after them effectively and efficiently.” 
In respect of the capacity of Metropolis to manage the filtration plant 
contracts, private company informant D1 said: “...Metropolis operates water 
filtration plants themselves, they have failures on their plants and they share that 
information with us.  They will come and do an audit on our plant to see that we are 
not exposed to the same risk.  If they have a safety incident, they will share with us 
the lessons learnt.”  In addition to that technical knowledge of the business, 
Metropolis has invested in employee capacity to manage the plant contracts.  Large 
filtration plant company informant D1 said: 
... possibly part of the success of this arrangement is that there is a dedicated 
team, because Metropolis have a number of private operators on the water 
plants...they have set up a dedicated contract management unit.  That is very 
important to us as the operator because Metropolis is a very big 
organisation...they all indirectly have an interest in what is happening on water 
production and it is very difficult for us to operate a plant but to also engage 
with a client that is very large....   
The leader of the Metropolis contract management unit, informant D4 
explained that the major part of the unit’s work is around water treatment, drinking 
water treatment, or sewage or waste water treatment and that a large amount of 
treatment is contracted out.  Informant D4 said: 
... I think with every contract it takes a while to get the communication 
right, especially when the relationships are complicated and it has such 
impact.  Things like the contaminations taught us that.  In our case 
[Metropolis] for all our contracts we follow this model...we have a 
contract meeting and an interface meeting.  At the interface [monthly] 
meeting we talk about performance and operational issues, how we can 
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get those working better, so we talk about partnering and 
communications, it’s where we talk about learnings from incidents.  At 
the contract meeting it is usually just a senior operations manager and a 
contracts manager.  If there is any issue around performance, that will 
come up there, KPIs [monthly] those sort of things.  We will apply the 
letter of the law, they know that, that’s the straight bat that we always 
play, we are a government organisation.  We don’t bend on that. 
Verification of this structured arrangement was sought from the Global 
Utilities and Transportation Company Informant D5 who said: 
There are probably three tiers.  The first tier is that we have that “face to face” 
on a periodical basis, it could be a week or every couple of weeks at that level, 
just call in and say hello, it depends on the type of plant and size of plant.  That 
means that the office manager of that particular plant would be talking to 
somebody that works for [Informant D4] on a regular basis.  The second one is 
our monthly interface meeting.  For large contracts it is monthly and sometimes 
we have a quarterly meeting.  For that meeting we usually actually bring in the 
catchment authority as well and the people downstream.  We actually say, 
delivering water to the customer is not just Global Utilities and Transportation 
Company looking after the contract here, it actually involves the people who 
look after the pipes, which is the Metropolis people, it actually involves the 
Metropolis people who look after the bulk water and give us the water in the 
first place.  We go through an agenda to make sure we are continually meeting 
the customer’s requirements as a team, and that has worked fairly well.  And 
the last one is what we call periodical partnership meetings and that is getting 
together with your owner and saying, what has worked well over the last four to 
five years, what can we improve on and where do we want to go next, building 
up relationships. 
When asked whether the Metropolis contract managers have power over 
the private operator Global Utilities and Transportation Company informant, said:  
Oh most definitely.  At our contract meetings that are monthly or quarterly, we 
have to report on the KPIs, we have to report on any incidents, we have to 
report on contract areas that we haven’t met.  They then write us a letter that 
says in accordance with your contract, we expect you to let us know why you 
are not meeting this sort of thing.  They are custodians of the contract.  They 
are contract managers. 
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In respect of the issue found in the early alliances case study where the 
government entity employees with whom the contractor interfaces seek to treat the 
contractor’s employees as inferior and generally behave in a way which frustrates the 
sense of responsibility of the contractor, private company informant D1 advised that 
there was no inappropriate behaviour on the part of Metropolis employees, observing 
that “Metropolis manage their staff, we manage our staff, we are separate entities 
with separate responsibilities.”  Private informant D2 said “But Metropolis don’t 
manage our staff, we have a contract, there is an interface at management level, 
there is an operational interface between the controllers and that sort of thing, but 
they don’t direct our staff at all.”  Private informant D2 went on to say: “They see us 
as the expert, they take our word on water treatment, if we tell them that we can’t 
take this [raw] water, or a certain aspect of the water, you need to fix this, they will 
listen.”  Private informant D1 contributed “Because they have a vested interest, if we 
fail, they fail, it’s that inter-dependency.” 
5.5.3.3.2 Clear contractual terms 
The clarity of the contractual terms was seen by informants as facilitating 
the sense of responsibility of each of the private operators.  The clarity comes from 
three features of the relationship: the single principal/single agent relationship, the 
limited variation in the inputs and highly specified nature of the output (drinking 
water), and the clear separation of roles. 
The simplicity of the contractual arrangement was seen by one large 
filtration plant company informant as contributing positively to the company being 
able to act with a sense of responsibility to Metropolis.  International Utilities 
Company informant D1 said “The reason why this relationship works so well...is that 
we have one client which is Metropolis, so everything we do in this operation [the 
filtration plant site] is based on serving a single client.” 
This reference to a single filtration plant site (or in the case of the other 
BOOT contract, two sites) highlights the contractual requirement that the two 
companies must produce the drinking water from the three plants thereby bringing 
further simplicity to the transactions.  Similarly the other input, raw water, is known 
intimately by the operators as there is no variation as to the source of the water and 
the operators were provided with the history of the technical aspects of that water 
when entering into the contracts.  As to the output of the contractual relationship the 
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informants saw this as elegantly simple, with the Metropolis informant D4 declaring 
“We are about producing water, a certain quality and quantity that protects public 
health and that message is well and truly through the whole site.  The game is 
relatively simple.  So even when there is an incident, it focuses on the goal.”  
Similarly the large treatment plant company informant D1 said “The boundaries are 
very clear, we receive water within a specification, within a range and we have a 
contract to produce water of a certain quality.” 
The private company informants were enthusiastic about the benefit of the 
whole plant operation, the ownership, design and staffing being the sole 
responsibility of the operator.  Private company informant D2 put it this way: “They 
[Metropolis] benefit from our autonomy, we are governed by ourselves; we have got 
our own systems and standards that we set up to achieve our efficiencies, whereas 
they are regulated.”  The informant from the company D5 operating the two small 
plants conceptualised their operation of the plants as “inside the box” with the 
outcome of what happens “inside the box” being the objectives of Metropolis.  
Informant D5 said: “Everything inside the box is the way that Global Utilities and 
Transportation Company do business.  All our staff have Global Utilities and 
Transportation Company uniforms.  All our business systems and mode of operation 
is all the Global Utilities and Transportation Company way of doing things.”  
Metropolis informant D4 confirmed this clear separation of roles and responsibilities 
saying: “There aren’t many grey areas, because they own the site and are 
responsible for the site.  They own the plant and are responsible for the plant.  They 
manage all operations within that site and deliver us performance, outcome-based, 
quality, quantity.” 
5.5.3.3.3 Incentives to private participants 
The matter of incentives to the private companies to act with a sense of 
responsibility was not declared by the informants to be as important as having 
suitable participants, or indeed was less important than such incentives were for the 
private companies participating in the Case Study A alliance.  However there was a 
negative financial incentive that is, a penalty if water supplied is not of an adequate 
quality.  Yet in the context of other issues, data as to incentives emerged.  This 
section firstly outlines the findings as to the term of the contract.  Then data as to the 
importance of additional work are assembled.  Thirdly, the opportunity for the 
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operators to carry out research, either independently or in concert with Metropolis, at 
their filtration plants is examined. 
5.5.3.3.3.1 Terms of contract 
The term of the contracts for each of the BOOTs is 25 years, resulting in 
Metropolis being required to decide by 2019 whether to extend the contract or 
finalise the transfer (at a market valuation) of the ownership to Metropolis.  The way 
in which this relatively long term acts as an incentive was explained by International 
Utilities Company informant D1 who said “The beauty of these type[s] of contracts 
is that it is business, so if you have to invest in an asset, obviously you have to pay 
down that loan, and...it comes with a long-term operating contract which is a 
guaranteed income stream for a long period.”  Metropolis informant D4 spoke to the 
matter of those long-term contracts being extended saying  
There is obviously commercial interest in a long-term contract.  There are 
options to extend those sorts of contracts, and I think they [the two operating 
companies] would like to extend.  If you have got a long-term contract, it is in 
your interest to extend that, to have that cash flow.  The water industry is quite 
stable and the cash flow is there from this sort of investment. 
Global Utilities and Transportation Company informant D5 confirmed 
the attractiveness of the long-term income stream and highlighted other cost saving 
aspects saying: 
…if we can set up longer-term contracts for our labour…if you’re doing 
it every twelve months or every two years it’s hard, but if you can go for 
four years which is the maximum in our state at present, that’s good.  In 
regards to chemicals and power it is better to be able to go to the 
chemical industry and power industry and say look we have a number of 
contracts throughout Australia for these years that we would like you to 
give us your best price.  The last one is improvements.  If it’s a new 
infrastructure it takes the first twelve months fixing up defects or doing 
optimisation…So the third and fourth year you will try and go for better 
systems, continual improvements, so if it is a five-year contract, by the 
time you hit five years, you probably will have the project down to a 
fairly fine art if everything has gone according to plan…So out of all of 
that, I would say a 10-year contract for a metropolitan O&M.  I wouldn’t 
want to see any lower than that.  To gain benefit, to say to your 
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shareholders you’ve got continuity for the next 10 years, we will put a bid 
in, there is usually a lot of effort goes into winning these contracts. 
Whilst that data supports the desire of private companies for a significant 
minimum term one informant provided a very interesting insight into the issue of the 
private company’s need to be able to exit from a long-term contract.  Global Utilities 
and Transportation Company informant D5, after talking of the minimum contract, 
used the concept of a continuum of the term of contracts saying “At the other end 
obviously 20 or 30 years, it depends on the client and where they are heading to.  But 
for each of those you could put bus stops or milestone points in and say right, if these 
KPIs are not being met or the client hasn’t shown value for money over a period of 
time, we [the operating company] can break the contract.” 
5.5.3.3.3.2 Additional work 
The opportunity for additional work is not provided for within the 
contacts for the two plants.  The reference to additional work that emerged from the 
data was in respect of additional contracts with Metropolis and work for other 
utilities which may come to Metropolis as a referee.  Both International Utilities 
Company and Global Utilities and Transportation Company have other significant 
contracts with Metropolis for the broader range of functions covering waste water 
and sewage, providing both construction and O&M services.  The private company 
informants advised that the prospect of this additional work was an incentive for the 
private company to act with a sense of responsibility to Metropolis. 
The International Utilities Company informant D1 said “... an operator 
earns his margin by doing a good job over a long period of time and having a long-
term relationship and focus with the client. They [Metropolis] value the relationship 
and that is very good for us in terms of future business, so we can come with 
confidence.  When we ask them to vouch for us in front of other clients they do so in 
a positive way.”  International Utilities Company informant D2 said “They 
[Metropolis] are quite happy to be a referee for us on other bids.” 
5.5.3.3.3.3 Research opportunities 
Each water filtration plant contract requires collaborative research 
between Metropolis and each of the private participants to keep abreast of 
technology, perform on-site research and exchange findings with Metropolis 
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(Mumford, 1996; Implementation Review, 2008).  This aspect of the contractual 
arrangements was portrayed by the private company informants as contributing to the 
strong relationship with Metropolis and the sense of responsibility to Metropolis on 
the part of each company.  International Utilities Company informant D1 advised: 
...part of the payments that are received ... is invested in a fund for 
research where both parties can agree to research projects where it is in 
[the] common interest and there is another smaller component which is 
about providing Metropolis access to the wider International Utilities 
Company technology and research.  It also has a very strong research 
activity based in Europe but with affiliations across the world, many 
universities, so the many good things that are happening in our Group 
elsewhere, they [Metropolis] want to tap into that, and similarly we share 
through our link with Metropolis some of the activities that Metropolis is 
doing.  Some of the research that is done physically on our plant is for 
the benefit of International Utilities Company. 
International Utilities Company informant D1 summarised the research 
fund arrangements saying “It is a partnership in terms of the service delivered, but I 
think another key aspect is the R&D partnership which unites not only the physical 
asset of the filtration plant and the operation of that, but it really brings two 
organisations together at a high level in terms of cooperation to actively pursue best 
practice.”  It would seem that Metropolis’s commitment to the agents to pursue best 
practice and to do so in a highly collaborative way is providing a strong incentive to 
the agents to act with a sense of responsibility. 
5.5.4 Significance of findings 
These findings identify a model of privatised contractual arrangements which 
is likely to achieve a strong stewardship outcome.  The key findings were: 
 The water filtration plants operate within a highly regulated, transparent 
environment. 
 There was no information asymmetry favouring either the principal or the 
agent, but rather there was a real-time sharing of data as to water quality 
and plant breakdown and full availability to the principal (Metropolis) of 
data as to plant O&M. 
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 Because of the contamination events the two private operator companies 
and the government entity have enduring corporate memories of the 
adverse impacts of failing to meet public expectations as to a critical 
service — safe drinking water. 
 The private filtration plant operators now continually achieve stewardship 
of the quality of the Metropolis drinking water. 
 There was strong stewardship of the privatised water filtration plants. 
 The demands on the part of the public were of an evolving and more 
demanding nature viz. the water purity expectations were increased, both 
at the time of contracting in the mid-1990s and again in response to the 
contaminations in 2000. 
 These demands as to stewardship were met by the privatised contractual 
arrangements. 
 The contractual arrangement, whereby Metropolis has the option to extend 
the contracts or to acquire the plants at a market price at the end of the 25-
year contractual term, is highly likely to ensure that there will be no 
reduction in the stewardship of the plants. 
 The behaviour of the private companies was strongly acting in the interests 
of the principal yet did not go beyond that required by the contracts. There 
was no evidence of any acts where the private companies did anything for 
which they were not paid in terms of the contract, with all parties taking 
the perspective that the relationship was commercial and the simplicity of 
the contractual terms and outputs positioned the companies to not have to 
work outside the contractual requirements.  For those reasons it was 
concluded that the contractual relationships were configured in accordance 
with Agency Theory. 
 There was significant evidence that the private water filtration plant 
operators felt a strong sense of responsibility to the principal, Metropolis.  
That sense of responsibility to the principal was concluded to be highly 
important to the agent acting in the interests of the principal. 
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 From the perspective of the principal sense of responsibility was essential 
to achieving stewardship of the critical service, safe drinking water. 
 It was found that the international water services companies which are the 
operators of the filtration plants are protective of their reputations and have 
a sense of responsibility to the public.  The fierce protection of reputation 
was found to contribute strongly to the sense of responsibility to the 
principal.  The sense of responsibility to the public did not appear to 
conflict with the sense of responsibility to the principal, but rather is a 
feature or factor which the principal can utilise to achieve alignment with 
the goals of the principal. 
 Sense of responsibility was found to be increased or supported by a range 
of actions and factors.  Ensuring suitable private participants and a suitable 
government participant (and its employees), clear contractual terms and 
incentives to the private participants were all found to impact positively on 
the sense of responsibility of private participants. 
It was found that the private stewards would act with a sense of responsibility 
to Metropolis so as to protect and enhance that reputation with Metropolis and other 
similar water systems.  Metropolis was found to have supported the agents in acting 
with a sense of responsibility by establishing practices and capability to very 
effectively manage the contracts.  A related matter which supported the effective 
management of the contracts and facilitated the companies acting with a sense of 
responsibility was the clear specification of contractual outcomes and the clear 
separation of the roles brought about by the BOOT form of contract. 
Incentives to the agents were found to increase the sense of responsibility.  In 
contrast with the other case studies, direct financial incentives did not come forth in 
the studies but the long-term nature of the contracts, additional work and the 
opportunity to carry out research at the plants were seen as incentives which focused 
the sense of responsibility to Metropolis. 
These findings were reviewed to identify any possibility that data which would 
upset or qualify the findings reported for this case study.  In addition to the interview 
transcripts the evidence drawn from an exceptionally broad range of public sources 
(i.e. literature and an Auditor-General’s report, a Royal Commission, a subsequent 
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Implementation Review, public documents of regulators and press archives) was re-
examined.  That further interrogation of the broad and interrelated body of data 
confirmed the findings reported in this section. 
The findings in this BOOT case study should be accepted in the context of a 
key variable unique to these water filtration plant case studies; that is, the 
extraordinary large size of the task.  The payments made to two private companies 
are larger than the combined O&M and capital expenditure of any of the other case 
studies.  This large size drives requirements for technical capabilities that only very 
large companies can reliably bring to the relationship.  These large companies are 
highly likely to be predisposed to act with a sense of responsibility. In a similar vein 
the criticality of the output of the contractual relationship (safe drinking water) 
leaves the agent no option but to act with a sense of responsibility to the principal.  
However, it was found that the BOOT concession form of privatisation achieved 
stewardship of the critical infrastructure and that there was a strong causal link 
between sense of responsibility and stewardship-like behaviour.  In addition, the 
findings were that sense of responsibility can be positively impacted by certain 
actions and factors.  Those actions and factors and the other findings from the four 
case studies are further examined in the following chapter to develop Agency Theory 
and Stewardship Theory and provide learnings to assist in the configuration of 
contractual relationships for critical infrastructures. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this research was to evaluate the potential of Stewardship 
Theory to guide the configuration of contractual relationships for privatised critical 
infrastructures that result in agents acting as stewards.  As certain aspects of Agency 
and Stewardship theories relating directly to the relationships between principal and 
agent or steward were underdeveloped the researcher sought to understand the actual 
experience of contractual relationships by collecting data from case studies drawn 
from the Australian urban water services industry.  The findings from the four case 
studies were set out in the previous chapter.  This chapter analyses those findings and 
develops conclusions as to the impact upon theory, the literature and practice. 
For convenience the three Research Questions (RQs) which drove and shaped 
the findings are repeated as follows: 
1. RQ 1: To what extent will a steward act in the interests of the 
principal? 
2. RQ 2: How important is it that the steward feels a sense of 
responsibility to the principal for the steward to act in the interests of the 
principal? 
3. RQ 3: What actions are available to the principal to increase the 
steward’s sense of responsibility and achieve stewardship of critical 
infrastructures? 
The case study findings now analysed by way of a cross-case comparison 
utilising the same framework of themes and factors applied from the point of 
determining the RQs through to the development of the case study findings.  The 
analysis teases out the implications of the evidence for the operation of Agency 
Theory and Stewardship Theory prescriptions in the context of the agent or steward 
being a private entity and the principal being a government entity.  The analysis 
delivers for academics and practitioners a clear explanation of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the four forms of privatisation, and Agency and Stewardship theories 
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are extended and developed to better explain the dynamics of the inter-organisation 
contractual relationships which underpin the forms of privatisation. 
This chapter firstly establishes the achievement (or otherwise) of stewardship 
of the infrastructures by the case study forms of privatisation and then explores the 
nature of what constitutes stewardship behaviour.  Second, the importance of sense 
of responsibility is examined to understand the causal link with stewardship 
behaviour and to understand the extent to which the principal requires that the 
steward have a sense of responsibility.  Thirdly, the actions of principals which 
impacted on the steward’s sense of responsibility are assembled and analysed to 
assist principals when configuring contractual relationships. 
6.2 STEWARDSHIP 
This analysis will first delve into the findings as to the achievement of 
stewardship of the critical infrastructures by each of the case study forms of 
privatisation, identifying the Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory characteristics 
and prescriptions and their link to stewardship (or otherwise).  Secondly with the 
objective of understanding what constitutes the stewardship behaviour of 
organisations, the findings will be interrogated to establish both aspects of the 
behaviour relative to Agency Theory behaviour and to identify what constitutes 
stewardship behaviour.  Thirdly, the findings are drawn together to form a definition 
of the behaviour of the contemporary organisation as steward for the purposes of 
establishing the reasonable expectations of the government and the community. 
6.2.1 Stewardship by privatisation forms 
This research was initiated in response to findings of the press, Auditors-
General and scholars, for example Funnell et al. (2009), that stewardship of critical 
infrastructures is not meeting the requirements or values of the public.  For that 
reason this thesis measured whether stewardship was achieved by the case study 
water systems against two key public values, namely the efficient use of public 
resources and the quality of services provided to customers (including the 
environmental impact of operations).  This section examines the findings as to 
whether stewardship was achieved (or not), unpacking any causal link between 
Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory characteristics of the contractual 
relationships and the achievement of stewardship. 
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To facilitate examination of the findings a comparison of key findings is 
assembled in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1 Characteristics of case study forms of privatisation 
 Form of 
privatisation 
Extent of 
government 
involvement 
Whether 
stewardship 
of system 
was 
achieved 
Characteristics Theory 
underpinning 
contractual 
form 
Case 
Study 
A 
Alliance Government 
is principal 
and a 
member of 
the ‘virtual’ 
alliance 
contributing 
1/3 of 
staffing 
Strong 
stewardship 
achieved 
Closely aligned 
goals, trust, 
acting in the 
interests of the 
principal 
Agency 
Theory 
Case 
Study 
B 
A traditional 
contract, but 
with the 
agent being 
two 
partnership 
forms of 
joint venture 
Government 
is both 
principal 
and 50% 
owner of the 
Joint 
Venture 
Stewardship 
was 
achieved 
Control, shared 
goals, acting in 
the interests of 
the principal 
Agency 
Theory 
Case 
Study 
C 
Traditional 
contracts 
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6.2.1.1 Alliance 
The alliance form in Case Study A achieved strong stewardship of the 
infrastructure.  In addition the suitability of that alliance form was endorsed by the 
government entity in Case Study C, the early alliances.  That government entity 
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recognised the deficiencies in the early alliances model and in 2012 introduced a 
single, NG Alliance which has many characteristics in common with the form 
utilised in Case Study A.  The Case Study A example of the alliance form is closely 
aligned with Stewardship Theory prescriptions.  The private company participants 
were bound by contractual prescriptions which required that they act only in 
accordance with unanimous decisions made between the three participants and 
required that they work towards the collective goals of the alliance.  These goals 
(KPIs and targets) are painstakingly aligned annually with the goals of the principal.  
In terms established in the seminal Stewardship Theory work of Davis et al., (1997) 
the two private companies demonstrated strong cooperative behaviours with, and 
towards, the principal and did not depart from the interests of the organisation (the 
principal).  The annual adjustment of the goals and objectives of The Alliance to 
align intimately with those of the principal was found to result in the behaviour on 
the part of the private participants satisfying the description of a steward by Van 
Slyke (2007): “…makes decisions he/she perceives to be in the best interests of 
his/her principals.” (p. 165).  There was a high level of respect between the parties 
with the managerial starting point of the government entity being to trust the private 
participants and the government entity continuing to extend trust as evidenced by 
awarding additional capital works and allowing The Alliance to contract with 
external parties in the name of The Alliance. 
Looking through the Agency Theory normative lens goal divergence was 
not found, there was no inclination to distrust and no reliance on control on the part 
of the principal.  Accordingly this example of the alliance model could be found to 
be configured according to Stewardship Theory prescriptions which linked strongly 
to the achievement of stewardship of the infrastructure.  In each of two case studies 
an informant attributed this effectiveness in achieving stewardship to each participant 
having ‘skin in the game’.  Yet the absence of goal divergence, indeed goals were 
closely aligned, is also contemplated in the Agency Theory model (Caers et al., 
2006; Eisenhardt, 1989; Waterman & Meier, 1998) wherein the prescription as to 
goal conflict is relaxed and the Agency Theory model is expanded to include 
relationships where there is no goal conflict and indeed consensus.  This area of 
confusion between the prescriptions of the two theories, and possibly common 
ground, is explored later in Section 7.2.1 Implications for theory. 
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6.2.1.2 Joint venture 
The Joint Venture in Case Study B was found to be comprised of two 
contractual relationships, the first being the traditional contract between the 
government entity and the two Joint Venture partnerships, and the second being the 
two partnerships (distribution and retail) between the government entity and each of 
the private companies.  The distinguishing feature of this combined configuration 
was that the agent (the two partnerships) is 50% owned by the principal.  The two 
partnerships were found to be an example of uneven public/private mixing with the 
government entity being the more active because it was local.  Professor 
(2008, p. 511) concluded that the Joint Venture partnerships had achieved ‘mutual 
benefit’.  As stewardship of the infrastructure was achieved and as Stewardship 
Theory behaviours such as the Joint Venture acting in the interests of the principal 
and goals being shared were evident it was concluded that the relationship within the 
partnership is configured in accordance with Stewardship Theory. 
Yet the Joint Venture contractual relationship is characterised by tight 
control by the government entity, contrasting with the approach in The Alliance 
where the KPI targets are achieved by decision-making processes guided by 
principles of unanimous decision-making and decisions being to the benefit of all 
parties.  For the Joint Venture the principal draws on its 50% ownership, 50% 
membership of the JGB (Joint Venture governance board), and having board 
members in common with the principal and Joint Venture and effects strong control.  
Agency Theory describes these governance and control arrangements as monitoring 
expenditures (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) made necessary by the assumed divergent 
goals of the agent and principal and the opportunism of the agent.  There was no goal 
divergence but rather goals were shared, aligning with the Stewardship Theory 
conceptualisation.  The Joint Venture was found to unfailingly act in the interests of 
the government entity with the Stewardship Theory characteristics having a strong 
causal link to stewardship of the infrastructure.  A possible explanation of the 
principal’s tight control is the need for the principal to demonstrate to the 
independent regulator that the market tensions mandated in a contestable 
principal/contractor relationship are in play.  One principal’s informant had advised 
that the independent regulator had asserted that the relationship was ‘really cosy’.  
More recently, in early 2013 the independent regulator recommended in a discussion 
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paper that the government separate out the water and sewerage business from the 
Joint Venture and into an additional completely separate government-owned 
corporation for the purpose of facilitating regulation of the business (Regional Centre 
Independent Regulator, 2013).  Accordingly it is possible that the principal might be 
exercising tight control, notwithstanding that the steward was strongly acting in the 
interests of the principal, to manage known criticism that the principal is favouring 
the Joint Venture to the detriment of the community. 
Nonetheless this finding of strong control (an Agency Theory prescription) 
being accompanied by Stewardship Theory behaviours on the part of the 
agent/steward highlights two possibilities.  One, that strong control does not preclude 
Stewardship Theory behaviours on the part of the steward.  Stewardship Theory 
asserts that establishing a less controlling environment by extending the autonomy of 
the steward motivates the steward to deliver increased benefits to the principal 
(Davis et al., 1997) and that instituting additional control may signal distrust and 
lower motivation of the steward to work in the interests of the principal (Tosi et al., 
2003).  However there was strong evidence that the Joint Venture partnerships acted 
in the interests of the principal, suggesting that the control by the principal did not 
diminish their motivation to behave like a steward.  Accordingly, whilst this finding 
emerged from evidence drawn from a single case study it is possible to conclude that 
the Stewardship Theory model can be conceptualised in the inter-organisational 
context as encompassing models where autonomy is extended (Van Slyke, 2007) on 
the one hand, OR strong controls on the other. 
Yet the more straightforward possibility is that the tight control by GOCO is 
a feature of an Agency Theory relationship of the model proposed by Eisenhardt 
(1989), where the goals of the parties are aligned, albeit that the behaviour of the 
private participants is like that of stewardship.  This finding would be consistent with 
the finding that the stewardship-like behaviour of acting in the interests of the 
principal was encompassed within the contractual requirements and that this 
compliance with the contract did not extend to the behaviour of the steward 
contemplated in Stewardship Theory, wherein the concept of acting in the interests 
amounts to something more than contractual compliance. 
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6.2.1.3 Traditional contracts 
Traditional management contracts underpinned the relationship in Case 
Study C, the early alliances, with the government entity being principal and two 
unrelated private companies being the agents in two identical contracts.  It was found 
that stewardship of the service had not been achieved.  There was evidence of at least 
one agent company acting with self-interest (and against the interests of the 
principal) accompanied by a focus by the agents upon literal contractual compliance.  
The evidence as to the behaviour of each company was not distinct as the principal in 
archival data, and the principal’s informants, intentionally obscured which of the 
private companies was behaving inappropriately, due to there being a current tender 
process ongoing at the time. 
The divergence of goals was accompanied by evidence that the principal did 
not trust at least one of the two agents, leading the researcher to conclude that these 
relationships were operating in the manner conceptualised in the normative Agency 
Theory model.  In turn these normative Agency Theory relationships were concluded 
to have a strong link to there not being stewardship of the infrastructure.  However 
caution must be exercised in generalising these findings because the evidence was 
gathered from only one case study of two contractual relationships and the principal 
had chosen to not be specific as to the behaviour of each private company agent.  As 
such the utility of these findings is as a base for an inter-case comparison against the 
BOOT form of contract. 
6.2.1.4 BOOT concession 
The BOOT form of concession contract in Case Study D was found to have 
achieved strong stewardship of the critical infrastructures, the water filtration plants.  
In addition, this research concluded that the mechanism unique to the BOOT model, 
the transfer of ownership (or alternatively an extension of the contract), was highly 
likely to result in there being stewardship of the plants in the lead up to the end of the 
contract term.  Applying the typical Agency Theory criterion of goal divergence it 
was found that there was no goal divergence but rather a very close alignment of 
goals accompanied by coordination, collaboration and partnership.  Yet as has been 
acknowledged in the preceding case studies some Agency theorists (Caers et al., 
2006; Eisenhardt, 1989; Van Puyvelde et al., 2012, Waterman & Meier, 1998) claim 
that the Agency Theory model can encompass relationships where there is no goal 
 194 Chapter 6: Discussion 
divergence.  Applying a second criterion, that of the agent acting against the interests 
of the principal, it was found that the companies at all times acted in the interests of 
the principal.  In the case of the large plant, even when confronted by a Royal 
Commission as to the reasons for contamination of drinking water, the operator did 
not act against the interests of the principal.  A third criterion that distinguishes 
between an Agency Theory and a Stewardship Theory configuration was the extent 
of control or alternatively autonomy.  Informants from both the government entity 
and each of the private companies provided evidence that the government entity did 
not seek to control any aspect of the operations of the three plants but rather the 
operators were autonomous as to how they constructed and operated the plants. 
Autonomy is a Stewardship Theory prescription and in this case study was 
accompanied by Stewardship Theory behaviours; that is, acting in the interests of the 
principal, coordination and collaboration.  Yet this was all in the context of a 
contractual relationship which meets the criterion of an Agency Theory model.  The 
dilemma then is whether the BOOTs were configured in accordance with Agency 
Theory or with Stewardship Theory.  This question may be resolved by examining 
the extent to which the private companies acted in the interests of Metropolis.  The 
operators of the filtration plants were found to have acted strongly in the interests of 
Metropolis but within a scheme of rigid contractual monitoring and compliance.  
Taking all the findings into consideration it is concluded that the contractual 
relationship configured in accordance with Agency Theory prescriptions has been 
able to utilise contractual specifications to achieve stewardship-like behaviours. 
The BOOT concessions were found to have achieved stewardship of the 
infrastructure providing an informative contrast with the traditional contracts which 
were found to have not achieved stewardship.  Both were long-term contracts, 25 
years compared with a total of 17 years, and neither mixed the private company staff 
with those of the government principal.  In the concessions the private companies 
owned the plants retaining the benefit of their quality of maintenance.  In the 
traditional contracts the private companies did not own the systems and did not 
obtain any benefits from the quality of the maintenance they carried out.  Rather they 
were rewarded by KPI targets which engendered a literal contractual compliance 
perspective.  At the very least these cases suggest that traditional contracts in a long-
term context do not provide the likelihood of stewardship and that the issue of 
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ownership (albeit subject to withdrawal by the government entity) may be a factor 
which promotes stewardship of the infrastructure. 
The preceding sections have laid out the characteristics of each of the four 
forms of privatisation from the case studies against the prescriptions of Agency 
Theory and Stewardship Theory and identified those characteristics which have a 
causal link to stewardship of the infrastructure being achieved.  This thesis now 
discusses the findings which expand our understanding of underdeveloped aspects of 
Stewardship Theory, namely, the level or nature of behaviour inherent in stewardship 
behaviour and the concept of acting in the interests of the principal.  A definition of 
the stewardship behaviour of modern organisations is built using those findings to 
explicate reasonable expectations as to stewardship by organisations. 
6.2.2 Stewardship behaviour 
In the previous section this thesis explored the characteristics of the case study 
examples of forms of privatisation and in so doing also commenced the examination 
of the behaviours of the agent or steward.  This section builds on that work and 
discusses the findings as to the behaviours for the purpose of extending the literature 
in relation to what constitutes stewardship behaviour.  Firstly, the findings as to 
stewardship behaviours are unpacked to understand the difference in the behaviour 
between case studies and the ways in which the behaviour in relationships with 
Stewardship Theory characteristics is different from (or similar to) that of 
relationships having Agency Theory characteristics.  Secondly, the findings which 
clarify and develop the meaning of acting in the interests of the principal are 
discussed with the objective of expanding the understanding of this Stewardship 
Theory (Davis et al., 1997) concept.  Thirdly, the outcomes of the discussion are 
brought together in a definition of stewardship behaviour of modern organisations for 
the purpose of providing scholars and practitioners with a clear understanding of the 
behaviour which can be reasonably expected, and which results in the better 
stewardship of critical infrastructures. 
Earlier in this thesis the terminology used in Agency Theory and Stewardship 
Theory in respect of the behaviour of the agent or steward towards the principal was 
unpacked.  The most aspirational behaviour of Stewardship Theory — acting in the 
interests of the principal — was portrayed by Stewardship theorists to offer 
something more than the contractual compliance which is the aspiration of Agency 
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Theory.  The problem then is identifying what this ‘something more’ is in the context 
of both theories prescribing contractual compliance.  These possible behaviours 
prescribed by the theories have been applied to the findings from the four case 
studies with the results summarised in Table 6.2. The findings are discussed in detail 
with the preliminary observation that in no case study was there not contractual 
compliance. 
Table 6.2 Behaviours of agents or stewards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.2.1 Contractual compliance 
Contractual compliance, as minimum behaviour, was found in each of the 
four case studies.  However, in the early alliances case study contractual compliance 
was found to have a negative connotation and in the other three case studies to be 
accompanied by stewardship-like behaviours.  The early alliances were traditional 
contracts, with the principal’s informants advising that at least one of the early 
alliances focused on the KPIs to achieve bonus payments rather than acting in the 
interests of the principal by providing adequate service to the customer.  The RFP 
(2011) for the single NG Alliance to replace the early alliances revealed that the 
principal believed that there were ongoing instances of the alliances acting against 
the interests of the principal.  Examples were: there not being a strong cooperative 
focus, lack of alignment of goals and lack of collective responsibility for outcomes.  
Having regard to those data this thesis found that in the early alliances, which were 
configured in accordance with Agency Theory prescriptions, the behaviour was no 
Form of privatisation Agent/Stewards 
behaviour 
Applicable theory 
Alliance, joint venture, 
BOOT concession 
Contractual 
compliance and acting 
in interests of the 
principal 
Agency Theory 
Traditional contract Contractual 
compliance, but acting 
against the interests of 
the principal 
Agency Theory  
None Not contractual 
compliance 
Agency Theory 
 Chapter 6: Discussion 197 
more than contractual compliance and the agents did not act in the interests of the 
principal. 
Whilst this evidence of the agent not acting in the interests of the principal 
confirms the conventional Agency Theory conceptualisation of the parties being 
opposed in their goals the findings do not assist in understanding whether 
stewardship behaviour of acting in the interests of the principal, as claimed by Davis 
et al. (1997), sits within the concept of contractual compliance or is beyond, or 
something more than, contractual compliance. 
6.2.2.2 Acting in the interests of the principal 
The conceptualisation of the steward as acting in the interests of the 
principal is a major tenet of Stewardship Theory (Davis et al. 1997, p.24; Donaldson, 
1990, p. 377; Van Slyke, 2007, pp. 164-165).  This research sought to develop 
knowledge of what constitutes acting in the interests of the principal, specifically 
whether there was any upper limit upon the extent to which the steward would act in 
the interests of the principal.  This was particularly important as Stewardship Theory 
literature is notable for its focus upon the human services arena where the steward, 
typically an individual, enters the contract already highly motivated to benefit the 
recipient of the services, for example homeless youth.  Davis et al. (1997) 
conceptualised the steward’s actions saying a steward “...will not depart from the 
interests of his or her organisation” (p. 29) and Van Slyke (2007) asserted that a 
steward “…makes decisions he/she perceives to be in the best interests of his/her 
principals” (p. 165).  These conceptualisations are offering something more than that 
expected of an agent and hint of the dedication and service, and the preparedness to 
go the extra mile for deserving individuals which characterise the human services.  
This research proceeded on the basis that these conceptualisations were possibly 
unrealistic in the context of the steward being a for-profit organisation and sought out 
examples of extraordinary actions; that is, instances where the steward went the extra 
mile, perhaps making a contribution for which they would not be compensated. 
Unpacking the data from the archival study and questioning in the 
interviews the evidence was that The Alliance, Joint Venture and BOOT case studies 
were configured in accordance with Agency Theory and the agent entities displayed 
stewardship-like behaviours such as acting in the interests of the principal.  No 
examples of the private entities doing anything exceptional or extraordinary that 
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might incur cost that could not be recovered from the principal were found.  The 
questioning also revealed that no principal expected any act of extraordinary 
stewardship.  The government entity informants in all four case studies put the 
perspective that as the relationship was commercial there was no expectation that the 
private companies perform any extraordinary acts but rather that contractual 
requirements in two of the case studies removed the option of such action.  The 
Alliance agreement requires that all decisions must be unanimous and must be made 
in the interests of The Alliance and not any one participant.  Government entity 
informants explained that rather than expect private participants to act to their own 
detriment the government entity would use the mechanisms in the agreement, for 
example annual adjustment of performance targets and the Agency Theory 
prescription of financial incentives, to focus the private participants on activities 
which are in the best interests of the principal.  The Joint Venture was limited by the 
governance mechanisms and ownership arrangements, having to put all proposed 
actions to the governance board for a decision.  The 50% ownership by the principal, 
the funding coming from the principal, and the principal having extraordinarily 
strong representation on the governance board precluded the Joint Venture from 
having any discretion to take any extraordinary actions. 
This finding that no steward entity had performed any extraordinary act and 
that the principals had no expectation that they do so, sets an upper limit to the 
meaning of the term acting in the interests of the principal.  The lower limit of the 
behaviour of the steward is one in which the literature is silent.  Where the case 
studies demonstrated stewardship of the system the behaviour of the agent was that 
of continually acting in the interests of the principal.  Accompanying that, acting in 
the interests of the principal was the agent fully complying with the contract.  In 
summary, findings indicated that The Alliance, Joint Venture and BOOT case studies 
were configured in accordance with Agency Theory prescriptions and the agents 
displayed the stewardship-like behaviour of acting in the interests of the principal 
whilst doing nothing more than complying with the contract.  This finding is highly 
important as Stewardship theorists (Davis et al., 1997; Van Slyke, 2007) had asserted 
that Agency Theory characterises the agent in the normative model as acting against 
the interests of the principal. 
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This thesis has now found that The Alliance, Joint Venture and BOOT 
forms of contractual relationships which were configured in accordance with a 
relaxed Agency Theory model (Eisenhardt, 1989) have supported or created the 
stewardship-like behaviour of acting in the interests of the principal.  Having 
established that the stewardship-like behaviour of acting in the interests of the 
principal was achieved within contractual relationships which were configured in 
accordance with Agency Theory and that these contractual relationships achieved 
stewardship of the critical infrastructures it is important to understand what 
constitutes acting in the interests of the principal. 
The terminology regarding acting in the interests of the principal has varied 
over the years since Stewardship Theory first emerged.  Donaldson and Davis (1991) 
referred to executives as stewards “…motivated to act in the best interests of their 
principals.”  Davis et al., (1997) asserted that “…a steward’s behaviour will not 
depart from the interests of his or her organisation.”  Van Slyke (2007) asserted that 
a steward, amongst other things, “…makes decisions he/she perceives to be in the 
best interests of his/her principals…” (p. 165).  Explaining why the steward would 
not depart from the interests of the principal Davis et al., (1997) said “even when the 
interests of the steward and principal are not aligned, the steward places higher value 
on co-operation than defection.” (p. 24). 
The case study where the private entities were found to not act in the 
interests of the principal, the early alliances, provided valuable, publically-stated 
examples of the behaviour of the agent.  The government entity in its RFP (2011) 
said measures taken by the early alliances to achieve cost reduction sometimes 
resulted in increased cost elsewhere, there not being a strong cooperative focus, lack 
of alignment of goals, and lack of collective responsibility for outcomes.  As 
discussed previously, the evidence was that the private companies had focused on 
bonus payments to the detriment of quality of service to the customer.  Taken 
collectively Case Study C provided rich and deep evidence of what constitutes acting 
against the interests of the principal. 
The findings as to stewardship-like behaviour from the case studies where 
the stewards were acting in the interests of the principal (The Alliance, the Joint 
Venture and the BOOT concessions) are now discussed.  Five of the informants had 
had a significant role in establishing the case study contractual relationship and this 
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was apparent in the rich, conceptual language they chose to describe the relationship 
and the role of the agent.  The private participant informants described (and the 
government entity supported) the conduct of the agent as highly values-driven for 
example honesty and integrity, accompanied by behaviour such as cooperation and 
collaboration and doing what is best for the partnership they share with the principal.  
Informants depicted a long-term perspective on the part of the parties with the agents 
genuinely putting the interests of the principal first over the interests of their own 
organisations.  Cooperation was a term that emerged often, with the BOOT case 
study data providing evidence that the private and government entity informants 
distinguished between cooperation and collaboration.  In respect of the large 
filtration plant the discussion regarding cooperation flowed into the shared research 
activities, with both government entity and private operator informants using terms 
such as collaboration and partnership. 
An informant from the operator of the two small filtration plants took an 
expansive perspective, observing that his company provided many services to the 
government entity, for example the operation of a desalination plant, and O&M of 
waste treatment plants.  He explained that his company not only always met the 
terms of the contract but also “...see ourselves as an extension of the client...”.  This 
conceptualisation of the agent is a powerful way of depicting an alignment of goals 
and actions that is so complete that, to the external observer, there is no discernible 
divergence between the principal and agent on goals or actions.  This concept will 
assist the development of the Stewardship Theory literature not only by its power to 
describe the alignment of the two parties but also as a counterpoint to the 
conventional Agency Theory conceptualisation of the agent having different goals 
and acting against the principal. 
Drawing these findings from all four case studies together, two strong 
threads of concepts emerged, namely: the sharing of goals and objectives, and the 
intense focus on ‘cooperation’ and ‘collaboration’.  Both these threads of behaviours 
resonate strongly with the conceptualisation of relational contracts.  Relational 
contracts resulted from the parties seeking to avoid the costly adversarial (Agency 
Theory) relationships common to traditional Agency Theory contracts which were 
incomplete in that the nature of the output or externalities precluded the writing of a 
contract that covered every eventuality (Walker & Hampson, 2003).  The incomplete 
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nature of the contract led to conflict between the parties who responded by adopting 
longer-term relationships supported by relational contracts which were characterised 
by trust and the pursuit of common goals (Waterhouse et al., 2011).  Thus adoption 
of relational contracts presents an example of a response to the conventional Agency 
Theory model not being adequate and something more (by way of focus upon 
relationships) was needed and created.  Reflecting upon the Stewardship Theory 
literature and case study findings on the one hand and the underpinning 
characteristics of relational contracts on the other, it is apparent that there is a strong 
congruence between the behaviour of acting in the interests of the principal and the 
behaviour of the agent conceptualised in relational contracts.  Yet only The Alliance 
was configured in accordance with the prescriptions of a relational contract, 
suggesting the possibility of the concept of acting in the interests of the principal 
being more pervasive and operating in a broader range of contractual relationships 
beyond the relational contract alone. 
The threads of concepts found in the literature and the water service case 
studies — shared goals and a focus on cooperation — are assembled for the purpose 
of defining the behaviour of the steward as follows: 
1. The goals and objectives of the steward must be aligned with those of 
the principal so that there are shared goals and objectives, and that the 
steward is expected to continually, proactively seek that alignment. 
2. The behaviour of the steward towards the principal is to be cooperative 
with the possibility of interdependency and collaboration if that is the 
required relationship. 
6.2.2.3 Definition of stewardship behaviour 
Whilst the case studies were found to be configured in accordance with 
Agency Theory, not Stewardship Theory, all case studies provided a substantial body 
of findings regarding the behaviours expected of a steward.  Turning first to the 
findings as to the agent integrating its goals with those of the principal, the key 
findings from the case studies were that there was both a requirement by the 
principal that the goals and objectives be aligned and shared, and an understanding 
between principal and agent that the agent would proactively and continually seek to 
build that alignment.  Those findings are highly important as they confirm the core 
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Stewardship Theory tenet that “…a steward’s behaviour will not depart from the 
interests of his or her organisation (the principal)” (Davis et al., 1997, p. 24) 
establishing a base for further development of Stewardship Theory.  The findings go 
further to both identify that the alignment or sharing of goals is a requirement of the 
principal, and to provide a practical example of the behaviour of the organisation as 
steward; that is, that the steward must continually refresh its understanding of the 
principal’s goals and objectives and in turn adjust its activities to align with that fresh 
understanding.  This proactivity in aligning towards the objectives of the principal 
contrasts vividly with the stereotypical Agency Theory conceptualisation of the agent 
continually acting opportunistically and diverging from the goals of the principal.  
Put simply, this research has positioned the proactivity of the steward on behalf of 
the principal as the key point of differentiation between the steward and the typical 
agent as conceptualised in the normative Agency Theory model. 
The steward’s continual realignment of its activities is highly important to 
the second thread of the findings, the strong requirement for cooperation and the 
achievement of collaboration, where that closer alignment was required.  Davis et al., 
(1997) in their seminal Stewardship Theory work had asserted that “…even when the 
interests of the steward and principal are not aligned, the steward places higher value 
on co-operation than defection” (p. 24).  In that way the cooperation feeds the 
alignment and the closer alignment facilitates the cooperation.  However the findings 
of the water system case studies, providing evidence as to partnership, cooperation 
and collaboration suggest that there is a need to further unpack the high-level 
conceptualisation of ‘cooperation’ and ‘cooperative behaviours’ which Davis et al., 
(1997) used as a counterpoint to ‘defection’ and ‘self-serving behaviours’. 
The terms cooperation, coordination and collaboration have typically been 
used interchangeably in the broader literature to describe a concerted effort to 
achieve common goals (Keast et al., 2007).  Yet Keast et al., (2007) distinguished 
between the terms bringing clear meaning to what are quite different activities 
directed at achieving quite different objectives.  Distinguishing between the terms is 
highly important, as according the same meaning will invariably obscure the concept 
intended by the informant or author. 
Having made specific the meaning of each term Keast et al., (2007) then 
placed each term along a continuum from cooperation, through coordination to 
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collaboration to depict the rising intensity of the integration of the activities of the 
parties to the relationship and the related concept of the degree of formality or 
(informality) that governs relationships.  The continuum adopted by Keast et al., 
(2007) is set out in Figure 6.1.  
Figure 6.1 Horizontal Integration Continuum 
 
Source: Keast et al., (2007) 
The power of this continuum is the rigor it brings to the differentiation 
between the meanings intended when terms are used, for example cooperation and 
collaboration.  Cooperation is defined by Keast et al., (2007) as being about taking 
others into consideration, compromising and being accommodating without 
necessarily adjusting individual goals.  Coordination is about bringing together 
independent parts into an ordered relationship to produce a whole characterised as a 
more enduring system of relationships between different components of a larger 
system.  Collaboration is a process through which parties who see different aspects 
of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that 
go beyond their limited vision of what is possible. 
Applying the Horizontal Integration Continuum to the case study findings 
the nature of the relationships in each case study can be understood and the 
behaviour of the agent can be established to inform the development of a definition 
of the organisation as steward.  The behaviour between the parties in each 
contractual relationship is depicted in Figure 6.2 by allocating each contractual 
relationship to the appropriate place on the continuum. 
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Figure 6.2 Relationships between parties to case study contracts 
 
In The Alliance, Joint Venture and BOOT case studies the relationships 
were more than cooperation, showing clear evidence of enduring systems of 
relationships characteristic of coordination and in limited instances, collaboration 
(Keast et al., 2007).  The BOOT concessions had the least coordination, with the 
relationships being characterised by each party carrying out their role with a 
relatively low level of integration with the other and the connections being formally 
structured and relatively few in number.  In contrast, the BOOT water research 
activities were depicted as intensely integrated with those of the principal with 
extensive connections between virtually all the staff involved, providing an example 
of close collaboration.  The relationships in the early alliances, where the 
relationships were configured in accordance with the normative Agency Theory 
model and at least one private company was found to have acted against the interests 
of the principal, had not proceeded far along the cooperation/collaboration 
continuum.  The relationships were cooperative but the ambition of coordination was 
not fully realised. 
This evidence from these case studies, and the continuum of behaviour 
established by Keast et al., (2007), both suggest the need to revisit the earlier use of 
the term ‘cooperative behaviours’ by Davis et al., (1997), who asserted “A steward 
will not substitute or trade self-serving behaviours for cooperative behaviours” (p. 
24).  In that context ‘cooperative’ is used as a counterpoint or contrast to ‘self-
serving’ and would be expected to encompass not only the meaning attributed by 
Keast et al., (2007) — that is, i.e. about being accommodating without necessarily 
adjusting individual goals — but also the sharing of goals characteristic of 
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Stewardship Theory behaviour (Davis et al., 1997; Van Slyke, 2007).  Coordination 
as defined by Keast et al., (2007) in the inter-organisation context, with its bringing 
together of independent parts to produce a whole characterised as a more enduring 
system of relationships, describes the water service case study relationships.  
Collaboration, where parties constructively explore their differences and search for 
solutions, describes the relationship between the members of The Alliance in the 
project to replace a sewer main and the ongoing research into improved drinking 
water treatment in the BOOT concessions.  In summary, the case studies clearly 
indicate that stewardship behaviour reflects a relationship which is characterised by, 
at the very least, coordination and in some circumstances collaboration, with 
cooperation alone not being a characteristic of stewardship behaviour. 
This research has found that the agents in the water case studies, by acting 
in the interests of the principal, displayed behaviours which go to the essence of an 
organisation that is a steward, notwithstanding that the contractual relationships were 
not configured in accordance with Stewardship Theory.  The behaviours 
encompassed the proactive alignment by the agent of its goals with those of the 
principal and the contribution to relationships which are characterised by 
coordination and sometimes collaboration with such behaviour always being more 
than mere cooperation.  For that reason, and to obviate any perception that behaviour 
at the level of cooperation in its own right amounts to stewardship behaviour, this 
thesis does not include the term ‘cooperation’ in the following definition.  This 
definition is developed to extend and better explain the seminal conceptualisation of 
stewardship established by Davis et al., (1997), that “…a steward’s behaviour will 
not depart from the interests of his or her organisation (the principal).” (p. 24).  In 
addition this definition explicates the reasonable expectation of organisations as 
stewards. 
Stewardship behaviour: 
The steward organisation acts in the interests of the principal, coordinating, 
or collaborating with the principal to achieve the goals and objectives of the 
principal.  The steward continually seeks to integrate the goals of the steward 
with those of the principal and will not act against the interests of the 
principal. 
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6.3 IMPORTANCE OF SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY 
In Section 2.4 Conclusion it was concluded that, of the factors that had been 
identified in Stewardship Theory (Van Slyke, 2007) as contributing to an agent 
acting as a steward, sense of responsibility was important to the steward acting in the 
interests of the principal and offered the possibility of being essential to stewardship 
behaviour.  If sense of responsibility were to be demonstrated as essential or highly 
important to there being stewardship behaviour then governments seeking better 
stewardship of critical infrastructures could require contractors to have that attribute 
and also focus on the actions which increase that sense of responsibility.  The 
literature in respect of sense of responsibility was found to be underdeveloped. 
This thesis first discusses how important sense of responsibility was in 
terms of the causal link between sense of responsibility and stewardship-like 
behaviour and identifies the impact of the findings as to the motivation of agents to 
act with a sense of responsibility upon Stewardship Theory and Agency Theory.  
Second, the findings are examined through a second lens: that of the principal, as 
there is a strong possibility that principals may, in certain circumstances consider that 
sense of responsibility is essential.  Third, this thesis then explore the unanticipated 
findings of the Stewardship Theory attribute sense of responsibility operating in 
relationships configured in accordance with Agency Theory. 
6.3.1 Causal link to stewardship 
This section first discusses the findings from all case studies as to the link 
between sense of responsibility and stewardship behaviour and develops conclusions 
as to the importance of sense of responsibility to there being stewardship behaviour.  
Then, the findings as to the nature of the motivation within agents to act with a sense 
of responsibility and factors which impacted on that motivation are analysed. 
The case studies where sense of responsibility was found are first considered, 
followed by the findings from the early alliances case study where sense of 
responsibility was inadequate will be discussed.  In The Alliance it was concluded 
that sense of responsibility was highly important to the stewardship of the water 
service.  Indeed it was reasoned that it would not have been possible for the private 
companies to have delivered the significant benefits that were demonstrated if the 
companies had not had a very strong sense of responsibility to the principal.  An 
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example was the difficult water mains project in an iconic shopping precinct 
conducted over several years.  If the companies had not continually acted with a 
sense of responsibility then various technical and community relations challenges 
would have been left unresolved and there would have been no stewardship of that 
part of the water service.  Whilst that line of reasoning would suggest that sense of 
responsibility was essential the extent of the evidence only supported a finding that 
sense of responsibility was ‘highly important’.  Similarly, the Joint Venture provided 
clear evidence of a very strong sense of responsibility but having regard to the 
strength of the evidence it was found that sense of responsibility was ‘highly 
important’ rather than essential.  The determination of whether sense of 
responsibility was essential to there being stewardship in the BOOT case studies 
proved more straightforward because of the criticality of the output.  The provision 
of safe drinking water is the inviolate goal of the principal.  Consideration of the 
sense of responsibility demonstrated by the operator of the large water filtration plant 
in response to the water contamination events drove the conclusion that it was 
essential that there be sense of responsibility to the principal on the part of the 
filtration plant operator for there to be stewardship of the drinking water. 
Turning to the case study where sense of responsibility was not found, the early 
alliances, there was not an adequate sense of responsibility to the principal.  Only 
limited stewardship was found.  The evidence which led to the finding that there was 
an inadequate sense of responsibility was primarily that of the State Corp. 
informants: the early alliances’ focus on the KPIs and not on customer service, and 
the RFP (2011) where the principal revealed publicly the defects in the early 
alliances’ contractual relationships.  The RFP (2011) shows that the principal has 
been prepared to say that the arrangements applying to the early alliances “…have 
not always encouraged a strong co-operative focus on business improvement” and 
that there was a “…lack of alignment of goals and objectives…and…collective 
responsibility for outcomes…”.  This thesis took the approach that this language was 
conveying the meaning that there was not a sense of responsibility and that that 
defect, and others, in the contractual arrangements had led to stewardship of the 
service not being achieved.  Further, the principal went on to spell out its ambition to 
achieve stewardship seeking “…further and ongoing business improvement in a way 
that maintains high standards of service within budgetary constraints (RFP, 2011, 
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p31).  This thesis concluded that this language was describing stewardship of the 
service but required an ongoing behaviour on the part of the new contracting 
company.  For that reason this thesis found that the government entity saw a very 
strong link between sense of responsibility to the principal and stewardship 
behaviour. 
Bringing those findings together The Alliance and Joint Venture provided 
evidence that sense of responsibility was highly important and the early alliance case 
study provided strong evidence that the dissatisfied principal was of the view that 
there was a very strong causal link between there not being a sense of responsibility 
and there not being stewardship behaviour.  The principal’s actions of abandoning 
the form of contractual relationship led to the finding that sense of responsibility was 
essential.  A further dimension to sense of responsibility was revealed in the BOOT 
water filtration case study where the finding was that because of the criticality of the 
outcome of the relationship, safe drinking water, there was a strong link between 
sense of responsibility and stewardship behaviour required of the agent companies — 
so strong that the attribute was judged essential. 
Having established that sense of responsibility was, at the least, highly 
important to stewardship behaviour the question then is what does this finding of 
such a strong causal link mean in the context of Stewardship and Agency theories.  
Stewardship Theorists, Davis et al., (1997), Dicke (2002) and Hernandez (2012) have 
established that there are both situational factors (structural aspects of the 
relationship and extrinsic rewards) and psychological factors (higher order needs and 
intrinsic rewards) which, if emphasised, increase the motivation of the agent to act as 
a steward.  This thesis continues that distinction between factors, examining first the 
structural arrangements and extrinsic rewards which operated once the contractual 
relationship had commenced and then the beliefs or values which were inherent 
within the individual or organisation before they entered into the contract. 
The findings that sense of responsibility was increased or impacted by the 
structure of the relationship and extrinsic rewards is congruent with (and further 
develops) the tenet of Stewardship Theory, that “…the performance of a steward is 
affected by whether the structural situation in which he or she is located facilitates 
effective action…Structures that facilitate and empower rather than those that 
monitor and control” (Davis et al., 1997, p. 25).  All The Alliance informants were 
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consistent in the view that the annually adjusted KPIs and linked financial incentives 
engendered sense of responsibility.  However, financial incentives and other extrinsic 
rewards as motivation for the agent to pursue the goals of the principal is a core tenet 
of Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), reinforcing the conclusion earlier in 
this thesis that The Alliance, which was characterised by highly structured 
performance indicators and rigorous monthly reporting against indicator targets, was 
configured in accordance with Agency Theory.  In the Joint Venture, the informants 
invariably explained that sense of responsibility was caused by, amongst other 
things, 50% ownership by the government entity and the Joint Venture’s tight 
alignment of its coverage with a single community.  In the early alliances the 
government entity had resolved that the private companies had displayed 
inappropriate behaviours driven by organisational characteristics, for example not 
being aligned with the government entity goals and not joining in a collective 
responsibility for outcomes.  The government entity adopted the structural remedies 
of mixing staff from both participants and increasing in the scope of the NG Alliance 
to include organisational elements of the government entity.  Many more structural 
factors which were found to impact upon sense of responsibility are discussed in 
Section 6.4 Actions to increase sense of responsibility. 
The findings as to the beliefs or values which were inherent within the 
individual or organisation before they entered into the contract built on the 
conceptualisation of Dicke (2002), that the steward has an internal sense of 
responsibility to the principal which is closely allied with an individual’s personal 
conscience, values or loyalty.  For Dicke (2002) this sense leads to the steward acting 
accountably and achieving the principal’s goals.  Other than the concept built by 
Dicke (2002), Stewardship Theorists have not, to date, explored the issue of whether 
stewards come to the relationship with a predisposition to act with a sense of 
responsibility.  Indeed Stewardship Theory (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012) 
focuses on the application of intrinsic rewards within the relationship, once 
established.  Similarly, Agency Theory has not contemplated the circumstances 
whereby an agent might enter the relationship with a predisposition to act with a 
sense of responsibility but rather has conceptualised the agent as not having a sense 
of responsibility to the principal. 
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The issue of whether agents or stewards enter the relationship with the 
capability and intent to act with a sense of responsibility is highly important, because 
if there was evidence that agents or stewards had been recruited with this 
responsibility attribute and behaved as a steward then government entities seeking to 
achieve stewardship could make future selections of organisations who possess that 
attribute. 
The evidence as to the organisations as agents having values and their own 
sense of responsibility was demonstrated most eloquently by The Alliance informant 
A5, who explained his company’s belief system as “…being honest, acting with 
integrity and making sure everything you do is genuinely for the best of the 
alliance…”.  For the BOOTs there was significant evidence that the two water 
filtration plant operators have conducted themselves with a strong sense of 
responsibility and that the companies are each driven by both a very strong sense of 
responsibility to the public as suppliers of safe drinking water and the jealous 
protection of their international reputations.  This sense of responsibility directed to 
the public was found to not conflict with sense of responsibility to the principal.  The 
concept of an organisation having an inherent sense of responsibility at the 
commencement of the contractual relationship was pivotal in the Joint Venture, 
where the informants attributed the very strong sense of responsibility of the Joint 
Venture being comprised of a critical mass of long-term water industry staff.  The 
staff had worked for the current government entity (and its predecessors) before all 
were transferred to the Joint Venture.  Evidence was put by the informants that the 
sense of responsibility of staff is directed not only to the principal but also to the 
local community.  In the early alliances, private company informant C6 revealed a 
strong personal sense of responsibility for providing a community’s water service (or 
to the water industry) as distinct from responsibility to the government entity.  This 
sense of responsibility directed to the community was found to support the agent 
having a sense of responsibility to the principal, as the individual employees within 
the water system demonstrated the internalised desire to protect the water system 
conceptualised by Hernandez (2012, p. 182) as “psychological ownership”.  
Hernandez (2012) believes this attribute or objective is the central function of the 
operation of stewardship behaviours within and across an organisation.  Accordingly, 
both the organisations and the employees which comprise the organisations 
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demonstrated a sense of responsibility which is driven by factors external to the 
contractual relationship.  The organisations brought to the relationship a sense of 
responsibility based on their company values and desire to protect the company 
reputation.  The individuals brought a sense of responsibility based on their prior 
experience of working in the water industry.  The broader impact upon sense of 
responsibility from the private company engaging employees with long-term 
experience in the water industry and from government contracting with private 
companies known to have a sense of responsibility is considered in greater detail 
later in this section. 
In summary, this thesis found that sense of responsibility was, at the very least, 
highly important to stewardship-like behaviour of the agents and that the motivation 
of the steward to act with a sense of responsibility could be attributed to a number of 
factors.  The factors fell into two groups: one, the structural arrangements and 
extrinsic rewards which operated once the contractual relationship had commenced; 
and the other, the beliefs or values which were inherent within the individual or 
organisation before they entered into the contract.  The structural arrangements, for 
example the mixing of staff from each party to the contract and the extrinsic rewards 
such as incentive payments linked to the achievement of KPI targets, provided clear 
evidence of how sense of responsibility can be promoted within a relationship where 
the agent or steward is a private company and the principal a government entity.  The 
findings that extrinsic rewards led to sense of responsibility to the principal are 
highly important to both Stewardship Theory and Agency Theory.  Proponents of 
Agency Theory had argued that the agent does not have a sense of responsibility and 
therefore requires controls and incentives, whereas proponents of Stewardship 
Theory had espoused that sense of responsibility was one of the key factors that 
promoted stewardship behaviour.  The absence of a case study where the relationship 
was configured in accordance with Stewardship Theory results in there being no 
empirical evidence to allow this thesis to directly go beyond the scope of the 
literature to date to establish findings in respect of the operation of sense of 
responsibility in the Stewardship Theory context.  Yet the rich data in respect of 
relationships configured in accordance with Agency Theory might be combined with 
the Stewardship Theory literature knowledge to establish propositions as to the 
operation of sense of responsibility in the Stewardship Theory context of the steward. 
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The findings that sense of responsibility to the principal can be possessed by 
the individual or organisation well before they enter into the contractual relationship 
built on the conceptualisation by Dicke (2002) and established a complement to the 
existing Stewardship Theory, which has to date focused on how sense of 
responsibility is engendered within an established contractual relationship (Davis et 
al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012).  This is highly important as individuals and 
organisations can be recruited against the criteria of sense of responsibility for the 
purpose of achieving better stewardship, irrespective of whether the contractual 
relationship is configured in accordance with Agency Theory or Stewardship Theory. 
This discussion has focused upon the importance of sense of responsibility to 
there being stewardship behaviour and upon the motivation within the steward to act 
with a sense of responsibility.  The next section discusses how important the 
principal considers sense of responsibility to be. 
6.3.2 Sense of responsibility from the principal’s perspective 
This section discusses how important it is to the principal that the agent or 
steward has a sense of responsibility to the principal. 
In The Alliance, the Joint Venture and the BOOT concessions stewardship of 
the service was achieved and the principals were found to have an unequivocal 
expectation that the agent have a sense of responsibility to the principal.  In The 
Alliance it was found that the contract documents both specified goals and objectives 
for the stewardship of the water service by way of the financial incentive system and 
set requirements as to the behaviour of the private participants which constituted 
sense of responsibility.  Contractual terms specifying that Alliance decisions be 
unanimous, ‘best for alliance’ and ‘for the benefit of all parties’ effectively position 
all participants, including the private companies, to act with a sense of responsibility 
to the principal.  Having regard to that evidence it was concluded that for the 
principal sense of responsibility was essential. 
In the Joint Venture it was reasoned that the principal having a 50% 
shareholding in the Joint Venture, and 50% membership of the JGB, was found to 
give the principal the motivation and means to require sense of responsibility.  
Having regard to the literature (Professor, 2008) and the informant data it was found 
that the principal through these governance arrangements did ensure that the agent 
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acted with a sense of responsibility to the principal and that this sense of 
responsibility to the principal was, from the perspective of the principal, essential. 
The BOOT case study revealed an imperative as to why a principal might 
mandate that the steward have a sense of responsibility: the criticality of the output 
of the contract.  No evidence was presented that the BOOT contracts specified 
principles as to decision-making or allowed the principal to specify the behaviour 
required of the private companies as was found in The Alliance and the Joint 
Venture.  Rather the contracts were focused on outputs, albeit to a highly specified 
quality.  Yet the informants, literature and archival documents revealed an all-
pervading focus upon the drinking water being safe.  A very strong sense of 
responsibility to providing that safe drinking water to the principal was found and it 
was reasoned that the participant could not carry out the purpose of the contract 
without having a sense of responsibility to the principal.  It was found that in the safe 
drinking water instance it was essential that there be a sense of responsibility on the 
part of the private companies.  This thesis reasons that this finding could be applied 
to contractual relationships where the output had a similar criticality; that is, that the 
principal would not select an agent or steward which might not act with a sense of 
responsibility, nor would the principal accept an agent or steward not acting with a 
sense of responsibility. 
This finding that for the water service principals the agent having a sense of 
responsibility to the principal was so important that it was essential does not of itself 
inform the question of whether sense of responsibility is important (or essential) to 
there being stewardship.  However, in each of the case studies where it was 
concluded that sense of responsibility was essential to the principal it was found that 
there was also stewardship-like behaviour.  It follows then that there was a very 
strong causal link between the principal requiring that the agent have a sense of 
responsibility and there being stewardship behaviour on the part of the agent. 
It is probable then, that as a minimum the requirement by the principal that the 
agent have a sense of responsibility has resulted in agents being selected who 
brought to the contractual relationship a sense of responsibility and who continued to 
have that sense of responsibility to the principal.  This probability is supported by the 
actions of the government entity in the early alliances case study of formally advising 
candidate proponents for the single NG Alliance (RFP, 2011) that the suitability of 
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proposals would, amongst other things, be assessed upon evidence as to the 
candidate’s nominated staff having the behaviours necessary to make the alliance 
relationship work. As discussed earlier in this thesis there was strong evidence that 
State Corp. had concluded that there was a strong causal link between there not being 
sense of responsibility and there not being the appropriate behaviour — stewardship 
behaviour — on the part of the private companies.  State Corp. abandoned the use of 
the early alliance form of relationship which had not demonstrated a sense of 
responsibility, signalling that for State Corp. sense of responsibility was essential. 
Having established that it is probable that for the principal responsible for 
critical infrastructures sense of responsibility on the part of the agent or steward is 
essential this thesis sought to position this finding in the literature.  Dicke (2002) had 
focused on whether an agent’s sense of responsibility and shared value sets could be 
a foundation for the development of accountability methods internal to an 
organisation, not focusing on the requirements of the principal.  Similarly, 
Hernandez (2012) examined both the actions which influence sense of responsibility 
and also the operation of sense of responsibility as an antecedent of stewardship 
behaviour.  Hernandez (2012), like other Stewardship Theorists, took the perspective 
that stewardship behaviour is a desirable objective, and did not address the 
requirements of the principal.  The absence of a case study where the relationship 
was configured in accordance with Stewardship Theory means that there can be no 
findings in respect of the principal’s requirement as to sense of responsibility in the 
Stewardship Theory context.  However, there may be significant learnings from the 
case study relationships configured in accordance with Agency Theory that can 
translate to the Stewardship Theory context.  In Agency Theory sense of 
responsibility as a requirement of the principal has not been specifically addressed, 
but rather Agency Theory assumes that the agent does not have sense of 
responsibility and prescribes controls and incentives.  Thus Agency Theory has not, 
to date, established an expectation that the agent will possess the attribute of sense of 
responsibility.  Yet the evidence from the case studies is that it is highly probable 
that for the principal responsible for critical infrastructures sense of responsibility is 
essential, extending Agency Theory and raising the strong possibility that in the 
context of relationships configured in accordance with Stewardship Theory it is 
similarly highly probable that the attribute is essential. 
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In summary, sense of responsibility has been found to be seen by principals 
responsible for critical infrastructures as essential.  In each of the contractual 
relationships where sense of responsibility was found to be essential there was 
stewardship-like behaviour on the part of the agent.  It was concluded that in those 
case studies it was probable that the requirement by the principal had resulted in 
contractors possessing a sense of responsibility being selected and, in turn, 
stewardship-like behaviour demonstrated.  Importantly, sense of responsibility was 
found to be an a attribute against which candidate contractual participants can be 
selected, which in turn demonstrates that sense of responsibility is an attribute which 
the candidate organisation may bring to the relationship.  This finding supports the 
conceptualisation by Dicke (2002) of sense of responsibility as a sense internal to the 
individual. 
These findings that sense of responsibility is both highly important to there 
being stewardship behaviour and is an attribute that critical infrastructure principals 
consider essential direct the thesis towards exploring whether sense of responsibility 
has more than a strong causal link to there being stewardship behaviour, to explore 
whether it is a fundamental element of stewardship behaviour. 
6.3.3 Sense of responsibility as an Agency Theory behaviour 
This thesis initially sought to understand whether sense of responsibility was so 
important to stewardship behaviour that it is a fundamental element of stewardship 
behaviour.  This course was taken because the Stewardship Theory literature (Davis 
et al., 1997, Van Slyke, 2007) asserted both that the attribute sense of responsibility 
was one of the pro-stewardship factors which, if emphasised would cause 
stewardship behaviour, and that the typical Agency Theory agent acts with self-
interest and does not have a sense of responsibility to the principal.  The 
unanticipated findings of this research were that the Stewardship Theory attribute 
(sense of responsibility) operated in case studies configured in accordance with 
Agency Theory.  As there was no case study configured in accordance with 
Stewardship Theory the findings redirected the course of the research toward 
understanding the operation of this Stewardship Theory attribute in relationships 
configured in accordance with Agency Theory. 
The findings were that there was a sense of responsibility to the principal and 
stewardship-like behaviour in three case studies and in the fourth, the early alliances, 
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stewardship behaviour was not displayed, nor was there an adequate sense of 
responsibility to the principal.  This evidence led to the conclusion that there is a 
strong causal link between sense of responsibility and stewardship-like behaviour.  
Revisiting the findings as to the early alliances not evidencing stewardship behaviour 
this conclusion was reached having regard to both informant data and data from the 
RFP (2011) for proposals to replace the early alliances.  The evidence encompassed 
at least one private company acting against the interests of the principal and a lack of 
alignment of goals and lack of collective responsibility involving both early 
alliances. 
This thesis then contemplated the alternate scenario, where the early alliance 
private companies acted with the same sense of responsibility as was evidenced in 
the three other case studies and speculated whether that change would lead to the 
stereotypical Agency Theory attributes, for example divergent goals or self-
interested behaviours being replaced with stewardship behaviours or stewardship-
like behaviours.  It is reasoned that a sense of responsibility would preclude 
behaviour such as the companies acting against the interests of the principal, rather 
the companies would act in the interests of the principal and align their goals with 
those of the principal.  This reasoning runs counter to conventional Agency Theory 
prescriptions but is consistent with the Agency Theory model where the goals of the 
principal and agent are aligned (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
This finding that sense of responsibility to the principal can be displayed by 
agents in a contractual relationship configured in accordance with an Agency Theory 
model demonstrates that this attribute is possessed by both agents and stewards. 
In summary, this thesis had identified from the Stewardship and Agency 
Theory literature that there was a strong possibility that sense of responsibility was 
so important to stewardship behaviour that it would be the attribute which 
distinguishes the steward from the agent.  Yet the finding from the case studies was 
that sense of responsibility to the principal can be displayed by agents in an Agency 
Theory relationship, showing that the sense of responsibility attribute is possessed by 
both agents and stewards.  Clearly there can be no distinction between the two 
theories on this attribute, suggesting the possibility for Stewardship Theory that 
sense of responsibility may be no more than one of several factors which contributes 
to stewardship behaviour.  Having established the importance of sense of 
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responsibility to the achievement of stewardship-like behaviour this thesis now 
discusses the findings as to the actions which impact on sense of responsibility with 
the objective of understanding how stewardship of infrastructures can be maximised. 
6.4 ACTIONS TO INCREASE SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY 
The case studies revealed actions which increased or supported the sense of 
responsibility of the agent.  The discussion of all the findings as to the importance of 
sense of responsibility has focused those findings into four strands: configuration of 
ownership and governance of the steward entity, ensuring suitable participants, clear 
contractual outcomes and incentives to private participants.  These strands of actions 
are now analysed to understand their impact upon sense of responsibility. 
6.4.1 Configuration of ownership and governance 
The action taken by governments to configure the ownership and in turn the 
governance arrangements was found in the case studies to have had the greatest 
impact upon sense of responsibility when compared to other factors.  This section 
first examines the interrelated matters of ownership of the water system and the 
configuration of the entities which carried out the O&M roles and in some cases 
capital works.  The governance arrangements and the decision-making rules applied 
by the governing body are then discussed. 
Ownership of the steward entity was prominent in the findings of The Alliance, 
Joint Venture, and BOOT case studies as a foundation decision on which many of the 
other attributes which contributed to sense of responsibility are dependent.  Yet in 
each case study ownership was approached from very different perspectives, 
providing several options as to ownership which promoted sense of responsibility. 
With The Alliance the government entity entered into a 10-year contract with a 
consortium of private companies for O&M and capital works plus works for third 
parties in the name of the government entity.  There is no jointly owned entity, but 
rather a virtual organisation, The Alliance, and an alliance contract that specifies the 
terms of the alliance, for example the three parties each carry out the work 
themselves with the private companies being reimbursed their actual costs, and being 
paid margins plus rewards based on performance.  The relationship was configured 
in a typical modern alliance form — that is, risk was allocated to the participant best 
able to bear the risk, each participant entity contributed a significant number of 
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employees, there is a ‘no-blame’ clause in the contract and all transactions are 
transparent, and costs and gains are shared between the parties — satisfying the 
criteria for a true alliance (Davies, 2008) — which in turn falls within the ‘partial 
divestiture’ category established by Rees (1998).  Yet the ownership of the water 
system remained with the government entity.  The government entity chose this 
alliance form of contractual relationship with the objective, amongst other things, of 
ensuring a sense of responsibility on the part of the private participants.  This 
approach to ownership allowed the merging of employees from the three entities into 
a single ‘privatised’ business which achieved stewardship.  The Alliance is an 
example of successful stewardship through privatisation without government 
ownership of the infrastructure being surrendered. 
The Joint Venture ownership arrangements were created in response to intense 
public opposition to the divestment and privatisation of the water system (Professor, 
2008).  Tellingly, the public at the same time accepted the privatisation of electricity 
infrastructure with the sale of electricity assets to a private company (which later sold 
half its share to a second private company). Two joint venture partnerships were 
established (one for distribution and one for retail sales), resulting in the government 
entity owning 50% of each partnership and two unrelated international utilities 
companies each own 50% of one of the partnerships.  The two joint ventures trade 
under one business name and each is governed by the same board.  The government 
entity has entered into a 20-year contract with the two joint venture partnerships for 
the O&M of the government-owned water system.  This joint venture form of 
contractual relationship was found to be particularly suited to achieving sense of 
responsibility and in turn stewardship of the infrastructure, and gaining the benefits 
of privatisation without government having to surrender ownership of the water 
infrastructure. 
In the BOOT case study the government decided that ownership of the water 
filtration plants by government was not essential and gave greater weight to the 
benefits of the agent fully owning the infrastructure; that is, significant savings by 
way of the specialist expertise and the self-interest of an owner and operator ensuring 
the best possible design and construction of the plants.  In addition the government 
placed the capital raising and financial viability risks with the private sector.  Unlike 
the previously discussed case studies the government never owned the infrastructures 
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nor did it own a part of the steward entity.  Yet there was a strong sense of 
responsibility to the principal on the part of the two private plant operators.  Whilst 
demonstrating that this BOOT model was very successful in supporting a strong 
sense of responsibility and achieving stewardship of a key element of a water system 
the scope of the case study provided no data to allow consideration of whether this 
BOOT model could be applied to the wider water service. 
Governance arrangements involving board membership and including 
decision-making rules for the board were found to require sense of responsibility on 
the part of the steward entity.  In The Alliance and the Joint Venture the agents 
displayed a strong sense of responsibility and were managed by strong governance 
arrangements, with each principal taking the perspective that it was essential that the 
agent have a sense of responsibility to the principal.  In The Alliance governance is 
achieved by way of a four-member alliance governance board of which the principal 
has two members, one of which is the chair.  In the Joint Venture the principal has 
50% membership of the governing board, and has appointed members from within its 
own board.  Of these three members one is the chair of both the agent and principal 
entities and another is also managing director of the principal entity.  The evidence 
was that in both cases the principal, through these governance arrangements, ensured 
that the agent acted with a sense of responsibility to the principal. 
Intertwined with the governance board arrangements are rules as to decision-
making which the relevant principals stipulated by way of the formal contracts and 
agreements.  In The Alliance the evidence was that contractual requirements that all 
parties ensure the highest standards of probity, full transparency of all financial and 
operational matters, and decisions of The Alliance governance board be unanimous 
and ‘best for alliance’ fostered a sense of responsibility on the part of the agent.  In 
the Joint Venture the overarching agreement requires that all six Joint Venture Board 
members (including the three representatives of the two private companies) exercise 
their powers “in the best interests of the partnerships as a whole” (Professor, 2008, p. 
335). 
These decision-making rules, together with strong governance control through 
membership of the governing board, offer examples of contractual terms which the 
principal can stipulate with a strong likelihood of achieving sense of responsibility 
on the part of the agent. 
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The finding is that sense of responsibility can be increased and supported by 
choices as to the ownership and governance of the entity that carries out the 
privatised O&M of the infrastructure.  The data that supports that finding revealed a 
significant use of formal risk assessments which led to government retaining 
ownership of the water infrastructure (The Alliance, the Joint Venture water system, 
the early alliances) OR not retaining ownership of the water infrastructure (the 
BOOTs, the Joint Venture electricity infrastructure).  This choice of ownership was 
found to be one of the ways risks were allocated to the various parties to the contract, 
with the agents in each case demonstrating a significant appetite for risk.  This 
finding showed that the Agency Theory assumption that the agent is risk averse does 
not apply in the context of the agent being a substantial commercial organisation.  In 
all, a risk-based consideration of the options as to ownership of infrastructure and the 
entity that operates the system has a high probability of identifying a form of 
ownership which promotes sense of responsibility and achieves stewardship of the 
service. 
6.4.2 Suitability of private and government participants 
Whilst the focus of this thesis has largely been upon the behaviour of the agent 
or steward the suitability of the government entity and its employees emerged from 
the data as a factor which impacted upon the sense of responsibility of the agent and 
in turn the opportunity for the agent to apply that sense of responsibility to achieve 
stewardship.  For that reason this thesis next examines the attributes of the private 
participants in the privatisations and, in turn, the attributes of the government entity, 
which impact on the agent’s sense of responsibility. 
6.4.2.1 Suitability of private participants 
Key to understanding how the suitability of private participants drives or 
delivers agents who bring a sense of responsibility to the contractual relationship is 
to recognise that the principals, in allocating risk and choosing private participants 
against criteria to address those water system risks, have effectively made eligible 
only large, invariably international, companies.  This section first discusses the way 
in which risk considerations impacted on the perspective as to the suitability of 
participants.  Second, the attributes of the private companies which contribute to 
sense of responsibility, first reputation, then importance of brand and then employee 
experience in the water industry, are discussed. 
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The risks addressed by the principals resulted from the scale of operations, 
specialist capability and the substantial size of funding required to operate and to 
maintain an urban water service.  The standout example was the BOOT water 
filtration plants where the contract not only required the technical skills to operate 
the plant but also technical skills to construct the plant and substantial capital to fund 
construction and ongoing ownership.  Another example of risk consideration is The 
Alliance government entity which obtained legal advice about how risk is treated 
within an alliance and addressed these in the configuration of The Alliance and the 
contractual terms (Auditor-General, 2010).  Similarly, in the early alliances case 
study the government entity evaluated all the available models having regard to the 
different risk scenarios (Development Bank, 2007) and chose the early alliances 
configuration acknowledging itself as having poor employee management skills and 
the private sector as strong in employee management.  The impetus for the 
government entity in the Joint Venture case study contracting with large, 
international companies was the government apprehending the risk inherent in the 
then upcoming unavoidable participation in the national energy market.  Thus the 
risk to government as a small non-generator electricity supplier drove it to contract 
with an Australia-wide energy company (Professor, 2008) who has subsequently sold 
its share in the distribution partnership to an international utilities company. 
In all but one case study the selection of a suitable private participant to 
address these risks resulted in a specialist technical international company being 
chosen which was found to dictate many of the non-technical attributes — 
reputation, brand and employee water industry experience — which impacted 
positively on the sense of responsibility of the private participants.  However, before 
moving to consider the impact of those attributes upon sense of responsibility the 
opportunity should be taken to compare these findings as to the agent contracting to 
accept risks against the Agency Theory assumptions that agents are risk averse and 
that the principal suffers agency loss when contracting with another party 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The evidence that agents contract to accept risks that the principal is not 
prepared to accept directly challenges the Agency Theory (Davis et al., 1997; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976) assumption that the agent is risk averse.  The acceptance of those 
risks by the agents, albeit large, well-funded specialist technical organisations, 
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demonstrates that the reality of the principal/agent relationship where the agent is a 
successful commercial organisation is that the agent is not risk averse.  The Agency 
Theory and Stewardship Theory literature has, to date, not directly explored appetite 
for risk of agents who are for-profit organisations, but rather the literature has 
focused upon the behaviour of the individual as agent (Davis et al., 1997; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  In these water system case studies the agents are highly technically 
specialised and very large companies, suggesting that the Agency Theory assumption 
that agents are risk averse is incorrect in the context of organisations contracted to 
government to operate privatised critical infrastructure.  Accordingly, the Agency 
Theory assumption that the agent is risk averse is found to not apply in the context of 
the agent being a commercial organisation.  These findings point governments in the 
direction of adopting models of contractual relationships which allow and support the 
allocation of risk to the extent that the private company has the appetite and 
capability to accept the risk. 
The second Agency Theory assumption to be challenged by the case study 
findings is that of agency loss; agency loss being where the agent is assumed to never 
be able to carry out the task as well as the principal could if the principal itself had 
done the task and that an additional element of agency cost is thus incurred 
(Donaldson, 1990).  The case study evidence was of the principals relying on agents 
who are more highly skilled and performed better than the principal.  This better 
performance was confirmed by independent assessors, for example the Auditor-
General (Auditor-General, 2010) in The Alliance and the Development Bank 
(Development Bank, 2007) in the early alliances.  Thus the early Agency Theory 
assumption of agency loss has been found to not apply to these water system 
privatisations and most likely in the broader circumstances of the agent being 
engaged because of their specialised knowledge and capability.  Further, it is highly 
unlikely that Agency Theory scholars (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) anticipated their 
assumption of agency loss to be tested in the context of an inter-sector contractual 
relationship in an era where the state, as principal in contractual relationships with 
private sector or third sector entities, will be ‘hollowed out’ (Rhodes, 1994), being 
left without itself having the required skills. 
Having discussed the impact of the risk-driven selection of agents who are 
large international organisations this thesis now turns to the impact of attributes of 
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those organisations which were found to impact positively on sense of responsibility.  
The discussion first examines the importance of reputation, then the impact of brand, 
followed by employee experience in the water industry. 
The private company continually seeking to protect its reputation, and its 
desire to enhance its reputation, was seen by the private company informants to 
impact very strongly on the sense of responsibility of the company.  This strategy on 
the part of the private companies was consistent with the position taken by Fombrun 
(1996) in his seminal reputation management work, in which he argued that by 
developing strong and consistent images well regarded companies create hidden 
assets that give them a distinct competitive advantage.  Fombrun (1996) established 
‘six pillars’ of reputation to which the organisation should pay attention, and against 
which it can be measured.  Two of the pillars are ‘emotional appeal’ and ‘products 
and services’.  It would appear that the private companies acting with a sense of 
responsibility are seeking to address those two pillars. 
The importance of the reputation of the large filtration plant company 
following the contamination events was a dominant theme in the data, with the 
findings being that the principal was protected by the operator being intensely 
motivated to ensure that safe drinking water was seen to be provided — to maintain 
its international reputation for providing safe drinking water.  In The Alliance the 
enhancement of the reputation of the two private participants was found to be a key 
motivator for the private company participants to continually take decisions that 
demonstrated a strong sense of responsibility to the government entity.  The private 
company informants reasoned that acting with a sense of responsibility to the 
principal would also lead to their gaining additional work, both with the principal 
and with third parties by way of a business reference from the principal.  Whilst no 
evidence was found that the principals selected agents against a specific ‘reputation’ 
criteria or managed the contractual relationship by threatening or enhancing the 
reputation of the agent (Van Slyke, 2007) it was reasoned that the government entity 
principals would benefit from contracting with an organisation which had a 
particularly strong motivation to protect its reputation and would continually assist 
the agent company to enhance its reputation.  This finding is consistent with the 
findings of Van Slyke (2007) that “…large providers view reputation enhancement 
as a reward and one that can lead to positive externalities.” (p. 177). 
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The branding of the entity providing the privatised services emerged as a 
device to achieve sense of responsibility on the part of the steward entity (or 
negatively impact that sense of responsibility), but with divergent approaches to the 
use of the concept of brand being equally successful.  The governance board of The 
Alliance suppressed the existing brands of the three alliance participants, including 
that of the government entity, and created a new single brand.  That new single brand 
was presented to the public on client accounts, signage and uniforms and was found 
to be a strategy which drew employees from the three entities together in common 
identification with that brand, leading to a sense of responsibility on the part of those 
employees.   
The brand name of the Joint Venture is a combination of that of the 
government entity and the first of the two private participants.  Because the Joint 
Venture also retails electricity and electricity is a genuine competitive market it has 
been necessary to aggressively develop the brand, much more than would be 
necessary for a monopoly provider of water services.  The employees identified 
strongly with the brand and the informants asserted that this identification with the 
brand of the organisation led to the employees having a strong sense of responsibility 
to the principal.  This conceptualisation was tested against the broader literature.  It 
was found to align closely with the prescriptions of Social Identity Theory (Ashforth 
& Mael, 1989) in respect of identification with the organisation.  In respect to the 
benefits to the organisation from the resultant state of commitment/sense of 
responsibility in the Joint Venture case study this is strongly supported by the 
Organisational Commitment literature as helpfully summarised by Mathieu and 
Zajac (1990).  It would appear that this identification with the brand of the 
organisation is reinforcing the sense of responsibility to the Joint Venture, 
established by factors such as past employment by the predecessors of the Joint 
Venture, dedication to the water sector, and close alignment with the local 
community. 
In the BOOTs the private operators continued to trade under their respective 
company’s brand, yet each of the two companies and their employees were found to 
have a strong sense of responsibility to the government entity.  In the early alliances 
the government entity required that the brand names of the two private operating 
companies be displayed smaller than the accompanying brand or logo of the 
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government entity.  This decision, together with the early alliances being provided 
with accommodation of a much lower standard than that provided to government 
entity employees on the same site, were found to have likely diminished the sense of 
responsibility to the government entity.  Accordingly, the evidence is that the clarity 
and inherent reputation of the brand contribute to the employees of the agent entity 
having a sense of responsibility, suggesting that the continual enhancement of a 
brand is an initiative which will increase the sense of responsibility of the agent 
organisation. 
The theme of employees having long-term experience in the water sector 
was found in all case studies other than the BOOTs and was found to have 
contributed strongly to the sense of responsibility.  The informants characterised the 
long-term water employees as dedicated and loyal to the water service and the 
government entity, depicting a career in the water industry as a calling which was 
accompanied by a commitment to the employer, the water system and the 
community.  This characterisation is supported by the organisational commitment 
literature (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990); Meyer & Allen, 2007).  However, the empirical 
research of Duffy, Bott, Allan, Torrey, and Dik (2012) found only a moderate 
correlation between the individual’s perception of a calling and job commitment, 
suggesting that it would be prudent to conduct further research into the contribution 
of an industry ‘calling’ to commitment or sense of responsibility in the critical 
infrastructures sector.  The principals used differing arrangements to intentionally 
position employees with experience of the water service in the privatised entity.  In 
The Alliance a third of the positions were held by current government entity 
employees.  This allowed the government entity to retain the capability to operate the 
system within its own staff and grew the sense of responsibility of The Alliance 
employees to the government entity.  The Joint Venture is the only water industry 
employer in the region and all but 30 government entity employees were unilaterally 
seconded to the Joint Venture.  When the early alliances were established all ‘day 
labour’ O&M employees were transferred into either of two service companies, each 
one owned by the successful alliance operator company.  The finding across The 
Alliance, Joint Venture and early alliances case studies was that much of the current 
sense of responsibility to the government entity on the part of individual employees 
could be attributed to the remaining core of past government entity employees and 
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those current government entity employees who are imbedded in the agent 
organisation. 
The learning then is that the sense of responsibility of the agent organisation 
is impacted by the reputation the agent brings to the relationship, the identification 
by employees with the brand under which the agent delivers services and the 
workforce of the agent organisation having a significant proportion of long-term 
water service staff.  If the government entity selects an agent company that relies on 
its reputation to obtain future and ongoing work in the government entity’s industry 
and the contract puts that reputation at risk if the contract outcomes are not delivered 
then the government entity can leverage reputation enhancement and risk to 
reputation to ensure that the agent company acts with a sense of responsibility.  
Focusing on a single, clear brand, be it the brand of the contracting private company 
or a brand created for the new entity, was found to enhance the sense of 
responsibility of employees of the agent organisation.  The employment of past 
government entity employees by the agent entity, or seconding current government 
entity employees into the agent organisation was found to increase sense of 
responsibility to the water service and government entity on the part of individual 
employees. 
6.4.2.2 Suitability of government entities 
Evidence that the capability of the government entity and its employees 
(who interface with the privatised operations) has a direct impact on the ability of the 
agents to act with a sense of responsibility to the principal was provided by 
informants in all four case studies.  The findings settled into two themes: the 
government entity and its employees not recognising that the privatised activities 
were legitimate operations of the government entity; and the need for the government 
organisation to be structured and resourced to interface effectively with the 
privatisation. 
The government entity and its employees not recognising that the privatised 
activities were legitimate operations of the government entity was offered by both 
government entity informants and private company informants in the early alliances 
case study as impacting adversely on the sense of responsibility on the part of the 
agent entities.  The evidence was that at the inter-organisational level the government 
entity’s focus was upon cost reduction as distinct from stewardship of the service and 
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service to the customer.  Similarly, it was found that the private companies focused 
upon KPIs and the resultant bonus rather than quality of service to the customer.  In 
addition there was evidence that human resource policy and practice on topics such 
as entitlements and discipline were distinctly more favourable for government entity 
staff.  The limited evidence at the interpersonal level was that a sufficient number of 
government entity employees did not cooperate nor coordinate, let alone collaborate, 
with the employees of the private companies.  Rather, the private informants 
portrayed the government entity employees as evidencing distrust and seeking to 
exercise control beyond that which the private company informants judged to be 
contemplated in the contract.  Such distrust and disposition to excessive control 
suggests an Agency Theory perspective on the part of the government entity 
employees and is consistent with the prescriptions attaching to the underlying 
traditional management contracts underlying the early alliances.  The principal 
acknowledged shortcomings of the management contracts and increased the scope of 
the replacement alliance to minimise the interfaces between the alliance and the 
government entity (RFP, 2011).  The private company informants put forward this 
then current behaviour on the part of the government entity and its employees as 
blocking or suppressing their preparedness to act with a sense of responsibility. 
Whilst the attribution of certain Agency Theory prescriptions to the 
government entity and its employees may assist to understand why such an approach 
was taken there remains the matter of why an Agency Theory relationship was not 
effective in managing the early alliances which were traditional contracts.  It was 
found that it was highly possible that there was a deficiency in the capability of the 
government entity to manage contracts generally, and specifically that the 
outsourcing of the day-to day operation of the water service to the early alliances had 
resulted in there being inadequate knowledge of the system on the part of the 
government entity staff managing the contract.  In contrast, in the BOOT case study 
it was found that the capability of the government entity to manage those water 
filtration contracts was highly effective and that this capability on the part of the 
principal, with its balance of monitoring and collaboration, assisted the steward 
companies to act with a sense of responsibility.  This capability was widely 
established in the government entity with extensive outsourcing and close 
management of procurement and well-resourced contract management.  These 
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findings are highly important to the achievement of stewardship and are directly 
aligned with the tenets of the contract management literature.  Kelman (2002, p. 90) 
established the concept of the administration of contracts as the ‘neglected stepchild’ 
of contract management.  Brown and Potoski (2003) in their comparative study of 
US local governments found that the purposeful investment in the capability and 
capacity to manage contracts did achieve improved contract performance.  For that 
reason all principals entering into privatisation contracts must consider investment in 
an appropriate contract management capacity or anticipate a high likelihood of 
failure. 
 Sense of responsibility of the private participants was found to be impacted 
on strongly by both their own suitability and the suitability of the government 
participant and its own employees.  In all case studies but the early alliances the 
government entity informants evidenced a consistent approach of developing the 
relationship by continual investment in the alignment of goals, obvious trust and 
abundant respect.  The perspective taken by the government entity informants 
reflected Stewardship Theory prescriptions.  For the private company informants the 
dedication to the improvement of the water system, the evidence as to continual 
adjustment of activities to accord with the latest goals and objectives of the 
government entity, and the sentiment of responsibility to the principal showed that 
their conceptualisation of their own role was consistent with Stewardship Theory 
principles.  Yet those stewardship-like behaviours were achieved by a relationship 
configured in accordance with Agency Theory prescriptions.  The perspective taken 
by the participants in the early alliances (which were found to be traditional 
contracts) was less clear, with the private company informants demonstrating 
predominantly stewardship-like behaviours and the government entity having a 
traditional Agency Theory perspective to the early alliances.  There was some 
evidence (possibly topic specific and not universal) of its employees taking a high 
control, low trust Agency Theory conceptualisation of the relationship.  Taken 
overall the findings from The Alliance, the Joint Venture and the BOOTs were that 
the private participants had conceptualised their role as a steward, and continually 
displayed stewardship-like behaviour.  The government participants also 
conceptualised the relationship from a Stewardship Theory perspective, 
distinguishing these findings as to inter-organisational relationships from those of 
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Van Slyke (2007), where not-for-profit executive directors were found to be 
predisposed to adopt Stewardship Theory perspectives but the public managers were 
predisposed to adopt Agency Theory prescriptions. 
6.4.3 Clear contractual outcomes 
In each case study the roles, outputs and the outcome of the contractual 
relationship were exceptionally clear and in each case study the finding was that this 
clarity or certainty caused the agent entities to act with a sense of responsibility.  The 
clarity was established by a number of factors: the highly specified nature of the 
outputs, for example drinking water or treated waste water; the very public scrutiny 
and comparison of performance; the very high level of shared information; and the 
regular adjustment of performance targets and related incentive payments.  The high 
level of specification of outputs and the publishing of data as to water quality and 
performance by the National Water Commission, as well as the scrutiny by 
independent regulators, have been examined elsewhere in this thesis.  This section of 
the thesis discusses the very high level of shared information and how it impacts on 
an agent’s sense of responsibility, followed by the way in which regular adjustment 
of performance targets and monthly reporting positively impact sense of 
responsibility. 
The sharing of information had as a foundation the data required by contract 
terms specified by each principal and also information which was shared on an 
interpersonal basis.  The principals were driven by reporting requirements set by 
external bodies, their ongoing long-term responsibility for the infrastructure, and 
their immediate responsibility for achieving value for money from public monies.  
All case studies evidenced the sharing of real-time data as to the performance of key 
plant.  In the three case studies which achieved stewardship of the water systems the 
unconstrained sharing of information was facilitated by highly professional 
organisational interfaces that had been established to provide governance, contract 
management and communication between the principal and the agent.  Because the 
principal (or predecessor) had been custodian of the water service the principals were 
able to provide the private entities with highly detailed historical data as to 
significant equipment and performance, for example raw water characteristics.  In all 
four case studies the principal had all the information they required and the agents 
 230 Chapter 6: Discussion 
were not disadvantaged in respect of any information, indicating that information 
symmetry had been achieved. 
These findings of information symmetry upset the Agency Theory paradigm of 
information asymmetry, strongly suggesting that, at least in the context of industries 
such as urban water services or similar major infrastructures, a more accurate 
conceptualisation of the contractual relationship is one where there is sufficient 
information for both parties to carry out their roles without the inefficiency of 
additional controls or distrust caused by an information disadvantage. 
The ready sharing of information that characterises information symmetry 
underpinned the regular adjustment of performance targets, monthly reporting and, in 
three of the four case studies, incentive payments based on that reporting.  Whilst 
information symmetry was found in the four case studies, sense of responsibility was 
found only in The Alliance, Joint Venture and BOOTs.  The finding in each of those 
case studies was that these arrangements positively impacted sense of responsibility 
through the regular negotiation and resetting of contractual expectations in the 
operational terms applicable to the employees whose responsibility it was to achieve 
the target outcome.  For example, in The Alliance the most recent resetting of 
performance indicator targets led to more focus on safety and less focus on 
community; less focus on innovation, and more focus on timely delivery of projects.  
In the Joint Venture the contract specifies about 160 services, the majority of which 
have specific quantified targets. 
This finding of a causal link between clarity of objectives for the agents and 
their acting with a sense of responsibility to the principal resonates with the Agency 
Theory tenet of the need for tight control and incentives driven by closely specified 
contractual goals.  Yet the question is whether this constitutes a strong causal link.  
In the early alliances case study where the relationship was found to be configured in 
accordance with Agency Theory prescriptions there was a comparable scheme of 
KPIs, yet it was concluded that there was not an adequate sense of responsibility.  
Specifically the finding that sense of responsibility was not adequate was reached 
because of significant corroborated evidence that at least one of the private 
companies continually focused on a literal interpretation for the alleged purpose of 
increasing bonus payments rather than taking a customer service perspective and 
acting with a sense of responsibility to the principal. 
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In The Alliance, Joint Venture and BOOTs there was a very clear specification 
of objectives and the sense of responsibility to the principal was in each case very 
strong.  The arrangements which were found to create clarity of objectives for the 
purpose of achieving efficiency within the contractual relationship, the long term of 
the contracts, and intense measurement and frequent reporting from the agent, are 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The long terms of the contracts, for example 10 or 20 years offered the 
possibility of outcomes set at the commencement of the contract not remaining 
relevant, nor clear as the term progressed.  This issue was addressed by contract 
prescriptions that the principal vary measures (and their targets) at nominated 
intervals.  The shortest interval was 12 months in The Alliance and the early 
alliances (in The Alliance the variations must be by agreement), and the longest 
interval was 4 or 5 years found in the Joint Venture.  The 4- or 5-year interval was 
determined by the duration of the price path set by the independent regulator for 
different services, providing clear but onerous outcomes in that the steward bears the 
risk for increases in costs such as labour, energy and chemicals.  The contractual 
provisions that allow for a 12-month adjustment or 4/ 5 year adjustment have nicely 
resolved the perennial contract law “…tension between the need to fix 
responsibilities at the outset [of the contract] and the need to readjust them over time 
permeates the long-term contractual relationship” (Baird, 1990, p. 586). 
This innovation within the long-term contract is highly important as 
traditionally long-term contracts have been characterised as adversarial (Walker & 
Hampson, 2003; Rahman & Kumaraswamy, 2004; Keast, Waterhouse, Brown, & 
Mandell, 2005) because of the incompleteness of the contract resulting from the 
difficulty of adequately specifying the outcomes many years beyond the time of 
executing the contract.  The examples offered by The Alliance and the Joint Venture 
will assist governments and others seeking to obtain services through long-term 
contracts to utilise the concept of regular adjustment and resetting of targets to bring 
certainty to the contract and reduce the risk to candidate agents. 
This intense measurement and frequent reporting from the steward to the 
principal could be perceived as Agency Theory controls reflecting a low trust 
environment (Muth & Donaldson, 1998) and an apprehension by the principal of 
opportunism on the part of the agent.  Yet there was a very high level of trust 
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extended by the principals in the three case studies where stewardship of the 
infrastructures was found.  In those case studies the agents were found to perceive 
the measurement and reporting as assisting them to act with a sense of responsibility 
because of the clarity brought to their role and expected outcomes.  No hint of a 
perception that the measurement and reporting constrained the stewards in acting 
with a sense of responsibility or achieving stewardship could be found.  Put in 
Agency Theory terms, there was no evidence that any party saw this intense 
measurement and frequent reporting as a control instituted by the principal because 
the steward was not to be trusted.  Thus the experience of the three case studies 
where sense of responsibility was found is best described as a variation of the 
Agency Theory model, where contractual compliance and tight control and 
monitoring is accompanied by the sharing of goals, and sense of responsibility (as 
discussed earlier in this chapter) is accompanied by trust. 
In summary, clarity of contractual outcomes was held by informants to 
contribute to sense of responsibility.  The clarity was created by the very high level 
of shared information and the related regular adjustment of performance targets, 
monthly reporting and incentive payments based on that reporting.  These incentive 
payments are discussed in the following section.  The sharing of information 
established information symmetry and all parties had sufficient information to carry 
out their roles.  The evidence showed that contractual relationships configured in 
accordance with Agency Theory prescriptions can achieve information symmetry.  
Indeed the information symmetry in the three case studies configured in accordance 
with Agency Theory where contractual compliance was found was accompanied by 
tight control and monitoring, and incentive payments based on regular adjustment of 
performance targets, intense measurement and frequent reporting from the agent. 
6.4.4 Incentives to private participants 
Incentives were seen by private company and government entity informants as 
being strong contributors to the agent acting with a sense of responsibility.  The 
operation of incentives is explained in the following sub-sections. 
6.4.4.1 Financial incentives 
Financial incentives were cited as a motivator of the agent in two of the four 
case studies and not all the case studies that achieved stewardship of the 
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infrastructure had a scheme of financial incentives in place.  For the informants 
financial incentives were payment arrangements in addition to, or in place of, 
conventional payment for services to the specified quality, quantity, timeliness etc., 
out of which a profit is made. 
Financial incentives were found to impact positively on sense of 
responsibility in The Alliance, where all five informants contended that financial 
incentives built around the O&M KPI targets and the capital works gain–share/pain–
share engendered a sense of responsibility to the government entity by continually 
focusing the attention of The Alliance upon the specific current interests of the 
government entity.  Very similar financial incentives were adopted by the early 
alliances government entity after it concluded that existing financial incentives led to 
the private companies acting in their own interests by their focusing on the KPIs for 
financial gain to the detriment of quality of customer service. 
A further form of financial incentive was found in the BOOT arrangements, 
where the private plant operators were at risk of a penalty on the water usage charge 
they made to the government entity; if the water they supplied was below the quality 
specified in the contract (Mumford, 1996).  Yet this penalty regime was not brought 
forward by the informants when questioned as to what impacted on sense of 
responsibility.  The production of safe drinking water was the dominant focus of the 
BOOT private operators and whilst the profitability of the overall charging regime 
may have been an underlying driver of the stewardship outcome it is clear that for the 
BOOTs sense of responsibility was not driven by financial incentives. 
Similarly in the Joint Venture there were no financial incentives in addition 
to the payments for the provision of the services to the specified targets.  Informants 
saw sense of responsibility as being created or harnessed from a range of factors such 
as ownership by the government entity, past employment by the predecessors of the 
government entity, and close alignment with the close-knit local community, but 
never suggested that the Joint Venture would be motivated by financial incentives.  
Yet sense of responsibility, and in turn stewardship of the infrastructure, were 
abundant. 
Such incentive payments are prescribed by Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) to reduce the self-interested behaviour of the agent 
and to minimise goal divergence.  The Joint Venture and BOOT forms of 
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privatisation achieved stewardship-like behaviours, for example acting in the 
interests of the principal, and the contractual relationship was configured in 
accordance with Agency Theory.  Neither case study utilised financial incentives 
such as were held by The Alliance informants to create sense of responsibility, 
suggesting that financial incentives in addition to conventional payment for services 
out of which a profit is made are not mandatory for the achievement of sense of 
responsibility but rather are a mechanism that may be adopted in concert with other 
mechanisms such as the adjustment of KPI targets.  An additional perspective is that 
collectively the evidence from the three case studies where sense of responsibility 
was evidenced is that the traditional Agency Theory extrinsic reward of profit or the 
performance-linked highly profitable incentives of The Alliance have a significant 
causal link to sense of responsibility. 
In summary, Agency Theory contractual relationships where the agent is a 
for-profit organisation can utilise financial incentives to achieve sense of 
responsibility which in turn leads to stewardship-like behaviour.  
6.4.4.2 Term of contract 
A longer-term contract was found to be very important to private informants 
and was recognised by some government entity informants as an incentive which 
was highly likely to lead to the agent acting with a sense of responsibility.  The terms 
of the contracts in the case studies were about 10 years, 20 years, 7 years and 25 
years, which were seen by the private companies and their shareholders as very 
attractive when compared with construction contracts which were typically 2 to 3 
years.  The longer term of water industry O&M contracts allowed the private 
companies to establish their operations and then progressively achieve efficiencies in 
subsequent years leading to a significant profit across the whole contract term.  The 
private companies could enter into longer-term contracts for the supply of materials 
and energy, and enter into longer-term bargaining agreements with unions and 
employees which facilitated the reduction and control of costs.  The contracts 
typically do have provision for extension and this was seen as an incentive for acting 
with a sense of responsibility and for high quality performance. 
Contract law faces the dilemma of, on the one hand, offering a means of 
commitment and, on the other, allowing for sufficient flexibility to adjust to changes 
in the environment.  Particularly with long-term contracts there is a need for the 
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contract to specify outcomes which are relevant at the time (any time during the term 
of the contract) for the purpose of holding all parties accountable and for focusing 
the parties upon what precisely has to be achieved.  “This tension between the need 
to fix responsibilities at the outset and the need to readjust them over time permeates 
the long-term contractual relationship”. (Baird, 1990, p. 586).  Whilst data as to the 
contract terms for the BOOTs was not made available, in the other case studies the 
contract provided for the adjustment of objectives and targets at specified intervals.  
The shortest interval between adjustments was 12 months in The Alliance and early 
alliance case studies, and the longest interval was 4 or 5 years found in the Joint 
Venture.  The 4 or 5 year interval was determined by the duration of the price path 
set by the independent regulator for different services, providing clear but onerous 
outcomes in that the steward bears the risk for increases in costs such as labour, 
energy and chemicals for up to 5 years.  The contractual provisions that allow for 
adjustment at intervals have nicely addressed the tension between the need to fix 
responsibilities at the commencement of the contract and the need for the parties to 
have certainty as to what exactly is required of them.  This certainty was held by the 
informants in The Alliance and the Joint Venture to strengthen the sense of 
responsibility. 
Whilst the term of the contract is listed here as it is an incentive to the agent 
to act with an ongoing sense of responsibility it was also found that the longer term 
retained the private participants into future years allowing for full accountability for 
earlier work that has subsequently failed.  This line of reasoning would suggest that 
the longer-term contract would allow both parties to benefit from investment now 
and in the future, be that in the quality of the infrastructure itself or in the quality of 
the relationship, one key aspect of which is the sense of responsibility of the agent.  
The next step then in this line of reasoning is that the term of the contract is a 
variable that should be considered as to its impact on sense of responsibility and in 
turn stewardship.  Van Slyke (2007, p. 164) summarised the overall proposition of 
Stewardship Theory as “…that long-term contractual relations are developed based 
on trust, reputation, collective goals, and involvement where alignment is an 
outcome that results from relational reciprocity”, then continued the theme of 
efficiencies for both parties because of less frequently going to market and also 
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reduced transaction costs because “…each party better understands the others’ 
motives, actions and signals” (Van Slyke, 2007, p. 165). 
The earlier work of Davis et al., (1997, p. 37) had viewed short-term 
contracts as characteristic of an Agency Theory management philosophy, usually 
associated with a control-oriented approach motivated to achieve short-term cost 
control and productivity increases.  Davis et al., (1997, p. 33) asserted that the 
control-oriented approach cannot be sustained in the long term and that an 
involvement-oriented management philosophy is more likely to be adopted if the 
longer term-view were taken, in turn being more likely to produce stewardship 
behaviour.  For that reason Davis et al., (1997) concluded “Clearly, the role of a 
long-term relationship is central to the choice [by the principal and the steward] of 
the stewardship role” (p. 37).  Yet the three case studies in which the agent acted 
with a sense of responsibility were found to be configured in accordance with 
Agency Theory prescriptions.  Accordingly, the findings from the case studies that 
longer-term relationships had a strong causal link to the agent acting with a sense of 
responsibility to the principal are valuable in that they demonstrate that contractual 
relationships configured in accordance with Agency Theory can achieve 
stewardship-like behaviours and stewardship of the infrastructure. 
In summary, the findings of the four water service case studies demonstrate 
that the Stewardship Theory tenet that the longer-term contractual relationships are 
more likely to lead to stewardship behaviour also operates within contractual 
relationships configured in accordance with Agency Theory. 
6.4.4.3 Additional work 
The prospect of additional work, either prescribed in the contract or not in 
the contract but gained from like water services by association with the government 
entity, was found to be a powerful motivation for the agent private companies to act 
with a sense of responsibility to the principal.  In The Alliance and the Joint Venture 
and in the single NG Alliance (which replaced the early alliances) the contract 
provided for additional work such as capital works at the discretion of the principal.  
In The Alliance the amount of such capital work was so significant that little work 
remained for further expansion.  Similarly in the Joint Venture the evidence was that 
the amount was unlikely to grow further.  In the BOOTs the work within the contract 
had remained limited to those three sites but the company which operated the two 
 Chapter 6: Discussion 237 
smaller plants was found to have other significant ongoing contracts with the 
government entity for other water services. 
In respect of the prospect of gaining work from like water services by 
association with the government entity it was found that the private participants 
perceived that acting with a sense of responsibility to their case study principal 
would establish a reputation that would be seen favourably by those like water 
services.  In The Alliance the contract went further, providing that the government 
entity and the two private companies could provide services to third parties such as 
other, smaller water services in the name of the government entity.  This is now a 
significant value of work and is prized by the civil engineering private participant 
which has expanded the usage of its propriety technology through this access to other 
water services. 
This availability of possible additional work as an incentive to companies to 
act with a sense of responsibility is consistent with the findings of Van Slyke (2007) 
that public managers used reputation enhancement as a reward (and sanction) for 
contracted not-for-profit organisations and used their knowledge of the reputation of 
existing providers as a decision heuristic for awarding further contracts. 
In summary, these incentives were integral to the achievement of sense of 
responsibility on the part of the private company agents.  The financial incentives 
when combined with clear contractual outcomes led to the agent pursuing the goals 
and objectives of the principal.  The relatively long term of the typical water services 
O&M contract was found to be a substantial incentive to the agent to continually act 
with a sense of responsibility to the principal.  Additional work from the principal 
was found to be a strong motivator to act with a sense of responsibility, as was the 
possibility of gaining work with similar government water entities because of the 
reputational enhancement that can be achieved through performing the current 
contract with a sense of responsibility. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis was triggered by evidence that some privatised critical 
infrastructures were failing to meet the needs of the public with the private 
companies acting with self-interest.  This thesis concluded that there was a strong 
possibility that self-interest on the part of the companies was caused by the 
contractual arrangement between the government entity and the private company 
being configured in accordance with Agency Theory prescriptions.  This thesis 
concluded that Stewardship Theory offered the potential to guide the configuration of 
contractual relationships which result in the private company agent acting as steward.  
However, certain aspects of Stewardship Theory and Agency Theory were 
underdeveloped, resulting in this thesis expanding the objective of this research to 
not only evaluate the potential of Stewardship Theory to guide the achievement of 
stewardship but also to further develop and clarify certain aspects of Agency and 
Stewardship theories. 
The research project has met those objectives, providing a significant 
contribution to Agency Theory and advancing the understanding of certain aspects of 
Stewardship Theory.  The literature regarding government as principal and private-
for-profit company as agent or steward has been extended.  The empirical data 
obtained through the multiple case study approach and analysed by cross-case 
comparison provided evidence of private companies achieving strong stewardship of 
critical infrastructures and generated the following key findings: 
 the alliance, joint venture and BOOT concession forms of contractual 
relationships achieved stewardship of the critical infrastructures, with the 
alliance form being particularly suited to O&M of urban water services; 
 Agency Theory assumptions of goal divergence, information asymmetry, 
the agent being risk averse and agency loss were found to be incorrect in 
the context of contemporary inter-organisational principal–agent 
relationships in the urban water industry; 
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 the behaviour of ‘acting in the interests’ as identified in the seminal work 
of Davis et al., (1997) is developed further, providing explication of the 
nature of that behaviour; 
 the behaviour of ‘acting in the interests’ was found, contrary to 
Stewardship Theory assertions, to be present in and supported by Agency 
Theory contractual relationships configured in accordance with the model 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) where the concept of goals being in conflict is relaxed. 
 the behaviour of modern private-for-profit organisations as steward is 
defined; 
 sense of responsibility to the principal was not found to distinguish a 
steward from an agent because no case study offered an example of a 
Stewardship Theory steward and three case studies provided examples of 
contractual relationships configured in accordance with Agency Theory 
accompanied by the agent having a strong sense of responsibility to the 
principal; and 
 Agency Theory contractual relationships promote and support the 
Stewardship Theory pro-stewardship attribute sense of responsibility 
through a range of factors; factors such as intense measurement, reporting 
and incentives as have been prescribed by Agency Theory, and other 
factors such as shared goals, long-term contracts and trust as have been 
asserted by Stewardship theorists to promote stewardship behaviour. 
This chapter proceeds on the following basis: those key findings and other 
findings that constitute an original contribution to knowledge are set out in greater 
detail first, then the limitations of the research are laid out, and finally the 
opportunities for further research are discussed. 
7.2 ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This thesis provides a contemporary view of the application of both Agency 
Theory and, to a lesser extent, Stewardship Theory in the context of inter-
organisational relationships.  The empirical data allowed this thesis to test several 
Agency Theory assumptions and tenets which were established in the mid-twentieth 
century and to develop and challenge several aspects of Stewardship Theory.  Those 
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findings, whilst having significant implications for theory, are also highly relevant to 
practice.  This section first reviews the implications for theory and then sets out the 
implications for practice. 
7.2.1 Implications for theory 
Both Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory proved to be well suited to the 
task of unpacking the behaviours in play within the case study contractual 
relationships.  The research has contributed to both Agency Theory and Stewardship 
Theory in a number of ways, each of which are explained, commencing with those 
regarding Agency Theory. 
Agency Theory assumptions of goal divergence, information asymmetry, the 
agent being risk averse and agency loss (the principal being able to carry out the task 
better than the agent) were found to be incorrect in the context of modern inter-
organisational principal–agent relationships in the urban water sector.  The case 
studies demonstrated that the typical Agency Theory assumption of goal conflict is 
incorrect.  Specifically, the Agency Theory model where goal conflict is a variable 
ranging through to shared goals developed by Eisenhardt (1989) was confirmed by 
case study examples. 
The Agency Theory assumption of information asymmetry favouring the agent 
was found not to be operating in any of the four case studies.  All case study 
contractual relationships achieved information symmetry.  The Agency Theory 
literature was extended by the finding that there was no causal link between 
information symmetry and stewardship of the infrastructure not being achieved.  The 
finding of Eisenhardt (1989) that information symmetry could contribute to the 
mitigation of the difference in goals in an Agency Theory relationship was 
confirmed. 
The knowledge as to the causal link between the configuration of the 
relationship and the achievement of information asymmetry was developed further.  
Information symmetry in all cases was supported by very specific contractual 
requirements as to the provision of information by both parties.  This demonstrated 
that in a relationship configured in accordance with Agency Theory information 
symmetry could be prescribed and achieved.  However, this thesis does not purport 
to generalise these findings to all Agency Theory relationships as the information 
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symmetry was accompanied by stewardship-like behaviours such as sharing goals 
and acting in the interests of the principal, such behaviours being contrary to the 
typical Agency Theory model and highly likely to support and engender information 
symmetry. 
The assumption of the agent being risk-averse (Davis et al., 1997; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) was found to be incorrect in the context of the agent being a for-
profit organisation.  The organisations as agents had contracted to accept risks that 
the principal was not prepared to accept.  This thesis has now extended the Agency 
Theory literature by demonstrating the conceptualisation of for-profit organisations 
as having an appetite for risk generated by their technical competency and financial 
backing.  This development of the Agency Theory literature will assist governments 
in understanding the opportunities as to the allocation of risk offered by the various 
forms of privatised contractual relationships when considering how to achieve the 
best possible stewardship of critical infrastructures. 
The agency loss assumption was found to be incorrect in all four water case 
studies.  In each case study the principal had conducted a considered risk process and 
a private company had been chosen to carry out the work because, by a comparison 
against the option of in-house service delivery, the agent had been judged to offer 
greater competency and efficiency.  Agency Theory was thus updated to reflect that 
in the circumstances where the agent is an organisation chosen for its capability it is 
highly unlikely that there is any agency loss. 
The knowledge as to the concept of ‘acting in the interests’ as identified in the 
seminal work of Davis et al., (1997) was developed further.  The evidence led to 
findings as to how that behaviour manifested itself in the relationships where 
stewardship of the infrastructure was achieved.  This expansion of the knowledge as 
to this behaviour was particularly important as stewardship of the infrastructure was 
achieved by contractual relationships configured in accordance with Agency Theory.  
The evidence was of a highly values-driven approach to the role of agent 
characterised by partnership, cooperation, coordination and collaboration, and 
evidence that goals and objectives were shared, providing a rich explication of the 
stewardship-like behaviour of the organisation as agent acting in the interests of the 
principal.  The conundrum is whether the knowledge of acting in the interests gained 
from Agency Theory relationships can be applied to Stewardship Theory 
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relationships.  This thesis posits that the knowledge of acting in the interests is fully 
transferable to a relationship configured in accordance with Stewardship Theory 
because the behaviour found in the Agency Theory case studies was similar to that 
conceptualised in Stewardship Theory literature and reported in related empirical 
studies (Van Slyke, 2007).  The findings are highly important as Agency Theory had 
previously characterised the agent as typically acting against the interests of the 
principal and Stewardship Theory literature to date (Davis et al., 1997) had not 
contemplated what constitutes the behaviour of the organisation as steward and the 
concept of acting in the interests had not been unpacked, nor explained. 
Applying the findings from the Agency Theory case studies, this better 
understanding and explanation of the behaviour that constitutes acting in the interests 
of the principal was then brought together to provide a definition of the behaviour of 
an organisation as steward of an infrastructure.  Having the concept of steward 
defined, at least in the context of an organisation as steward, fills the quite 
unexpected void caused by there being no definition of the individual or organisation 
as steward in the organisational literature. 
In addition, the coverage of Stewardship Theory knowledge is broadened by 
moving from the focus of previous research upon not-for-profit organisations to 
explore the behaviour of the for-profit organisation as steward, albeit that no case 
study was found to be configured in accordance with Stewardship Theory. 
This empirical research sought to test the strength of the causal link between 
the Stewardship Theory pro-stewardship factor sense of responsibility and 
stewardship behaviour because an examination of the literature (Davis et al., 1997; 
Hernandez, 2012; Van Slyke, 2007) suggested that, of the various pro-stewardship 
factors, sense of responsibility was likely to be important, if not essential, to 
stewardship being achieved.  The findings were complex.  The relationships in the 
three case studies where stewardship of the infrastructure was achieved were found 
to be configured in accordance with Agency Theory and provided evidence of a 
strong causal link between sense of responsibility and stewardship-like behaviour, 
leading to the conclusion that the attribute sense of responsibility was ‘highly 
important’ to stewardship-like behaviour. 
The complexity of the operation of sense of responsibility grew when the case 
studies revealed that sense of responsibility was found to be essential when taking a 
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perspective not previously taken in the Stewardship Theory literature: that of the 
principal.  The requirements of the principal first emerged from the findings in the 
case study where stewardship was not achieved, and sense of responsibility was not 
found — the early alliances.  The dissatisfied principal in the early alliances decided 
to replace the two management contracts with a single alliance, selecting against 
criteria which equated to sense of responsibility on the part of the new company 
being essential.  Examination of the findings from the other case studies revealed that 
for principals responsible for critical infrastructures sense of responsibility is 
essential.  As those remaining three case studies achieved sense of responsibility this 
thesis found a strong causal link between the principals’ requirement that there be 
sense of responsibility and there being stewardship-like behaviour.  As the 
perspective of the principal as to this attribute had not been addressed in the literature 
to date this thesis has expanded the knowledge of the importance of this attribute. 
The practice of selecting agents against the criteria of sense of responsibility 
was part of a larger body of evidence that led to the finding that sense of 
responsibility can be possessed by an individual or organisation well before they 
enter into a relationship.  Agency Theory had not contemplated the possibility of the 
agent acting with a sense of responsibility but rather had characterised the agent as 
requiring control and incentives to achieve contractual compliance.  The Stewardship 
Theory literature had paid limited attention to the attributes inherent within the 
steward but rather had focused on how responsibility is engendered within an 
established relationship (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012).  The focus by this 
thesis on the attributes which a candidate steward can bring to the contractual 
relationship extends the application of Agency Theory and sets a path for the 
development of the literature, including Stewardship Theory literature, which will 
benefit those seeking to apply the prescriptions of the theories in practice. 
The Stewardship Theory conceptualisation of sense of responsibility to the 
principal as an attribute internal to the individual, one which can be developed by 
intrinsic rewards such as trust (Dicke, 2002), was confirmed but also challenged by 
the finding that extrinsic rewards also engendered sense of responsibility.  Extrinsic 
rewards such as financial incentives (bonuses) in addition to the regular payments, 
which include an element of profit, additional work and long-term contracts, were 
found to engender sense of responsibility, which in turn led to stewardship-like 
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behaviour.  This finding was highly important as financial incentives had been held 
by Agency theorists (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) to modify behaviour to achieve 
contractual compliance but the nature of this changed behaviour had not been 
explained.  The water service case study findings clearly explicate the position of 
acting with a sense of responsibility as behaviour that can result from extrinsic 
rewards such as financial incentives. 
The Stewardship Theory tenet that stewardship behaviour, including sense of 
responsibility, could be engendered within a contractual relationship by structural 
and psychological attributes (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012) was supplemented 
by the finding that structural arrangements, extrinsic rewards and psychological 
attributes can also be applied within an Agency Theory relationship to achieve sense 
of responsibility of the agent.  These structural arrangements, for example the mixing 
of staff from each party to the contract, and the extrinsic rewards, for example 
incentive payments linked to achievement of KPI targets, will support the practical 
application of Agency Theory to maximise the sense of responsibility of the agent to 
the principal. 
The case studies revealed actions which increased or supported the sense of 
responsibility of the agent.  The discussion of all the findings as to the importance of 
sense of responsibility to the achievement of stewardship and how that attribute can 
be maximised has focused those findings into four groups: i.e. configuration of 
ownership and governance of the steward entity, ensuring suitable participants, clear 
contractual outcomes and incentives to private participants.  The utility of these 
findings to practitioners is discussed in the next section of this chapter.  The impact 
of this framework of actions or factors upon Agency Theory is highly likely to be 
significant in that such lists of practical information built on a foundation of theories 
are likely to encourage other scholars to conduct related research, building on a part 
or all of the findings from this thesis. 
This direction of this further development of both Agency and Stewardship 
theories runs contrary to the trend of the Stewardship Theory literature to 
characterise the two theories as opposed, or at the least as one being the counterpoint 
of the other and separate.  It may be the case that the research technique of 
contrasting the two theories (Davis et al., 1997; Van Slyke, 2007) across a range of 
dimensions has led to an unintended normative polarisation.  Certainly the findings 
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of this thesis were that the dimensions of the two theories were intertwined and 
characterised by much common ground, for example shared goals, and the agent or 
steward acting with a sense of responsibility to the principal.  The concept of there 
being common ground leads to the possibility that Stewardship Theory presents a 
‘special case’ of the Agency Theory model. 
This possibility was given life by Eisenhardt (1989) when she developed 
typical cases within the Agency Theory model where an individual tenet of Agency 
Theory, for example goal conflict, is relaxed.  This important area of characteristics, 
dimensions or features shared between the two policies is best addressed by future 
research.  Suffice to say at this stage that the one theory is a complement to the other 
and that the exploration of Stewardship Theory could not proceed without Agency 
Theory. 
7.2.2 Implications for practice 
The research reported in this thesis was carried out because of the significant 
disputation between parties and unsatisfactory outcomes for the public from some 
privatised critical infrastructures.  For those reasons the researcher was vigilant to 
ensure that the outputs from this research provide benefit to the community, 
particularly by being relevant to the needs of practitioners generally, and specifically 
government and industry who are responsible for achieving better stewardship of 
critical infrastructures.  The key areas where this thesis has identified implications 
for practice are: 
 the additional knowledge as to how each of the four typical forms of 
privatisation achieve stewardship (or otherwise) of critical infrastructures; 
 Agency Theory assumptions as to the behaviour within the contractual 
relationship have been updated in the context of contemporary 
government–private company inter-organisational relationships; 
 clear definition of the reasonable expectations as to the behaviour of an 
organisation that is a steward, in particular the concept of acting in the 
interests of the principal; 
 the identification of sense of responsibility as an attribute of an individual 
or organisation which is highly important, and possibly essential, to 
stewardship (like) behaviour; 
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 the provision of examples where principals consider sense of responsibility 
to be essential and have selected the agent against sense of responsibility 
criteria; and 
 creation of a list of actions or key issues that must be addressed by the 
principal to support an existing sense of responsibility or to promote such 
an attribute. 
How these contributions are relevant to practice is discussed in the remainder 
of this section. 
The alliance, joint venture and BOOT form of concession as forms of 
privatisation were found to be configured in accordance with Agency Theory and 
were characterised by stewardship-like behaviours such as the private company 
acting in the interests of the government entity, displaying a sense of responsibility to 
the principal and stewardship of the infrastructure being achieved in each case.  An 
additional attraction of the alliance and joint venture forms of privatisation was that 
stewardship of the infrastructure was achieved without ownership of that 
infrastructure passing to the private sector.  This feature of these forms of 
privatisation is highly relevant to governments who must meet the public’s 
expectation that the asset remain publicly owned yet gain the benefits of private 
sector efficiencies. 
Further findings of relevance to practitioners considering the alliance or joint 
venture forms of privatisation are in the areas of decision-making rules for 
governance boards, the application of the alliance and joint venture forms to O&M 
functions, and the perennial issue of the tension between long-term contracts and the 
progression through the contract term making the original specific outputs irrelevant. 
First, the decision-making rules adopted in the alliance and joint venture 
rejected the traditional hierarchical approach of the principal having the dominant 
power, but the extent differed.  In the alliance, decisions were to be ‘best for alliance’ 
and not to the benefit of any one party and decisions were to be unanimous.  In the 
joint venture there was a similar emphasis upon the decision being in the interests of 
the partnership but the chairman had a deciding vote in the event of there not being a 
majority vote. 
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Second, the use of the alliance and joint venture forms of contractual 
relationship in the infrastructure sector have largely been limited to the design and 
construction phases which are relatively short-term and have been little used in the 
O&M phase.  The alliance and joint venture provided examples of how those forms 
can be successfully applied to achieve stewardship, thus expanding the literature on 
this subject.  Third, long-term contracts are characterised by the tension (Baird, 
1990) between the need to fix outcomes and outputs at the outset and the need to 
readjust them over time; this has been addressed in the joint venture and the alliance, 
with differing degrees of elegance.  The joint venture provided an example of the 
adjustment of payments and KPI targets for each service at the same time as the 
independent regulator set the price path for customer charges; that is, four or five 
years.  The alliance demonstrated a mechanism comprised of annual adjustment to 
KPI targets and rebalancing of emphasis upon targets which linked directly to bonus 
payments paid quarterly.  This annual adjustment in the alliance was found to be 
highly effective in establishing shared goals and engendering a sense of 
responsibility on the part of the companies; however, the joint venture adjustment at 
four or five years was criticised by the joint venture as requiring the joint venture to 
bear an uncomfortably high risk of input cost increases. 
These findings as to decision-making rules, the extension of the alliance and 
joint venture forms regarding the O&M of critical infrastructures and the resolution 
of the issue of long-term contracts requiring the readjustment of targets over time 
better inform those considering the options as to ownership and governance of 
privatised infrastructures. 
The consideration of those options will be influenced by the assumed likely 
behaviour of the parties and this thesis has clarified (and found to be incorrect) the 
prevailing Agency Theory assumptions which this thesis concluded may have been 
limiting the outcomes for existing contractual relationships for privatised critical 
infrastructure.  This thesis found that Agency Theory assumptions of information 
asymmetry, agents being risk averse, and agency loss were incorrect.  The normative 
Agency Theory assumption that the goals of the principal and agent diverge or 
indeed conflict was found to be incorrect, with the findings being that the model of 
the Agency Theory relationship where the goals might be aligned or indeed shared 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) was in operation.  In the context of modern inter-organisational 
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relationships the attainment of information symmetry, the situation where all parties 
to the contract have sufficient information to carry out their roles efficiently, is 
highly important to all parties as the inefficiency of additional controls or distrust 
caused by an information disadvantage is removed and the parties are able to focus 
on the shared goals.  A further example of the benefit of applying the case study 
knowledge as to Agency Theory assumptions is the finding that agents which are 
large specialist organisations are not risk averse as asserted by Agency theorists 
(Davis et al., 1997; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Armed now with this knowledge of 
risk appetite this thesis has now extended the Agency Theory literature by 
demonstrating that for-profit organisations have a distinct appetite for risk generated 
by their technical competency and financial backing.  The more significant extension 
of the application of Agency Theory in the practical context is that the agent has 
accepted risk whilst providing stewardship of the critical infrastructure.  This is 
highly important as the findings demonstrate to principals that the allocation of risk 
to the agent does not prohibit the achievement of stewardship. 
Whilst many authors extol others to act as stewards or bestow upon themselves 
the role of steward the term steward has seldom been defined, leaving many unsure 
as to what is meant.  This thesis has explicated the meaning of ‘acting in the 
interests’ and built a definition of the reasonable expectations as to the behaviour of 
an organisation that is a steward.  That clear definition will allow parties to better 
define contractual terms and to communicate between organisations and their staff 
the concept and responsibilities of the steward. 
Having set the expectation of a private company as steward of the 
infrastructure the government entity is faced with selecting between companies and 
ensuring that the candidate selected can achieve stewardship.  This thesis found that 
the sense of responsibility attribute is highly important to — possibly essential to — 
stewardship being achieved.  This thesis confirms the Stewardship Theory tenet that 
sense of responsibility can be engendered within the relationship and also found that 
sense of responsibility is an attribute that the organisation or individual can bring to 
the contractual relationship.  This is important as principals can select against sense 
of responsibility criteria.  This approach was reinforced by the empirical research 
finding that for all principals in the critical infrastructure case studies sense of 
responsibility was essential. 
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As this thesis has established sense of responsibility as being ‘highly 
important’ to stewardship it follows then that those practitioners responsible for the 
configuration and operation of contractual relationships for privatisation will want to 
know what actions they should take, or issues they should anticipate, to ensure sense 
of responsibility is maximised.  This thesis has assembled the findings under a 
framework that directs the user to key topics, for example suitability of government 
and private participants, and incentives to private participants.  This framework will 
allow the practitioner ready access to a particular area of knowledge which includes 
not only the description of the action or issue, for example the mixing of staff from 
the participant organisations, but also provides description and analysis of the 
operation of these arrangements in the specific case studies.  This framework of 
actions and issues offers the prospect of further benefit if further scholarly work was 
carried out to develop a handbook for use by the broad group of practitioners. 
Put simply, having regard to these aspects of the research findings, and the 
objective of this research of informing the configuration of relationships to achieve 
better stewardship, Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory are concluded to offer a 
very strong framework on which a government entity can construct a relationship 
with private sector providers to achieve stewardship of critical infrastructures. 
7.3 LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
The limitations of this research derive from the research design and from the 
data and findings built on that data.  The discussion of the limitations of the research 
methodology is set out in Section 4.3.4 Limitations of the methodology and covered 
two key areas, namely the relative reliability of the research methods chosen and the 
generalisability of findings attributable to the form of privatisation, having regard to 
there being only one example of a form of privatisation in each of the case studies 
chosen.  The apprehended issues that had the potential to limit the reliability of the 
research methods were addressed by building into the research design a number of 
techniques and controls.  However, the major limitation which remained was the 
reliance upon a single (unaided) researcher for the conduct of the interviews and the 
treatment of data and analysis of findings.  The potential for bias in the conduct of 
the interviews and interpretation of data were addressed by controls, but the 
limitation in the design remained and flowed on to become a limitation upon the 
findings.  This thesis acknowledges that the findings and conclusions of this research 
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should not be taken to have greater reliability than should be given to the work of a 
single researcher. 
The reliance upon four case study water systems and the selection of case 
studies representing four different forms of privatisation provided a rich range of 
typical forms of privatisation but in doing so limited the capacity for generalisability 
of findings based on the form of privatisation.  In that way the original aspiration for 
this research for learnings which could be applied to all critical infrastructures cannot 
be met.  However, the performance of an individual form of privatisation, for 
example an alliance, as to stewardship is but one aspect of the research and the 
finding of stewardship by a particular form of privatisation at least points theorists 
and practitioners in the direction of a possible causal link.  Notwithstanding this 
limitation, the findings had significant commonality across cases studies allowing the 
research to reach sound findings as to the major foci of the research, namely 
stewardship and sense of responsibility. 
In respect of any limitation emanating from the data the researcher had 
concerns that the interviews of two informants from one private company was taking 
‘a snapshot in time’ but at that time the government’s decision to not further extend 
the contract with the two companies and their company’s decision to not compete for 
the re-tendered work may have resulted in those informants putting perspectives 
which represented their immediate reality as individuals but which was not 
representative of their companies past longer-term relationship with the government 
entity.  This potential limitation was addressed in the original design, for example 
designing in the opportunity for triangulation with archival sources, informants from 
the second private company and from the government entity informants.  In addition, 
where the researcher’s scepticism could not be satisfied the researcher was 
circumspect as to the validity of the evidence from the two informants. 
A regrettable limitation within the findings came from the full importance of 
sense of responsibility to the concept of stewardship not emerging until the cross-
case analysis of the case study findings.  The research design followed the path of the 
literature and approached sense of responsibility as being a factor which impacted 
stewardship, and sought to gather data to develop that thread seeking out data on the 
behaviour and attributes of the agent/stewards.  What became apparent after analysis 
of the findings was that the entity (the principal) responsible for the critical 
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infrastructure had an independent perspective as to the importance of sense of 
responsibility, driven principally by the criticality of the water services.  The findings 
were thus limited in two areas.  The first was that the exploration of the causal link 
between the agent displaying a sense of responsibility and stewardship of the system 
could have been aided by the gathering of data in the interview as to the 
repercussions if the agent did not display a sense of responsibility.  The second was 
that gathering of data from the government entity decision-makers, for example chair 
and board of directors, as to their perspective on the twin issues of the importance of 
sense of responsibility and the agent not acting with a sense of responsibility had not 
taken place.  Given such additional evidence is not available the findings of this 
research have been set in a cautious manner, determining the causal link to be only 
‘highly important’. 
An intentional boundary of this research was the adoption of the relationship 
between organisations as the unit of analysis.  This approach, of necessity, took the 
focus of this research away from the behaviour of the individual, an area upon which 
most of the Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory literatures had concentrated.  
Whilst there is no limitation inherent in this research it is acknowledged that this 
research gathered some findings as to the impact of the motivations and behaviours 
of individuals which contributed to the behaviour of their own organisation or the 
organisation which they interfaced.  Research utilising the individual as the unit of 
analysis would complement the findings of this research and this opportunity is 
discussed in further detail in the next section. 
7.4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Throughout this thesis the findings have revealed areas where future research 
would assist in a better understanding of the actual practice of or an aspect of a 
particular theory.  Applying the criteria of providing benefit to the community from 
future research, five areas arose: 
 the stewardship behaviours of both the organisation and its member staff; 
 the importance of sense of responsibility on the part of the agent from the 
perspective of the governing body of the entity responsible for the critical 
infrastructure and whether that importance varies having regard to the 
criticality (or not) of the contractual outcome; 
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 whether sense of responsibility is essential in a causal link sense; 
 development of a practitioners’ handbook of actions and issues which 
increase the sense of responsibility of the steward organisation; and 
 empirical research into the stewardship achievements of the alliance form 
of privatisation across a larger sample of critical infrastructure 
privatisations. 
This research adopted the inter-organisational relationship as the unit of 
analysis yet the findings showed that the motivations, capability and behaviours of 
the individual contributed to the stewardship-like behaviour (or otherwise) of their 
organisation or the organisation with which they interfaced.  Examples are the 
dedication to the provision of water services, the capability to effectively work 
within the particular form of contractual relationship, and collectivist rather than 
individualistic behaviours (Davies et al., 1997).  Research utilising the individual as 
the unit of analysis would complement the findings of this inter-organisational 
relationship research by providing knowledge as to the characteristics of the 
individual who might most effectively work within a particular contractual 
relationship, for example an alliance. 
Having established the preeminent position of sense of responsibility as being 
highly important, and possibly essential, to the achievement of stewardship, and 
having found that for principals in the urban water services industry sense of 
responsibility is essential, this thesis has opened up many questions as to the 
operation of sense of responsibility.  The finding that sense of responsibility was 
seen as essential by the principals challenged the finding that from a causal link 
perspective sense of responsibility was highly important to stewardship.  There was 
insufficient evidence gathered from the case studies to support a reliable finding that 
sense of responsibility was essential.  However, a reasoned argument was built that 
stewardship could not be achieved if a steward did not display a sense of 
responsibility.  As a conclusive answer as to whether sense of responsibility is 
essential would assist in the focus upon this attribute and in turn upon achieving 
stewardship it is appropriate that further research on this issue be carried out. 
Returning to the finding that for principals in the urban water services industry 
sense of responsibility is essential, it is important to understand whether all principals 
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consider the attribute to be essential or whether this perspective does not extend 
beyond the industry or is dependent upon a variable such as the criticality of the 
output, for example safe drinking water or safe rail travel.  Further research in this 
area would assist by bringing focus upon the sense of responsibility attribute, and if 
found to be essential in a particular industry then organisations and individuals can 
be selected against that criteria and held accountable against that criteria. 
In assembling and analysing all the actions and issues which impact sense of 
responsibility this thesis has established a framework of information which will be 
invaluable to the broader group of practitioners responsible for configuring the 
privatised arrangements or indeed achieving stewardship of the critical infrastructure.  
This thesis has assembled the findings under a framework that directs the user to key 
topics, for example suitability of government and private participants, and incentives 
to private participants.  This framework will allow the practitioner ready access to a 
particular area of knowledge which includes not only the description of the action or 
issue, for example the mixing of staff from the participant organisations, but also 
provides description and analysis of the operation of these arrangements in the 
specific case studies.  This thesis did not purport to assemble all the available 
relevant information as to the topic, but rather focused only on the findings emerging 
from the case studies.  Future scholarly activity could build on the framework of 
actions and issues established by this thesis and provide a handbook which by its 
advancement of knowledge would lead to better stewardship of critical 
infrastructures. 
The alliance form of privatisation was found to be highly effective in achieving 
stewardship of the critical water system infrastructure.  The NG Alliance in Case 
Study C, which commenced operation in 2011 adopted many of the features of the 
Case Study A alliance and indeed many of the features adopted are those 
acknowledged in the literature regarding typical alliances (Davies, 2008).  However, 
the government entity in the NG Alliance did not adopt all the features of the Case 
Study A alliance, specifically not making available to its private participant the 
possibility of significant capital work and not adopting the same KPI target and 
related financial incentive scheme.  The government entity must have made an 
intentional decision to not introduce this incentive.  Thus, these two similar but 
different examples of the alliance form of contractual relationship, both delivering an 
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identical output within near identical regulatory regimes, offer a rich opportunity for 
future research by scholars seeking to understand the nuances of the alliance model.  
Additional alliance privatisations drawn from other critical infrastructure sectors 
would increase the sample and support wider generalisability of the findings, and the 
possibility of understanding the impact of variables prominent in the urban water 
industry such as the long term of the contract and water industry staff working in the 
industry for extended periods of time. 
This research has been worthwhile if only for the exploration of case studies 
which demonstrate that organisations inter-relate in much more positive ways than 
are advocated in normative Agency Theory.  Yet this thesis offers much more.  The 
endorsement of models within Agency Theory and the principles advocated in 
Stewardship Theory as being highly suitable to provide conceptualisations of 
relationships which can deliver a better stewardship outcome are major achievements 
and the identification of the pivotal importance of sense of responsibility points 
practitioners and scholars towards greater focus on this attribute. 
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Appendix A 
Interview Protocols: 
Applying Stewardship Theory to Produce Better Stewardship of 
Privatised Water Infrastructure 
David Mills 
23 March 2011 
Critical infrastructures throughout Australia are increasingly being operated by 
private companies with mixed results.  Some operate to an evolving standard that 
satisfies the public.  Others do not satisfy the public.  This research seeks to 
understand whether particular factors within the relationship between the company 
and government entity account for the favourable or unfavourable outcome from the 
relationship. 
Specifically the purpose of this interview is to obtain a better understanding of 
the relationship between Water Systems Manager (WSM) INSERT NAME and 
government entity INSERT NAME and of whether WSM INSERT NAME acts as a 
steward for the INSERT NAME water system/water treatment plant/water storage 
facility.  I will ask you a series of questions relating to the relationship with ABC and 
the decisions and interventions which contribute to the relationship. 
Consent Form 
Discussion and signature of Consent Form 
Interview Details:  
Interview Date:  ..............................................................................................................  
Interview Time:  .............................................................................................................  
Location:  .......................................................................................................................  
Interviewee Details 
Interviewee:  ...................................................................................................................  
Organization:  .................................................................................................................  
 
 268 Appendix A 
QUESTIONS 
Preamble: 
The purpose of this research is to obtain information as to your experience of the 
performance of Water Systems Manager (WSM) INSERT NAME.  The research will 
seek to identify performance which goes beyond mere compliance with contractual 
terms. 
1.1 Tell me an example of a time when WSM acted in the principal’s (insert 
name of government or community) benefit. 
 Is this typical of how WSM behaves toward the government or community? 
 Has WSM ever acted against the interests of the government or community? 
 Can you tell me about a time WSM acted in the government or community’s 
benefit, even when it may have had a negative or detrimental effect for them? 
1.2 Whose role is it to initiate improvements to the water management system? 
1.3 What do you understand to be WSM’s role in the provision of drinking 
water?  If the drinking water provided was found to be contaminated who 
would you consider to be responsible? 
1.4 Are there any examples of any extraordinary events where WSM took the 
initiative and “went the extra mile”? 
1.5 If WSM had to choose between cost and protecting your organisation, what 
choice do you think WSM would make? 
 
Topic 2 – Sense of responsibility 
2.1 Do you believe WSM carry out agreed work on the agreed terms? 
2.2 What are the usual positions you observe taken by Water Systems Manager 
(WSM) INSERT NAME and government entity INSERT NAME in respect of 
a problem with the quality of the work done? 
2.3 Please give us your observations as to what Water Systems Manager (WSM) 
INSERT NAME and government entity INSERT NAME each understand they 
are responsible for? 
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2.4 Who do you observe WSM INSERT NAME is accountable to?  To whom 
WSM INSERT NAME are the individual executives of WSM INSERT NAME 
responsible?  Who legally?  Who in practice? 
2.5 What is the boundary between what WSM INSERT NAME should do in its 
role of water systems manager and what is not its role? 
2.6 What is the one thing that WSM INSERT NAME has done for the government 
or community which you think it has done really well? 
2.7 What do you think contributes to the way in which WSM INSERT NAME 
acts? 
 
Topic 3 – Decisions and interventions which support or prohibit sense of 
responsibility 
3.1 If WSM has shown sense of responsibility what do you think contributes to this 
attitude  of WSM? 
3.2 What do you observe government organisation INSERT NAME do to build 
that attitude? 
3.3 Tell me what government organisation INSERT NAME does to improve the 
relationship between the two organisations? 
3.4 Tell me about an example of: 
 shared decision-making; 
 interaction and communication;  
 opportunities for growth of size and reputation of WSM. 
 
Interview Close 
Thank you for your time.  From this interview and other similar interviews I 
will be able to identify themes around factors which impact upon the outcome from 
the relationship between the parties that manage privatised critical infrastructures. 
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I have developed a mailing list of interviewees like yourself and will send you 
the summarised findings when the research reaches that stage. 
 
